Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2012

The Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law: National
Treatment
Gene M. Grossman
Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
grossman@princeton.edu

Henrik Horn
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), henrik.horn@ifn.se

Petros C. Mavroidis
Columbia Law School, petros.mavroidis@unine.ch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the International Trade Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Gene M. Grossman, Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, The Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade
Law: National Treatment, RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN WORKING PAPER NO. 917 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2381

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

IFN Working Paper No. 917, 2012

The Legal and Economic Principles
of World Trade Law: National Treatment
Gene M. Grossman, Henrik Horn and
Petros C. Mavroidis

Research Institute of Industrial Economics
P.O. Box 55665
SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
info@ifn.se
www.ifn.se

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094286

LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
OF WORLD TRADE LAW:
NATIONAL TREATMENT
by

Gene M. Grossman
Princeton University
Henrik Horn
Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Petros C. Mavroidis
Columbia Law School and University of Neuchatel

April 28, 2012

This study is written for the American Law Institute project Legal and Economic Principles
of World Trade Law. It builds on joint work, and many discussions, with Kyle Bagwell and
Robert W. Staiger. We are also grateful for very helpful comments on previous drafts from
Bill Davey, Rob Howse, Michael Trebilcock, Michael Traynor, Evan Wallach, other Advisers
to the project participating in presentations of the study, the ALI Council, and participants in
a seminar at the Tilburg Law and Economics Center, Tilburg University. We are extremely
grateful for financial support from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Research
Foundation, Svenska Handelsbanken, Stockholm, and from the Milton and Miriam Handler
Foundation, USA.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094286

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 The Text of Art. III GATT ......................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Art. III GATT 1947, Art. III GATT 1994 .................................................................................. 8
2 The Rationale for NT ................................................................................................................. 10
2.1 The Rationale for NT in Negotiating History ...................................................................... 10
2.1.1 The Forum and Context of Negotiation ....................................................................... 11
2.1.2 The Transformation of NT.............................................................................................. 13
2.1.3 Summarizing the Negotiating Record .......................................................................... 24
2.2 The Rationale for NT in Case Law ........................................................................................ 25
2.3 The Rationale for NT from the Perspective of Economics……………………………….26
2.3.1 The Purpose and Structure of Trade Agreements…………………………………..27
2.3.2 The Role of NT: to Filter Out Protectionist Policies…………………………………33
2.3.3 An Alternative View of the Role of Trade Agreements…………………………….39
2.3.4 Summary of the Rationale of NT from an Economic Perspective…………………40
3
The Implementation of NT in Case Law................................................................................ 40
3.1 The Case Law Regarding Art. III GATT............................................................................... 40
3.2 The Legal Discipline ................................................................................................................ 42
3.2.1 Which Measures Come Under the Scope of NT? ........................................................ 43
3.2.2 The Right to Regulate...................................................................................................... 45
3.2.3 Fiscal Measures ................................................................................................................ 46
3.2.4 Nonfiscal Instruments ..................................................................................................... 69
3.2.5 Allocation of the Burden of Proof ................................................................................. 85
3.3 Exceptions to NT...................................................................................................................... 91
3.3.1 Art. IV GATT: Film .......................................................................................................... 91
3.3.2 Art. XX GATT: General Exceptions............................................................................... 91
3.3.3 Art. XXI GATT: Security Exception .............................................................................. 92
3.4 Critique of the Case Law ........................................................................................................ 92
3.5 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................. 101
4 How Should NT Be Interpreted? ........................................................................................... 102
4.1 Two Approaches to Evaluate Protection ............................................................................ 104
4.1.1 Interpretation XX ........................................................................................................... 106
4.1.2 Interpretation III ............................................................................................................ 109
4.2 The Difference in Outcome with the Two Approaches ................................................... 116
4.2.1 Interpretation XX Imposes Additional Restrictions for Measures Not to
Constitute Illegal Protection..................................................................................................... 117
4.2.2 The Evidentiary Burden Falls Heavier on the Complainant with Interpretation
XX…...…………………………………………………………………………………...118
1

4.2.3 The Nature of Measures That Are Market‐Like But Not Policy‐Like .................... 118
4.3 Which Interpretation Is Preferable? .................................................................................... 120
4.3.1 The List of Permissible Objectives in Art. XX GATT ................................................ 121
4.3.2 The Additional Requirements Imposed by Art. XX GATT ..................................... 123
4.3.3 The Allocation of the Burden of Proof ........................................................................ 125
4.3.4 Consequences for Trade Liberalization ...................................................................... 126
4.3.5 Concluding Discussion ................................................................................................. 128
4.4 Further Remarks on Interpretation III ................................................................................ 130
4.4.1 The Relevance of Art. III.1 GATT ................................................................................ 130
4.4.2 The Relative Facility to Find Grounds for Complaints ............................................ 131
4.4.3 Why Not Only Policy Likeness, Why Also Market Likeness? ................................ 132
4.4.4 The Relationship Between Like and DCS Products.................................................. 132
4.4.5 GATT Does Not Request Full International Efficiency ............................................ 133
4.4.6 Can a Measure That Violates Art. III GATT Be Justified Through Recourse to
Art. XX GATT? ............................................................................................................... 134
4.4.7 On Evaluating Market Likeness and Protection ....................................................... 135
4.4.8 Intent Versus Effect ....................................................................................................... 137
4.4.9 The Aims and Effect Test .............................................................................................. 138
4.4.10 Taxation Based on Features of the Production Process (PPMs).............................. 140
4.5 Revisiting the Leading Cases in Light of Our Proposals ................................................. 142
4.5.1 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II..................................................................................... 143
4.5.2 Korea – Alcoholic Beverages ........................................................................................ 144
4.5.3 Chile – Alcoholic Beverages ......................................................................................... 145
4.5.4 Concluding Remarks on the Revisit to the Leading Cases ...................................... 146
5 Principles .................................................................................................................................... 146
APPENDIX: NT Disputes Adjudicated Under the GATT and the WTO……..……............148
References...…………………………………………………………………………………...........165

2

Introduction
The purpose of the study is to propose interpretations of the National Treatment (NT)
provision included in Art. III GATT, unbound by case‐law interpretations of this provision.
To make such proposals, we need to understand the role of the provision in the agreement.
To this end, we first examine in Chapter 2 the negotiating record relevant to the rationale for
the enactment of this provision, as well as the manner in which case law has understood it.
In the same Chapter, we also discuss the role of NT in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) from the perspective of economic theory. Having established the purpose of
NT, we discuss in Chapter 3 the manner in which this provision has been implemented in
case law: that is, here we focus on the understanding of the key terms implementing the
purpose of NT by GATT and World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudicating bodies. At the
end of this Chapter we provide a critical assessment of the case law. In light of our
dissatisfaction with the case‐law interpretations of some key terms, we present in Chapter 4
our preferred interpretation of NT.
The main findings of this study could be summarized as follows: we believe that case law,
economic theory, and the negotiating record point in the same direction concerning the
purpose of the provision: NT is meant to outlaw protectionist use of domestic instruments. It
is often unclear whether case‐law interpretations of the key terms of this provision promote,
if at all, the purpose of the provision. This seems to be largely explained by the absence of a
coherent methodology, based both on legal and economic thinking. This is the gap that this
study aims to fill.
The reason for relying on legal analysis for an evaluation of a provision of the GATT needs
no motivation in this context. But why also base the study in economics? There are several
reasons why the working and appropriate design of Art. III GATT cannot be adequately
addressed without economic analysis.1
A first reason derives from the fact that in order to determine how Art. III GATT should be
interpreted (and possibly redrafted), it is crucial to take into consideration the rationale for
the provision, and hence also the rationale for the agreement as a whole. We will discuss
below the possible purpose of the agreement in much more detail, let us here just quote the
preamble to the GATT:2

1

Note the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions.

2

The preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization goes a step further, adding
objectives related to the environment and sustainable development:

3

…Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production
and exchange of goods . . . .3

The stated purposes of the GATT are thus all of inherently economic nature.
A second reason why economic analysis is needed as part of the evaluation is the fact that the
extent to which the agreement achieves these policy objectives depends on how the
regulations it imposes affect the working of markets. This interaction is of course an
intrinsically economic issue.
Hence, the objectives of the GATT and the mechanisms through which the regulation it
imposes achieve these objectives, are of inherent economic nature. An analysis of Art. III
GATT that relied solely on a traditional legal (i.e., legalistic) perspective would not
adequately reflect the importance and the meaning of the objectives. Economic analysis is
thus an essential component when examining the question of how Art. III GATT should be
interpreted.
How this should be done is far from being obvious: economic theory rarely provides
concrete guidance for the design of regulations. In the case of Art. III GATT, matters are
worse, since there is hardly any economic research on the appropriate design of a NT‐
provision. Also, to the extent that theory does provide suggestions for the treatment of
domestic instruments in a trade agreement, the suggested treatment has very little
resemblance to the structure of Art. III GATT, and it is therefore difficult to draw any

Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the
worldʹs resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development, . . .
One should not neglect that according to Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
recourse to the object and purpose of a treaty is compulsory, leaving the interpreter with no discretion as to its
relevance.
3
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concrete inferences. Consequently, we are forced to rely on our subjective judgment when
drawing on economic theory for the interpretation of Art. III GATT.
In this Chapter, we concentrate on the study of Art. III.2 GATT dealing with fiscal
instruments.

1.1 The Text of Art. III GATT
The full text of Art. III GATT and its Interpretative Notes are reproduced here:

Article III*
National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts
or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production.*
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes
or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly,
to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply
internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.*
3. With respect to any existing internal tax which is inconsistent with the provisions of
paragraph 2, but which is specifically authorized under a trade agreement, in force on
April 10, l947, in which the import duty on the taxed product is bound against
increase, the contracting party imposing the tax shall be free to postpone the
application of the provisions of paragraph 2 to such tax until such time as it can obtain
release from the obligations of such trade agreement in order to permit the increase of
such duty to the extent necessary to compensate for the elimination of the protective
element of the tax.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application
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of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the
product.
5. No contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation
relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or
proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or
proportion of any product which is the subject of the regulation must be supplied
from domestic sources. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal
quantitative regulations in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph
1.*
6. The provisions of paragraph 5 shall not apply to any internal quantitative regulation
in force in the territory of any contracting party on July 1, 1939, April 10, 1947, or
March 24, l948, at the option of that contracting party; Provided that any such
regulation which is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 5 shall not be modified to
the detriment of imports and shall be treated as a customs duty for the purpose of
negotiation.
7. No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of
products in specified amounts or proportions shall be applied in such a manner as to
allocate any such amount or proportion among external sources of supply.
8. (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to
use in the production of goods for commercial sale.
(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies
exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived
from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions
of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic
products.
9. The contracting parties recognize that internal maximum price control measures,
even though conforming to the other provisions of this Article, can have effects
prejudicial to the interests of contracting parties supplying imported products.
Accordingly, contracting parties applying such measures shall take account of the
interests of exporting contracting parties with a view to avoiding to the fullest
practicable extent such prejudicial effects.
10. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any contracting party from
establishing or maintaining internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed
cinematograph films and meeting the requirements of Article IV.

6

To this there are the following ad notes.
Ad Article III
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement of the
kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and to the like
domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at
the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or
other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in
paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III.

Ad Paragraph 1
The application of paragraph 1 to internal taxes imposed by local governments and
authorities with the territory of a contracting party is subject to the provisions of the
final paragraph of Article XXIV. The term ʺreasonable measuresʺ in the last‐mentioned
paragraph would not require, for example, the repeal of existing national legislation
authorizing local governments to impose internal taxes which, although technically
inconsistent with the letter of Article III, are not in fact inconsistent with its spirit, if
such repeal would result in a serious financial hardship for the local governments or
authorities concerned. With regard to taxation by local governments or authorities
which is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of Article III, the term ʺreasonable
measuresʺ would permit a contracting party to eliminate the inconsistent taxation
gradually over a transition period, if abrupt action would create serious
administrative and financial difficulties.

Ad Paragraph 2
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be
considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases
where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on
the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not
similarly taxed.

Ad Paragraph 5
Regulations consistent with the provisions of the first sentence of paragraph 5 shall
not be considered to be contrary to the provisions of the second sentence in any case in

7

which all of the products subject to the regulations are produced domestically in
substantial quantities. A regulation cannot be justified as being consistent with the
provisions of the second sentence on the ground that the proportion or amount
allocated to each of the products which are the subject of the regulation constitutes an
equitable relationship between imported and domestic products.

1.2 Art. III GATT 1947, Art. III GATT 1994
The text reproduced above is from the GATT 1947, that is, the original GATT. The GATT
1994 is not the same agreement that was signed in 1947. The latter was substantially
modified through the negotiations during the Uruguay Round during which it was agreed to
add to the original text all decisions adopted by the GATT contracting parties since 1947. So,
although the original text has not been modified, some GATT practice has been incorporated
into the text of the GATT as a result of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. WTO
Members are nowadays bound by the GATT 1994 which comprises the following elements:
(a) the provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated
30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second
Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment (excluding the Protocol of Provisional Application), as rectified,
amended or modified by the terms of legal instruments which have entered into force
before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement;
(b) the provisions of the legal instruments set forth below that have entered into force
under the GATT 1947 before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement:
(i) protocols and certifications relating to tariff concessions;
(ii) protocols of accession (excluding the provisions (a) concerning provisional
application and withdrawal of provisional application and (b) providing that
Part II of GATT 1947 shall be applied provisionally to the fullest extent not
inconsistent with legislation existing on the date of the Protocol);
(iii) decisions on waivers granted under Article XXV of GATT 1947 and still in
force on the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement4;

The waivers covered by this provision are listed in footnote 7 on pages 11 and 12 in Part II of document
MTN/FA of 15 December 1993 and in MTN/FA/Corr.6 of 21 March 1994. The Ministerial Conference shall
establish at its first session a revised list of waivers covered by this provision that adds any waivers granted
under GATT 1947 after 15 December 1993 and before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and
deletes the waivers which will have expired by that time.
4
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(iv) other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947;
(c) the Understandings set forth below:
(i) Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994;
(ii) Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994;
(iii) Understanding on Balance‐of‐Payments Provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994;
(iv) Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994;
(v) Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994;
(vi) Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; and
(d) the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994.

The term “other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947” featured in Art.
1(b)(iv) GATT 1994 is relevant for the purpose of our exercise: depending on its purview, the
substantive content of Art. III GATT 1947 might have been modified. The term has been the
subject matter of adjudication. As will be explained infra, GATT/WTO dispute‐settlement
reports do not come under the term “other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
GATT 1947,” but the Working Party report on Border Tax Adjustments, which relates to the
coverage of Art. III GATT, should be understood as an “other decision.”

9

2 The Rationale for NT
In this Chapter we will seek to highlight the purpose of NT from three different angles: the
negotiating record, the case law, and economic theory.

2.1 The Rationale for NT in Negotiating History
This Section discusses the negotiating record of Art. III GATT in order to unveil the purpose
of the provision as perceived by its drafters, and thus the spirit behind the terms it contains.5
As will be made clear, the words chosen to express the NT discipline are often wanting even
in the view of the negotiators; it is no wonder the Art. III GATT case law has had a difficult
time to define a clear benchmark for acceptable behavior, and a methodology that would
resolve disputes coming under its purview in a more or less predictable manner.
The study of the negotiating record of the NT provision points to two conclusions:
(a) This provision was thought as an anti‐circumvention device, that is, as a means to
safeguard the value of tariff concessions that would be exchanged in the first
multilateral negotiation in Geneva (1948);
(b) With the exception of a few specific domestic instruments that have explicitly been
exempted from coverage in the body of the provision, NT was meant to cover all
domestic instruments, whether of fiscal or nonfiscal nature.
These two conclusions seem solid in the light of the negotiating record that will be cited in
what follows. There are further good reasons to believe that negotiators aimed at outlawing
practices that either had the effect of conferring an advantage on domestic production,
and/or were intentionally designed to do so: besides the actual words that were incorporated
in the final text, a number of hypothetical examples that were used as basis for illuminating
the parameters of this obligation, as well as various statements by participating delegates,
point in this direction. The negotiating record also reveals the dissatisfaction of the framers
of the Agreement with some of the terms that found their way into Art. III GATT: for
example, the term like products was chosen faute de mieux, and it had been agreed to re‐
discuss it under the auspices of the planned International Trade Organization; this
organization will be briefly described below.

In this Section, we provide a broader account of issues than necessary to discuss the rationale for NT in
the negotiating record. The history of the negotiation of Art. III GATT is comprehensively discussed in
Charnovitz (1994), and Jackson (1969).
5
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2.1.1

The Forum and Context of Negotiation

The original GATT entered into force on January 1, 1948, at the end of a speedy negotiation
that lasted less than a year. We will briefly describe in what follows the evolution of the
drafting during these negotiations. As a background, we start with a broad overview of the
developments.
Following a proposal for an International Conference on Trade and Employment at its first
session on February 18, 1946, the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) established the Preparatory Committee charged with the task of drafting a
convention for international trade.6 Its members were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),7 the
United States, and the United Kingdom. At its second session (May 31, 1946), the ECOSOC
announced that the necessary arrangements were in place for the Preparatory Committee to

See E/PC/T/117 Rev. 1 of July 9, 1947 at p. 1. See on this score, Curzon (1965), Dam (1970), Irwin et al.
(2008), Jackson (1969), Hudec (1975), and Wilcox (1949).
7 The USSR declined to participate. This is how Irwin et al. (2008, p. 72) discuss this decision: “In Moscow,
George Kennen of the U.S. State Department requested a meeting to discuss Soviet participation in the
upcoming conference. Soviet officials never granted this request and never responded one way or another to
the U.S. invitation, despite the fact that their delegates had participated in the UN Economic and Social Council
discussion of the resolution‐on‐trade conference and voted for resolution. The State Department was skeptical
that the Soviet Union, given the state monopoly control on foreign trade, could participate in a useful way in
the tariff negotiations. Still, despite the lack of response from Soviet officials, the State Department decided to
include the USSR on the list of countries with which it intended to negotiate, leaving the door open for their
participation (FRUS 1946, I, 1354‐1355). The U.S. Embassy in Moscow cabled back with this message: “We have
noted with interest several recent reports from London of conversations with Soviet officials giving various
explanations why Soviet Government does not participate in many international meetings, particularly ITO.
Reasons given for nonparticipation range from lack of personnel to Soviet preoccupation with questions of
security. While there may be some modicum of truth in these arguments, we believe that in regard to such
institutions as the International [i.e., World] Bank, ITO and PICAO [i.e., Provisional International Civil Aviation
Organization], the principal, if not the only, reason the Russians do not join is that they do not wish to. Kremlin
insistence on keeping its independence of action in world affairs has even on occasion been frankly expressed
by certain responsible Soviet officials, and, in any event, is self‐evident in every aspect of Soviet policy in
action.” Furthermore, the cable added, for the Soviets “to join any organization which would require them to
give statistics on national income, international trade, balance of payments and gold production, would imply a
complete reversal of a basic and scrupulously maintained Soviet policy of state secrecy in such matters. On the
other hand, whenever they stand to gain something concrete by participation in an international organ or run
the risk of losing something important by failure so to do, they appear to find no difficulty in effecting such
participation (UNRRA, telecommunications, whaling). It would appear unreal, therefore, in the absence of
concrete evidence to the contrary, to base any policy on the belief that Russians actually desire to join such
organs as ITO but are precluded because of personnel or other administrative considerations” (FRUS 1946, I,
1355‐1356).”
6
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convene its first meeting in London on October 15, 1946.8 The London negotiations went on
until November 20, 1946,9 and were also attended by countries that were members of the UN
but not of the Preparatory Committee,10 by UN specialized agencies,11 by other international
organizations,12 and by nongovernmental organizations.13 The Preparatory Committee held
two meetings (sessions):
(a) from October 15, 1946, to November 20, 1946, in London (first session);
(b) from April 10, 1947, to October 30, 1947, in Geneva (second session), where the GATT
text that entered into force on January 1, 1948, was definitively agreed.
In between, from January 20, 1947, to February 25, 1947, the Drafting Committee, an organ
appointed by the Preparatory Committee, met in New York and prepared the first
comprehensive draft of the GATT. The Preparatory Committee established the following
working committees:
(a) Committee I:
(b) Committee II:
(c) Committee III:
(d) Committee IV:
(e) Committee V:

Employment and Economic Activity;
General Commercial Policy;
Restrictive Business Practices;
Inter‐governmental Commodity Arrangements;
Administration and Organization.

Committee II is our main interest because under its aegis the first draft GATT articles,
including the NT provision, were prepared. Committee II established a series of Sub‐
committees which were requested to report to it their findings: chief among them, the
Technical Subcommittee, which dealt with a number of provisions appearing in the GATT,
ranging from customs valuation to NT. Participation to the Technical Subcommittee was open

See E/PC/T/33 on p. 3. See on this score, Robbins (1971).
See E/PC/T/117 Rev. 1 of July 9, 1947 at p. 1.
10 Colombia, Denmark, Mexico, Peru, Poland, and Syria sent observers to both the first and the second
session of the Preparatory Committee; Colombia, and Mexico, to the Drafting Committee (which became
operational during the New York Conference, see infra); Afghanistan, Argentina, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia sent representatives to the second
session of the Preparatory Committee. Note that the Syrian delegates were representing the Syro‐Lebanese
customs union, see E/PC/T/117 Rev. 1 of July 9, 1947 at p. 2.
11 The International Labor Office (ILO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), see
E/PC/T/117 Rev. 1 of July 9, 1947 at p. 2.
12 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank, WB), and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), see E/PC/T/117 Rev. 1 of July 9, 1947 at p. 2.
13 The American Federation of Labor (AFL), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the
International Co‐operative Alliance (ICA), the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the International
Federation of Agricultural Producers, see E/PC/T/117 Rev. 1 of July 9, 1947 at p. 2.
8
9
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to delegates for all the countries represented on the Preparatory Committee. Delegates of six
different nationalities acted as rapporteurs, Leddy (U.S.), who is credited with the drafting of
the first GATT text, being one of them.
The Preparatory Committee did not start negotiating from a clean slate: the U.S. proposal to
establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) served as the basis for the negotiations
(the Suggested Charter). In anticipation of the London Conference, the U.S. government
prepared a Suggested Charter for the ITO in September 1946. This was a U.S. initiative, but
very much the product of extensive consultations between the U.S. and UK governments.14
The Suggested Charter was divided into seven Chapters: I Purposes; II Membership; III
Employment provisions; IV General Commercial Policy; V Restrictive business practices; VI
Inter‐governmental commodity arrangements; VII Organization. NT figured in Chapter IV.
The NT provision included in the Suggested Charter was the first multilateral attempt to
introduce NT‐type of provisions in a treaty, but not the first NT provision in general: the U.S.
Tariff Act of 1930, as well as bilateral agreements that the United States had signed with
Canada (1938), Mexico (1942), and Uruguay (1942), contained similar clauses.15 These
provisions provided an inspiration to the drafting of the NT provision that was included in
the Suggested Charter, and the drafting of the eventual GATT NT provision.
The text that entered into force on January 1, 1948, is not the current Art. III GATT: it
underwent one final transformation during the Havana Conference in 1948, where negotiators
aimed at streamlining the language used, but also to leave little room for doubt as to the
function of this provision within the overall GATT architecture.

2.1.2

The Transformation of NT

During the negotiations, NT underwent a series of changes.
2.1.2.1 The GATT, an (Independent) Part of the ITO
The decision to dissociate the drafting of the GATT from the drafting of the wider ITO
Charter was taken during the London Conference, but in the beginning the raison d’être of the
London Conference was the negotiation of the ITO.16 It became increasingly clear to the
negotiators, however, that a less ambitious project would keep the ball rolling and probably
also provide the impetus for subsequent negotiations on the more ambitious endeavor.17 The
idea was to start with a multilateral exchange of tariff concessions rather than with a
Compare the views of Meade (1990), and Miller (2000) on this score.
See Jackson (1967) at p. 314.
16 See on this score, Hart (1995), Wilgress (1967), and Zeiler (1999).
17 See Hart (1998), Irwin (1996), and Irwin et al. (2008).
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comprehensive Charter regulating each and every facet of international trade. At that point,
the GATT (or, more generally, a tariff agreement) would become necessary in order to
safeguard the value of tariff concessions made during the negotiations.18 The actual ambit of
the GATT was nevertheless not definitively agreed at the London Conference.19 Quoting from
negotiating documents, Jackson (1969, p. 43) states that it was agreed that the GATT would
include “such other provisions as may be appropriate.” NT was considered to be a key
element of this less ambitious project, which became the GATT.

2.1.2.2 NT in the Various Drafts

2.1.2.2.1 NT in the London Conference
The NT provision was Art. 15 of the London Draft. The text of the Suggested Charter
underwent a few changes in London.20 The negotiations, which took place within Committee
II, initially focused on internal taxes, which were distinguished from customs tariffs in that
they were decided unilaterally by every state and were applied to both domestic and foreign
products.21 Eventually, the negotiators moved to other areas of internal regulation of
nonfiscal nature.
The negotiators early on recognized the impossibility to draft a perfect regulation of
domestic instruments. This is how the Chairman of the Technical Sub‐committee in charge of
preparing the draft provision on National Treatment (NT) during the London meeting of the
Preparatory Committee understood the function of the group he was heading:
Whatever we do here, we shall never be able to cover every contingency and possibility in a
draft. Economic life is too varied for that, and there are all kinds of questions which are bound
to arise later on. The important thing is that once we have this agreement laid down we have
to act in the spirit of it. There is no doubt there will be certain difficulties, but if we are able to
cover 75 or 80 or 85 per cent of them I think it will be sufficient.22

The term tariff concession, which has customarily been used in the GATT‐context and continues to be
used in the WTO‐era, does not make much economic sense: states make a concession to themselves as well
since, at least those that cannot affect terms of trade, gain from trade liberalization. It does, nevertheless, make
good legal sense, since it signals the transfer of sovereignty associated with the tariff promise: absent such
transfer, trading nations would be free to increase or decrease tariff protection to their liking; through tariff
concessions, they concede their sovereignty in this respect to the international plane.
19 See on this score, Jackson (1969, pp. 42ff.).
20 See E/PC/T/C.6/65.
21 See E/PC/T/C.II/2.
22 See E/PC/T/C.II/PRO/PV/7.
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At the suggestion of the U.S. delegation, the negotiations were entrusted to a group of
experts, in light of the technical nature of the issues at stake: a subcommittee (Technical
Subcommittee) was created to this effect where delegates of all participants were invited to
participate.23 The negotiations were inconclusive, however, and the London Draft postponed
consideration of this item.24 Nevertheless, considerable progress was made in London:
First, discussions were held regarding the overall purpose of this provision. The views of
many delegations on this score were later synthesized at the Technical Subcommittee‐level. In
the words of the French delegate, the NT provision should outlaw disguised restriction of
trade through internal taxes;25 in similar vein, the delegate of Benelux argued that the
provision was meant to protect the value of tariff concessions by eliminating indirect
protection of domestic production;26 the report of the Technical Subcommittee ultimately held
that the purpose of NT should be to avoid undoing the tariff promise through either fiscal or
nonfiscal domestic instruments.27
Second, negotiations focused on the coverage of the NT obligation. There was an implicit
consensus that negotiations should not focus on a positive (which instruments should be
included) list, but rather on a negative (which instruments should be excluded) list, since it
was understood that the value of tariff promise could be undone by a very large number of
domestic instruments. In an effort to underscore the wide coverage of NT, the UK delegation
proposed the introduction of the term “indirectly” so as to ensure that any domestic measure,
without mentioning them explicitly one by one, should be in principle covered by this
discipline. The UK proposal was unopposed, suggesting a consensus across the participants
to opt for the widest possible coverage for this provision. Some instruments were explicitly
mentioned: the widespread use of local content measures (including mixing requirements)
probably explains why negotiators felt necessary to explicitly outlaw their use (in current Art.
III.5 GATT).28
National delegations also tabled various proposals for carve‐outs, some of which were
accepted and found their way into the final text, and some that did not: government
procurement, subsidies, and films belong to the first category.

See E/PC/T/C.II/3 at pp. 13‐15.
See E/PC/T/33 at p. 28.
25 See E/P/C.II/12 at p. 2.
26 See E/P/C.II/32 at pp. 1 and 2.
27 See E/P/C.II/54 and 54 Rev. 1.
28 For example, New Zealand had in place a number of local content measures involving tobacco and
wool that it sought to exempt from the coverage of NT (E/PC/T/C.II/28 at p. 2). The overwhelming majority of
delegations was opposed to the continuation of similar measures, see E/P/C.II/54 and Rev. 1.
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Government procurement is the one area where there was consensus that it should be left
out of the coverage of NT. Political economy‐type of reasons were advanced some time
explicitly and some time in concealed manner to defend this policy choice.29
The U.S. delegation, in line with the beliefs of the New Dealers, was eager to make room for
subsidies (which would become for all practical purposes obsolete if they were to be covered
by NT). In the words of Harry Hawkins, a U.S. negotiator: 30
. . . subsidies kept prices down and demand up. They were expansionist rather than
contractionist measures.31

Hawkins defended the choice to seek to target the use of tariffs and quantitative restrictions
(QRs) that were harmful to trade rather than to focus on disciplining subsidies;32 in the U.S.
delegation’s view, direct subsidies to producers were not harmful to international trade for
the reason explained above in the quoted passage. The U.S. delegation was prepared
however, to distinguish between domestic and export subsidies, and it was not opposed to
condemning the export subsidies that were in its view considered harmful to international
trade.33 Canada agreed with the U.S. delegation,34 and so did the UK delegation, which
explicitly accepted the bifurcation between domestic and export subsidies.35 The U.S.

See the lengthy discussions reflected in E/PC/T/C.II/PRO/PV/7. The UK and French delegations made
proposals to this effect (see E/P/C.II/11 at p. 1 and E/P/C.II/12 at p. 1 respectively); Cuba proposed for a more
limited exception that would cover only military procurement, which was eventually rejected (E/P/C.II/15 at p.
1), while Czechoslovakia agreed with the carve out but wished all foreigners to be treated on an MFN basis in
national procurement markets (E/P/C.II/24 at p. 1). The advent of the Government Procurement Agreement
(GPA) in the Tokyo Round, and its modern reincarnation as a plurilateral agreement during the Uruguay Round
have set aside any arguments that have persisted to the effect that the proposal by Czechoslovakia had
survived and government procurement had to be MFNed. Government procurement is, of course, nowadays
exempted from the coverage of NT by virtue of Art. III.8 GATT.
30 Hawkins later taught at Tufts University. See Irwin et al. (2008) for information about the vitae of the key
delegates.
31 See E/PC/T/C.II/37 at p. 8.
32 It is probably true that negotiations focused on border measures since there was ignorance regarding
the ambit and bite of domestic measures that were anyway nonobservable because of the high tariffs (customs
duties) and QRs in place. There was some discussion of nontariff barriers in the literature; as exemplified by
Bidwell (1939). The prevailing feeling among the negotiators was, however, that the bite of nontariff barriers
was blurred by the high tariffs applied during that time. Baldwin’s (1970) parable of the tide reflected this
point. See also Hawkins (1951).
33 See E/PC/T/C.II/3 at pp. 2‐3.
34 Idem at p. 9. Compare Hart (1995), and (1998), and also Brown (1950) who gives a detailed account
regarding the U.S. position with respect to farm subsidies.
35 Idem at p. 10.
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position was not totally unopposed though: both Brazil,36 and Australia argued in favor of
special treatment of subsidies, pointing to their adverse effects on foreign competitors.37
The UK delegation should be credited with the carve out regarding films.38 In the words of
Shackle (the UK delegate), it was axiomatic (sic) that film be exempted from the NT
discipline, since it was not strictly an economic matter: it involved cultural and other aspects
of national life.39 The UK found support in the New Zealand delegation: New Zealand had in
place the film hire tax, a domestic tax that discriminated between domestic and foreign films,
and also between UK films and other foreign films which were treated worse than imported
films of British origin.40 To this effect, it was the UK delegation that initially proposed (what
later became Art. IV GATT) the exclusion of films from the coverage of Art. 15 of the London
Draft. In the words of the UK delegate (Mr. Rhydderch):
…he would prefer a note to the Article to say it did not apply to films. There were
cultural, as well as commercial, considerations to be taken into account in the case of
films.41

This is probably one of the first expressions in favor of a cultural exception in the post‐war
world trading system.
There were proposals regarding the treatment of other domestic instruments: for example,
Brazil tabled a proposal aimed at explicitly addressing navigation port dues,42 and New
Zealand wished to exempt some of its measures regarding domestic tobacco and wool. All
proposals other than those concerning the treatment of government procurement, subsidies,
and films were defeated.
Third, we observe the beginning of a discussion regarding the parameters of the legal test for
consistency with the NT discipline. India, for example, wanted to ensure that discriminatory

Idem at p. 9.
Idem at p. 10. See Capling (2001). Subsidies are currently exempted from the coverage of NT by virtue of
Art. III.8 GATT. They are being regulated in a separate agreement (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, SCM) that was negotiated during the Uruguay Round.
38 In the current GATT text, films are treated in Art. IV and explicitly acknowledged as exception to Art.
III GATT which now reflects the NT discipline.
39 See E/PC/T/C.II/55 at p. 8. See also E/PC/T/C.II/11 at p. 1 where the UK delegation explicitly admitted
that their film quota in place was inconsistent with NT.
40 See E/PC/T/C.II/28 at p. 1.
41 See E/PC/T/C.II/E.14 of November 4, 1946 at p. 5. Incidentally, the UK position was supported by
Czechoslovakia, France (later, an ardent supporter of the “cultural exception”), New Zealand, and Portugal).
42 See E/PC/T/C.II/37 at p. 14.
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taxation for the sole purpose of raising revenue should be acceptable. It seems as if India was
implicitly advancing the understanding that NT should be concerned only with measures
that intentionally were aiming at protecting domestic production, and not with measures
which unintentionally did so.43 By the same token, Norway expressed its wish to be allowed
to vary domestic taxes for the purpose of achieving a uniform price across products
(domestic and foreign) sold in its market.44 Although the objective of NT was clear in the
negotiators’ minds,45 no provision equivalent to the current Art. III.1 GATT was included in
the London Draft; recall that this provision condemns any domestic regulation (of fiscal or
nonfiscal character) that operates so as to afford protection. It was left for later to explicitly
state that such should be the objective of this provision.
There was nevertheless substantial discussion regarding the terms that would be used to
express the (undefined) test for consistency. The text prepared by the Technical Subcommittee
refers to similar or identical products when it discusses the treatment of non fiscal
instruments, and simply contains a prohibition not to use taxes so as to afford protection,
without any reference to either similar or identical products.46 Eventually, the term “similar”
gave way to “like” during the New York Conference, probably in order to underscore the
parallelism in the obligations assumed under MFN and NT; there was already some
discussion in London as to the appropriateness of this term to express the agreed purpose of
NT, and we observe a general dissatisfaction with the choice which was due to two main
factors:
(a) on the one hand, it was felt that the term was obscure, and that it would be necessary
for the ITO to try to clarify at a subsequent stage. The idea was that a Definitions
Section should be subsequently negotiated that would, inter alia, include an agreed
definition of this term;47
(b) on the other, it was felt that, since the Suggested Charter contained references to like
products only,48 with no reference at all to competitive products, what is now known
See E/PC/T/C.II/54 Rev. 1.
See E/PC/T/C.6/97 at p. 7.
45 See, for example, the French proposal where, in application of the French doctrine of abus de droit,
France requested the insertion of a paragraph to the effect that “The members undertake not to institute or
maintain internal taxes on the products of other member‐countries the object of which might be a disguised
form of protection for national production.” This is one of the first statements to the effect that the national‐
treatment obligation would operate as an anti‐circumvention provision: ITO Members should not circumvent
through internal taxes their obligations with respect to tariff treatment of foreign products. Producer welfare
would thus be legally protected through tariffs only.
46 See E/PC/T/C.II/54.
43
44

47

See E/PC/T/C.II/54 at pp. 36‐38.

48

See the Suggested Charter, at p. 4.
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as directly competitive or substitutable products (DCS), something should be done to
address cases where a domestic tax on imported coffee was higher than that imposed
on domestic chicory.49 In the words of the Dutch delegate, Mr. Van den Berg, the
additional paragraph that was being negotiated during the London Conference, and
that dealt with competitive products aimed “to guard against the more concealed
types of discriminatory taxation.”50

Fourth, there was acknowledgement of the fact that federal structures might have a hard time
enforcing NT. Roux (France) acknowledged that there are many issues to discuss regarding
how much federal governments can do to force the hand of states.51 It was felt that this issue
extended beyond the coverage of NT. As a result, it was removed from the NT agenda, and
eventually became the current Art. XXIV.12 GATT.

2.1.2.2.2 NT in the New York (Lake Success) Conference
In Lake Success it was not the Preparatory Committee, but the Drafting Committee that was in
session. The mandate of the Drafting Committee was supposed to be limited to streamlining
agreed upon terms and concepts. With respect to NT, nonetheless, it was thought that more
than mere streamlining was necessary in light of the number of issues that were left
undecided during the London Conference. NT was further negotiated under the aegis of the
Subcommittee dealing with Arts. 15‐23, with the participation of delegates from the United
States, France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, and Czechoslovakia.52
Two days into the negotiations, the U.S. delegation submitted its first proposal concerning a
redrafting of Art. 15 of the London Draft.53 Negotiations were smooth,54 probably because it
See E/PC/T/C.II/W.2 at pp. 5ff. In the words of Leddy (U.S.) wheat was like to wheat only, and not to
other cereals. Leddy made his comments in the context of discussions regarding the ambit of MFN and not NT.
It was feared however, that had this attitude been exported to NT as well, the overall purpose of NT would be
severely undermined, see E/PC/T/C.II/65 at p. 2.
50 Idem. The level of sophistication of the arguments made is remarkable. See, for example, an exchange
between Mr. Morton (Australia) and Mr. Johnson (U.S.) on the legality of some Australian mixing requirements
and preferential tariff rates, see E/PC/T/C.II/W.2 at p. 7.
51 See E.PC/T/C.II/55 at p. 2.
52 See E/PC/T/C.6/4.
53 See E/PC/T/C.6/6 of January 22, 1947.
54 It is New Zealand only that objected to the redraft insisting for some sort of arrangement that would
take care of its film hire tax, see E/PC/T/C.6/8 of January 23, 1947. The film hire tax, however, was a delayed
customs duty levied at the point where the real value of the film had become apparent. The New Zealand
delegate eventually conceded that this imposition could form the subject matter of tariff negotiations under
Art. 24 of the London Draft. New Zealand was not, at the time, producing films, other than educational and
newsreels, see E/PC/T/C.6/55/Rev. 1 at pp. 7‐8.
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became gradually clear that the GATT would not contain any detailed obligations concerning
domestic instruments, other than the obligation not to discriminate.55 There are various
reasons that mandated this approach:
(a) more detailed provisions regarding (some) domestic instruments would be included
in the ITO Charter, the advent of which would supersede the GATT. The GATT was
conceived as some sort of regulatory minimum necessary to ensure that tariff
concessions would not be circumvented. To this effect, an obligation not to
discriminate was considered as adequate insurance policy against the danger of
circumvention;
(b) it was at least the U.S. view, that nontariff barriers (NTBs) should not matter much;56
(c) many NTBs were simply not known to negotiators since they were “hidden” behind
high tariffs. It was thus quite rational to first address tariff barriers before moving to
discuss in a more elaborate manner NTBs.
The corresponding provision in the London Draft underwent some changes without altering
its rationale or basic design.57 With respect to internal measures of non fiscal nature, South
Africa proposed the insertion of the terms “laws, regulations and requirements” that denoted a
wide coverage of this provision, since it reduced the potential for circumvention.58 As
already mentioned supra, the term identical or similar products gave way to the term like
products.59 India continued to insist on a carve‐out for taxation “strictly for the purposes of
raising revenue,” but this proposal was not accepted.60
The final redraft of NT was not unanimously accepted. It was decided, however, to leave it
to dissidents to consider whether they would maintain their objections: Cuba wanted an
exemption for protection of infant‐industry purposes; India’s desired carve‐out regarded, as
mentioned above, the possibility to tax discriminate in order to raise government revenue;
Norway requested a carve‐out in order to be in position to tax discriminate, if necessary, to
maintain uniform prices for a given product in its domestic market.61 Two texts (albeit with a
lot of bracketed language which denoted lack of agreement) were prepared during the New

See E/PC/T/C.6/67 at p. 1.
See Proposals, pp. 2ff.
57 See E/PC/T/C.6/55 at pp. 2ff.
58 See E/PC/T/C.6/55 at p. 3. It was argued by South Africa that laws could refer only to formal laws in
some domestic legal contexts and thus, were NT to be limited to such acts only, the possibility for
circumventing it through informal laws (such as, for example, administrative acts) would be open.
59 Id.
60 See E/PC/T/C.6/W.19 of January 24, 1947.
61 See E/PC/T/C.6/55/Rev. 1 at pp. 3ff.
55
56
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York Conference: one for the GATT, and one for the ITO Charter. The NT provision figured
in both, was identical and became Art. II of the New York GATT Draft, and Art. 15 of the New
York Draft ITO Charter.

2.1.2.2.3 NT in the Geneva Conference
During the negotiations, it was once again made clear that there was no room for preferential
internal taxes, such as those previously practiced in some parts of the world (New Zealand,
United States).62 As a result, a definitive end was put to these requests. China wanted to limit
the NT obligation to taxes (fiscal measures) only, but this attempt was thwarted by others.63
On the other hand, key terms such as like products which had been provisionally accepted
faute de mieux continued to provoke a lot of discussion: Brazil mentioned the existence of a
Committee (Comisão de Similares) that they had established to deal with determinations of
like products precisely because the term was hard to define. It was felt that some similar
action should be undertaken at the multilateral level as well. It was decided however, not to
overburden the GATT negotiations with similar tasks. Since the GATT would eventually
come under the aegis of the ITO, and the ITO would possess sufficient institutional
structure, it was decided it to leave it to the ITO
…later on to establish a jurisprudence on the meaning of this term.64

Following a U.S. proposal to this effect, the obligation of NT was extended to cover not only
like, but also directly competitive or substitutable (DCS) products,65 the intent being to ensure
that, in the absence of domestic production of like products, taxes could not be used to favor
domestic DCS products.66 The original idea was quite different from the current text: the
DCS‐discipline would come into play only when the regulating state had no substantial
production of the like product; in this case, the regulating state could neither introduce new,
nor increase old taxes so as to afford protection to its domestic DCS products. In contrast,
were the regulating state to have substantial domestic production, it could legitimately treat
DCS products in different manner, as long as it did not treat its products any better than the
imported like products. Moreover, it was possible to maintain existing internal taxes that

See E/PS/T/W/179 at p. 3.
See E/PC/T/W/181 at p. 3. In China’s view, hence, there should be no NT obligation with respect to
regulatory (nonfiscal) domestic instruments.
64 See E/PC/T/A/PV/40(1) at p. 14.
65 See E/PC/T/W7150 at p. 5.
66 See E/PC/T/174 at p. 6.
62
63
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afforded protection to DCS products, in cases in which there was no substantial production
of the like product, subject to negotiations for their elimination or reduction (Art. 17).67
The UK delegation continued to think of films not only as economic, but as cultural goods as
well. The continued support of Chile, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand, and now India,
Norway, and South Africa, left only the U.S. delegation opposing the UK view. The United
States saw no reason to treat films differently from other goods; in the view of its delegates,
the preference of the audience should determine the trade in films.68 It was clear,
nonetheless, that the U.S. delegation was fighting a losing battle on this issue.69
Finally, during the Geneva Conference, the provision expanded and the current Art. III.8
GATT was introduced in order to ensure that subsidies and government procurement were
not coming under the coverage of NT.70

2.1.2.2.4 NT in the Havana Conference
The Havana Conference on Cuba during the first months of 1948 is the first multilateral
conference after the entry into force of the GATT. The main mandate of the negotiators was
to discuss the Draft ITO Charter.71 At the same time, however, some important GATT
provisions were also discussed and important clarifications/amendments were agreed upon.
NT is one of the provisions that underwent substantial redrafting during this conference.72
Although its basic structure was not put into question, negotiators added clarity to a text that
had left, as we saw, many of them unsatisfied:
(a) It is now made clearer than ever before, through the introduction of what is now Art.
III.1 GATT, that the intention of the drafters was that domestic instruments should
not be used as a means of protection;73
(b) A series of Interpretative Notes were agreed which clarify a number of issues regarding
the ambit of NT;74

See E/PC/T/186.
See E/PC/T/W/181 pp. 7‐8.
69 As already discussed, eventually, a separate provision applicable only to films and justifying an
exception to national treatment would be agreed to in subsequent negotiations (the current Art. IV GATT).
70 See E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W/W.49.
71 See Toye (2003).
72 It figures as Art. 18 in the Havana Conference Draft.
73 See E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W.47.
74 See E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W.49. For example, it was agreed that domestic measures enforced at the border
should be considered to be covered by the NT discipline, and not by the discipline regarding QRs (Art. XI
GATT).
67
68
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(c) An outright elimination of all taxes that protect domestic DCS in the absence of
substantial production of domestic like products was agreed;75
(d) Some clarification regarding mixing regulations was also agreed: regulations
consistent with the first sentence of (what is now) Art. III.5 GATT shall not be
considered to be contrary to the second sentence in any case in which all of the
products subject to the regulation are produced domestically in substantial
quantities.76
The records of the Havana Conference further reveal some interesting discussions whereby
negotiators advance specific examples to demonstrate their understanding of the various
terms used. Although the legal relevance of such examples specifically mentioned in the
negotiating documents is limited, some of them bear mention: for example, the final text
provided for the outright elimination of taxes protecting DCS products irrespective whether
there was substantial production of the domestic like product; it was stated, nevertheless,
that, an internal law that might help a domestic product (say, butter), but which hits equally
imported and domestic oleomargarine (a DCS product), does not violate NT, if domestic
production of oleomargarine is substantial.77 More generally, we read that a tax that is
uniformly applicable to a considerable number of products which conformed to (what is
now) Art. III.2, first sentence (like products) would also conform to Art. III.2, second
sentence (DCS products).78 Similar opinions expressed provide further support to the view
that the underlying intent of the negotiators was to outlaw protectionist intent.
During the Havana Conference, it was also felt that the language chosen might be too
encompassing and that delimitations of the coverage were thus, in order. For instance,
according to the Havana Report (p. 61):
…neither income taxes nor import duties fall within the scope of Art 18 (of the Havana
Charter—Art III of the GATT) which is concerned solely with internal taxes on
goods.79

If at all, this language seems to suggest that at least some fiscal instruments (like income
duties) were meant to be left outside the coverage of NT. As we will see in Chapter 5, this

See E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W/52 at p. 8.
See E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W.47 at p. 5.
77 See Havana Reports at pp. 61‐67.
78 See Havana Reports pp. 62ff.
75
76

79 See § 12 of the Annex to the Working Party report on Border Tax Adjustments, op cit., citing the Havana
Conference.
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issue was re‐discussed in the context of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments where
negotiators did not manage to write an exhaustive list regarding the coverage of this
provision.
The Havana Conference signals the end of the negotiation on NT: Art. III GATT has remained
unchanged since the last negotiations in the early months of 1948 in Havana.

2.1.3

Summarizing the Negotiating Record

The negotiating record can be summarized as follows.
First, the study of the negotiating record of Art. III GATT shows that there was a consensus
view regarding the function of this provision: it was considered to be necessary to safeguard
the value of exchanged concessions. Absent an insurance policy to this effect, it was thought
that participants would lose the incentive to continue engaging in trade liberalization, since
the value of tariff concessions that they had extracted (and for which they had paid a price in
terms of themselves making tariff concessions in return) could be easily undone through
subsequent (to the international negotiation) unilateral action conferring an advantage to the
domestic product. NT was thought of as the insurance policy against this eventuality.
Second, the negotiators explicitly acknowledged that they had to be content with an
incomplete NT provision, in light of the number of instruments that qualify as domestic
instruments, and their ever changing form. They thus knowingly left the provision to be
gradually “completed” through subsequent adjudication (and, eventually, renegotiation)
Third, there was a consensus view that in principle all domestic instruments but those
explicitly excluded from the coverage of the provision should observe the NT discipline.
Fourth, it was commonly understood that certain key terms, such as like products, were not
specific enough, but it was agreed that the ITO would at a later stage give these terms more
precision. The failure to launch the ITO hence meant that today’s judge has less guidance
when dealing with cases coming under the ambit of Art. III GATT than was originally
intended.
Finally, there is some, admittedly inconclusive, evidence that negotiators wanted to outlaw
practices that were either intentionally protectionist, had a protectionist effect, or both.80

See C.3/A White Paper of 26 January 1948 (suggested by the Subcommittee) at p. 3 (on file at the WTO
Library).
80

24

2.2 The Rationale for NT in Case Law
Recall that the negotiating record81 suggests that the obligation to accord NT serves one
purpose: prevention of concession erosion, that is, that tariff concessions made to trading
partners should not be eroded through (subsequent) favorable treatment of domestic goods
by means of domestic instruments; what is, for example, the value of a 5% import duty on
imported cars if they are burdened with a 100% consumption tax whereas domestic cars are
exempted from consumption tax altogether?
There has been repeated institutional acknowledgment of this rationale in case law. By
means of illustration, we observe a note by the GATT Secretariat summarizing the meetings
of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments on 18 to 20 June 1968 captures this point in the
following terms:
In the case of Article III, the rules were designed to safeguard tariff concessions82

The AB, in its report on Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, confirmed this understanding of NT. as
we will see in more detail infra, the AB dealt in this case with a Japanese scheme that was
taxing alcoholic drinks that were predominantly produced in Japan less onerously (in ad
valorem terms) than drinks produced abroad. It went on to find that the Japanese scheme was
GATT‐inconsistent. The starting point of its analysis was its understanding for the rationale
for Art. III GATT, which it stated in the following terms (p. 16):[
. . . The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the
application of internal tax and regulatory measures. More specifically, the purpose of Article
III ‘is to ensure that internal measures not be applied to imported or domestic products so as
to afford protection to domestic production.’ Toward this end, Article III obliges Members of
the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation to
domestic products.

This statement has been reproduced almost verbatim in each and every dispute that
subsequently dealt with Art. III GATT. More on this in Chapter 4 where we discuss the case
law.

See the discussion in Chapter 1.
See GATT Doc. L/3039 of 11 July 1968, GATT Doc L/3464, adopted on 2 December 1970, GATT Doc
BISD 18S/97ff.
81
82
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2.3 The Rationale for NT from the Perspective of Economics
The previous Section sought to shed light on the motive for the drafters of the GATT to
include a NT provision in the agreement. This Section considers the role of NT from the
perspective of economics, and in particular, the economic literature on trade agreements.
It is a deeply rooted notion among economists that there are significant potential gains from
international trade. These gains stem from a variety of sources: for instance, they originate
from exploitation of comparative advantages stemming from differences in access to
technology, in endowments of factors of production, or in preferences; there are gains
stemming from increased competition and from better exploitation of economies of scale;
gains can be derived from more product variety in consumption and production, etc. It is
also clear that when governments determine their policies unconstrained by international
obligations, they are prone to restrict imports. A theory of trade agreements requires an
explanation of why national decisionmakers do not unilaterally ensure that these potential
gains from trade are reaped. Indeed, if governments did not have such “protectionist”
preferences, there would not be any role for a NT provision to play.
Most theories of trade agreements build on the notion that when making unilateral decisions
concerning trade (and other) policies, national decisionmakers disregard the adverse impact
these policies have on trading partners – there are in this sense negative international
externalities from unilaterally pursued policies. The general purpose of trade agreements is to
make countries “internalize” these external effects. This “international externalities”
perspective will be adopted also here, even though we will say a few words towards the end
of this Section about the main alternative – and in most respects complementary – view.83
In order to specify the nature of these international externalities, we must specify the
objectives – the “preferences” – of the decisionmakers that bring the agreement about.
Broadly speaking, the preferences describe how decisionmakers rank different possible
outcomes of their interaction. Significant efforts have been spent by economists and political
scientists to understand the nature of the preferences that are expressed through political
decisionmaking. But for much of what follows, we can skirt the thorny issues concerning the
nature of these preferences, by adopting an agnostic position. We will assume that the
policies of relevance from an NT point of view are determined by a single rational
decisionmaker – the “government.” The preferences of this government are hence the
economic/political trade‐offs that the country would be willing to make in the interaction
with the governments representing trading partners. For the most part we do not need to
take a stand on the more precise nature of these preferences, or the political constraints
under which it operates. We will see the purpose of our exercise in Chapter 4 as identifying
83

See, e.g., Bagwell and Staiger (2002), and Staiger (1995), for reviews of the literature.
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interpretations of Art. III GATT that would enhance the efficiency of the agreement – that is,
enhance the extent to which it achieves the objectives of Member country governments of
reaping gains from trade.
The structure of the rest of this overview is as follows. Section 3.1 highlights some basic
aspects of the main economic approach to understanding the purpose of trade agreements;
the reader is referred to the accompanying study Why the WTO? An Introduction to the
Economics of Trade Agreements for a more extensive discussion. Section 3.2 describes the role
of NT in this framework, and discusses some of the likely pros and cons of such a clause.
Section 3.3 offers a brief remark comment on NT building on an alternative view of the role
of trade agreements. Section 3.4 summarizes.
2.3.1 The Purpose and Structure of Trade Agreements
Section 3.1.1 provides a very discussion of the complex issues involved in formulating the
preferences of national decisionmakers. The subsection can be omitted without interrupting
the flow of the reading.
2.3.1.1 A Digression on Policy Objectives
Trade negotiations are conducted by officials appointed by their national governments. To
predict the outcome of a negotiation, and to interpret the meaning of the language of the
agreement, we need to understand the objectives of these negotiators. Whose preferences do
they represent? How do they evaluate and rank alternative proposals? And what guides the
voting behavior of legislators, who in most cases must ratify the product of any negotiation?
These are difficult questions that have perplexed economists and political scientists for
decades.
It is tempting to argue that negotiators in a democracy represent the aggregate preferences of
society. But how do we aggregate individualsʹ preferences? How much weight do the views
of a particular person receive? Should we weigh individuals equally in some sense? If so,
how do we deal with the fact that the intensity of an individualʹs preferences is a personal
matter and impossible to compare to that of another? Suppose citizen 1 in country A would
very much like a trade agreement with some given terms, but is less enthusiastic about
another agreement. Meanwhile, citizen 2 has the opposite ordering. What are the preferences
of society?
Perhaps the simplest approach would be to assume that each government seeks to maximize
its countryʹs national income, i.e., the sum of the incomes of all of its citizens. However, it is
difficult to justify national income as the appropriate government objective either
descriptively or prescriptively. As a description of government objectives, simple income
measures are suspect because they neglect citizensʹ concerns about the prices of the goods
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they buy, the insecurity they feel about potential disruptions to their income flows, the
conditions under which they work, the quality of their environment, and so on. As a
prescription, the measures suffer from these same omissions and moreover imply a lack of
societal concern about the distribution of income.
A more common approach begins with the notion of a social welfare function. Social welfare
is intended to measure overall societal well‐being, a worthy objective for governments if not
always the one they pursue. A non‐paternal social welfare function is one that reflects only
the citizenʹs own evaluation of their happiness and well‐being. A paternalistic social welfare
function can assess an individualʹs plight in a given situation differently than she would
herself. In either case, the social welfare function must impose some scheme for aggregating
individualsʹ well‐being. Should they simply be summed and, if so, in what units should they
be measured? If summing seems inappropriate, what weights should be applied to different
individuals and what is the implicit evaluation of inequality in outcomes?
The assumption that governments maximize a measure of social welfare has the advantage
of flexibility. In principle, the social welfare function can accommodate any considerations
that the analyst deems appropriate. The analyst need not take a stand a priori on what are
valid concerns for members of society or how these concerns ought to be weighed or
compared. Of course, in the application of this approach, the analyst adopts an objective
function with particular arguments and so implicitly imposes restrictions on the validity and
importance of alternative concerns. Unfortunately, there is little to guide the choice of the
social welfare function; essentially, the governmentsʹ objectives under this approach must
come from outside the analysis.
An alternative approach to specifying the governmentsʹ objective function begins with an
appreciation of political interactions. In this approach, the governmentsʹ objectives are
induced by the political regime. Government officials, like private agents, are assumed to
pursue their own well‐being (or ʺutilityʺ) subject to constraints. Their utilities might reflect a
taste for power or a pure desire to ʺdo good,ʺ in addition to private concerns about material
goods and perhaps the perquisites of office. After specifying the objectives of the political
agents, the analyst must model the political interactions: What is the assumed electoral
system? What are the voting rules, the political institutions, the role of campaign
contributions, and the behavior of voters? Given the analystʹs model of the political system,
and the assumed interactions between political players, the governmentʹs objectives in its
trade negotiations can be derived as a political outcome. That is, the electoral system,
political institutions and rules of the political game determine, among other things, the
identities of the elected leaders and the policy positions they take.
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This ʺpolitical‐economyʺ approach to government objectives recognizes, for example, that
elected officials might pursue more strongly the interests of some constituents than others.
The favored constituencies might be residents of swing districts, voters for whom trade
policy is the most salient issue, or groups with ample resources to contribute to campaign
financing. In any case, it is no longer clear, or even expected, that the government will
pursue the aggregate and socially‐just welfare of society.
The political‐economy approach also has shortcomings. First, the approach relies on the
modeling of political interactions. The more explicit are the government preferences used in
the analysis, the more dependent are the predictions about trade negotiations on the
plausibility and reliability of the assumed political model. Second, the induced government
objective function need not be stable over time. Changes in the identities of the elected
leaders may change the preferences of trade negotiators; changes in political institutions in
the negotiating countries almost certainly will do so. This makes it difficult to render
interpretations or predictions about trade agreements without detailed information about
the state of politics in all the participating countries at the time of their discussions. Third,
and perhaps most troubling, the governmentsʹ preferences may be jointly determined with
the outcome of the trade negotiations. For example, if changes in trade policy strengthen
some groups in society and weaken others, it will be impossible to know the governmentsʹ
preferences without knowing what trade policies prevail, and of course, impossible to
predict the trade policies without knowing the preferences of the negotiating agents. In such
circumstances, governmentsʹ preferences must be treated as endogenous, and predictions
about the results of trade negotiations must be made jointly with predictions about political
outcomes.
Arguably, the political‐economy approach is the more useful for answering positive
questions, whereas the social‐welfare approach may hold appeal for addressing normative
issues. In the category of positive questions, we would include predictions about the
outcomes of trade negotiations and matters of interpretation of existing agreements. For
these, an understanding of the political circumstances seems unavoidable. In particular,
matters of interpretation require us to consider what the negotiators were trying to achieve
when drafting the agreement. Their intentions surely are conditioned on their actual
politically‐induced preferences, and not on some ethically‐defensible preferences that they
might have held in some best‐of‐all‐possible worlds. In contrast, normative questions are
fundamentally about what ought to be – how should the WTO contract be structured to
achieve some specific goal. Here, the analyst may be justified, depending on the
circumstances of the analysis, in ascribing ʺsocialʺ preferences that are his or her own, or that
come from outside the analysis.
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2.3.1.2 Externalities from Unilateral Decisionmaking
The international externalities approach to trade agreements rests on two main assumptions.
The first is that countries are economically entwined such that decisions by one government
have noticeable effects on the welfare of other governments. The second central assumption
is that when governments make unilateral decisions, they are only concerned about their
consequences for various national interests (for instance, domestic firms and consumers),
while the consequences for trading partners are of no direct concern. The international
externalities from unilateral decisionmaking stem from the combination of these
circumstances. The externalities could be positive; for instance, when deciding in how much
to invest in medical research, governments may put less weight on the value of resulting
medical advances for people in other countries. But for many policies, the externalities from
unilateral decisionmaking are negative. This is particularly true of policies that seek to
enhance the competitive position of domestic products relative to foreign firms.
The existence of externalities implies that the outcome of the interaction between
governments does not bring the parties as much benefit as it could – the outcome is in
economic jargon “inefficient.” Broadly speaking, a situation is efficient if it is not possible to
improve the well‐being of any economic agent, without reducing the well‐being of some
other agent. Henceforth, we will use the notion of efficiency to capture the extent to which
pursued policies allow governments to achieve their objectives. It should be emphasized this
efficiency notion uses government preferences as the yardstick.84 More exactly, we will say
that a policy is (politically) efficient if the gain that any change would yield to some
governments could not suffice to compensate the governments that lose from the change;
that is, we adopt a Kaldor‐Hicks type of efficiency concept.
The distinguishing feature of unilateral decisionmaking – that is, when governments make
their decisions without coordinating with other governments – is thus that it gives rise to
international externalities that cause the outcome to be inefficient. It would therefore in
principle be possible to change these policies, and in each case let the exporting country
compensate the importing country’s government for the loss resulting from the reduction of
its trade barriers. However, trade agreements use a different means of achieving something
similar, which is to let the compensation take the form of reciprocal market access. That is,
trade agreements can be seen as means to reciprocally reduce trade barriers that governments
would not pursue if they were to bear the full global costs of their policies.
2.3.1.2.1 Externalities Can Be Internalized through Negotiations

The notion employed here should be distinguished from the more conventional economic concept of
“economic (or market) efficiency” which refers to the extent to which a market allocation maximizes social
welfare.
84
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The basic role of a trade agreement is to determine tariff levels through negotiations rather
than through unilateral decisionmaking.85 The exchange of offers and counteroffers during
the bargaining over the tariffs may effectively present governments with the externality costs
of their border barriers. For instance, if countries A and B negotiate their respective measures
X and Y, B might offer A to change policy Y against a certain change by A in policy X.
Government A can choose to continue pursuing the same policy X, but it has now become
sensitized to the internationally experienced cost of this policy, in terms of the forgone
change by B in policy Y. As a matter of theory, provided a number of special conditions are
fulfilled, the negotiated outcome will be (internationally) efficient, and this is also assumed
in most of the trade agreement literature.
2.3.1.2.2 What is Efficient Depends on Government Preferences
The defining feature of an efficient situation is that it is impossible to rearrange policies such
that some government gains without causing losses to other governments. It follows that the
preferences of governments determines what is an efficient policy outcome. For instance, if
governments seek to maximize national income, and markets are characterized by perfect
competition, no scale economies, etc., efficiency requires free trade. But more generally it is
by no means necessary that free trade is efficient. For instance, tariffs redistribute income
from consumers of the imported products to local producers of these (or similar) goods, and
the government may find such redistribution desirable, and for various reasons hard to
achieve through other means. It may, therefore, be part of a (politically) efficient
international arrangement that Members maintain tariffs.
2.3.1.2.3 Desirable and Undesirable Border Protection
Chapter 4 will distinguish between two notions of “protection.” First, the term can be used
in the same sense as the term “shield,” that is, as referring to a change in the competitive
conditions to the benefit of domestic producers. Tariffs always protect in this sense. As just
mentioned, an efficient agreement can feature positive tariffs, and it can hence be efficient
despite protecting in this sense. Second, “protection” is also often used to refer to a policy
that causes negative international externalities. For instance, a tariff that exceeds the efficient
negotiated level would have such a property. To capture the protective effect of tariffs
without taking a stand on whether they are efficient or not, we will say below that they
“shield from competition,” whereas we will reserve the terms “protectionist” and
“protectionism” to denote the pursuit of inefficient policies. As will be highlighted further in
Section 4.1 of Chapter 4, the GATT uses the term protection in both these senses.

We here for simplicity treat a trade agreement as a once‐and‐for‐all negotiated agreement on tariff
levels. But economic theory highlights a number of more complex aspects of actual trade agreements, such as
the role of bindings on other border instruments, the role of repeated negotiations, and the reasons for
negotiated tariff ceilings rather than levels.
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2.3.1.3 The Incompleteness of Trade Agreements
Border instruments are likely to be the instruments par preference for countries seeking to
restrict trade, since they are targeted at trade, and are relatively easy to handle
administratively. But many domestic policy instruments can be used for similar purposes as
border instruments, and some instruments with more or less identical effects. For instance,
sales taxes imposed specifically on imports are largely import tariffs by another name. If a
trade agreement restricted the use of border instruments only, governments might instead
resort to domestic instruments for the same purposes, if possible. The agreement must
therefore constrain also the use of domestic instruments.
The inclusion of domestic instruments severely complicates a problem that exists already
with regard to border instruments. First, there are an extremely large number of different
domestic policy instruments with trade impact. These instruments are typically used for
purposes that the members would agree to be legitimate, but they could also be employed
for the purpose of protectionism. The agreement hence has to be sensitive to the underlying
policy rationale – to be able to “sort the wheat from the chaff” – for an extremely large
number of domestic policies.
Second, there is a need to make the restrictions imposed on domestic policies responsive to
changes in the underlying economic/political environment. One possibility would be that the
agreement specified for each Member the policies to be pursued in each and every situation
that the Member might find itself in, that is, that the agreement is “state‐contingent” in
economic jargon.86 But of course, with the agreement intended to be in place for an extended
period of time, there would be a huge number of such different economic/political situations
that would call for different policy responses.
Needless to say, it would require an enormously complex agreement to separately bind all
domestic instruments with trade effects in a state contingent fashion. To the extent it would
be conceptually feasible at all, the costs of negotiating and drawing up such a grand contract
would be huge, and would most likely dominate the gains it would bring. Indeed, it would
amount to central planning at a global scale. Trade agreements are for these (and probably
also other) reasons therefore much less complex – they are contractually “incomplete.”

An alternative means of achieving politically efficient state contingency would be to leave discretion to
the importing country government over its domestic instruments, but to have in place a mechanism that
ensured that the governments face appropriate incentives from an efficiency point of view when unilaterally
determining its domestic policies. A dispute‐settlement mechanism would be a natural part of such a
mechanism.
86
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As an illustration of the difficulty facing negotiators, let us here quote again the Chairman of
the Technical Sub‐committee in charge of preparing the draft provision on National
Treatment (NT) during the London meeting of the Preparatory Committee:87
Whatever we do here, we shall never be able to cover every contingency and possibility
in a draft. Economic life is too varied for that, and there are all kinds of questions which
are bound to arise later on. The important thing is that once we have this agreement
laid down we have to act in the spirit of it. There is no doubt there will be certain
difficulties, but if we are able to cover 75 or 80 or 85 per cent of them I think it will be
sufficient.

Contractual incompleteness can take many forms.88 For instance, undertakings in the
agreement may not be conditioned on changes in the economic/political environment – they
are “rigid.” In other instances the agreement is silent on particular issues, leaving
“discretion” to individual governments to determine the policies unilaterally. Provisions
may also be vaguely formulated, postponing to future adjudication or negotiations the
clarification of the exact nature of the undertakings. The GATT exhibits all these forms of
incompleteness, albeit sometimes in less clean form than described here. For instance, border
(trade) instruments are rigidly bound: import and export quotas are forbidden and thus set
at their free trade levels; import tariffs are legal, but tariff levels are negotiated, and the
agreed‐upon levels are then bound; export subsidies are illegal. But while the bindings of
tariffs are rigid in the sense of not being explicitly conditioned on say the level of imports,
there are still a number of ways in which the tariffs can be adjusted ex post tariff
negotiations. For instance, temporary safeguards can be unilaterally imposed, it is possible to
temporarily increase tariffs in case of severe macroeconomic disturbances, and
renegotiations are possible.
Another example of the incompleteness of the GATT is the fact that it leaves domestic
instruments at the discretion of Members. As noted, there are strong reasons to believe that
governments have incentives to use such discretion for protectionist purposes, as a
substitute for the border instruments that have been bound. The first line of defense against
such behavior in most trade agreements is some form of NT provision.
2.3.2 The Role of NT: to Filter Out Protectionist Policies
The basic idea of the NT provision is deceptively simple: since inefficiencies from the use of
domestic instruments stem from less favorable treatment of imported products, countries
should not be allowed to treat domestic products better than foreign products solely by
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Document E/PC/T/C.II/PRO/PV/7.
The reasoning in the remainder of this Section draws partly on Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010).
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virtue of their different origins. While persuasive at a general level, the practical
implementation of this simple idea is far from trivial.
As emphasized above, the basic problem facing the treatment of domestic instruments in a
trade agreement is the need for it to be responsive to the nature of the national regulations it
affects. The fact that a regulation imposes costs on trading partners is not sufficient to show
that the measure is inefficient. It is therefore highly desirable that the regulation of domestic
instruments primarily filters out only those instances where differential treatment is
(internationally) inefficient.
A fundamental practical problem for this filtering is the fact that it depends on the preferences
of the Members whether a policy is efficient or not. For instance, it may be efficient to restrict
imports of a product when its environmental impact in the importing country is of concern
to the importing country government, while it would not be efficient if the government were
oblivious to such consequences. However, it is often very difficult to observe directly the
preferences of governments, and hence the true rationale for policies that are pursued.
Indeed, if it were possible to observe these motives, a NT provision would not be needed in
the first place: it could then be replaced by a simple yet powerful general dictum to not
pursue any inefficient policy.89 90
2.3.2.1 The Efficacy of NT for Given Tariff Levels
Having discussed the rationale for NT, we briefly turn to the question of its likely efficacy at
preventing inefficient use of domestic policies, drawing on the meager economic literature
on the role of NT in trade agreements. This literature is still in its infancy, and can at most
help identify some likely positive as well as negative features of the provision. The literature
for the most part considers a simplistic form of NT, what we will refer to as a “rigid” NT
rule, according to which members of the trade agreement must not treat a foreign product
differently than competing domestic products, regardless of any policy motives possibly
advanced as rationale for the differentiation. There exists thus hardly any economic analysis
that highlights the role of NT as a “filtering device.”
The literature has identified several mechanism though which NT may affect the welfare of
the parties, even if rigidly imposed so that no differential treatment is allowed of imported
and domestic products even if efficient. We will in this section consider effects that appear
also for given tariffs.

Such a policy would in principle just be an extreme case of negative integration, while its outcome
would be an extreme case of positive integration.
90 The problem would be exactly the same if the measure were to be evaluated under an exceptions clause
such as Art. XX GATT.
89
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Consider first some possible beneficial aspects of a rigid NT rule.
A first observation is that the direct impact of a rigid NT rule is indeed to constrain the
incentive to use of domestic instruments for protectionism, since any disadvantage imposed
on imported products must also be imposed on domestic products.
Second, this chilling effect on the incentives to use domestic instruments for protectionism
comes at a relatively limited contractual cost, since negotiators do not have to agree on a
huge number of specific domestic policies, but only need to agree on a principle that requires
a few lines of legal text. Furthermore, once such a principle is established and accepted, it
does not need to be renegotiated in subsequent rounds of tariff negotiations.
Third, as discussed above, for bindings of domestic policy instruments to be fully efficient
they would need to be state‐contingent, conditioning the prescribed policy levels on all
relevant circumstances that would affect their optimal levels. But such a complete contract
scenario would be enormously costly. A rigid NT rules allows for a similar adjustment to
exogenous circumstances, but in a very different, and from a contracting cost point of view
much cheaper, way: by leaving discretion over the common treatment of imported and
domestic products to importing country governments, it escapes the need for the parties to
determine the level for these instruments for long swathes of time, as would be the case if
this had to be done in a negotiation round. Instead, the importing country government can
unilaterally respond to changes in the economic environment whenever it likes. NT hence
has the virtue of limiting the possibility to use domestic instruments for protectionist
purposes, while at the same time preserving a certain degree of freedom to respond to
unforeseen events.
Turn next to the negative side of NT, still for constant tariffs. There are several fundamental
reasons to believe that NT (applied as a rigid rule or not) will not be panacea for achieving
full efficiency. To illustrate why, consider an example of taxation. A first limitation is that NT
only applies in situations where the tax on a domestic product is lower than the tax on a
competing imported product. This restriction would be hard to understand in a full
information context, but can be seen as a partial remedy to an informational problem, since it
tends to focus attention to cases where the likelihood of protectionism is likely to be higher.
Consequently, it does not have any bite in situations where the domestic product is taxed
higher than the imported product, but where this difference in taxation should be even
larger. Nor can it enforce higher taxation of the domestic product in situations where it is
taxed lower at the outset, it can maximally enforce equal taxation.
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To illustrate, suppose that a domestic and a foreign product are identical in all respects,
except for that the domestic product gives rise to environmental damage in the importing
country. Suppose further that the efficient tax on imports is tI = 0% and that the efficient tax
on the domestic product is tD = 40%. If the importing country were to set, say, tD = 20% and tI
= 10%, NT could have no impact, despite the fact that these taxes are not efficient.
A second limitation to the efficacy of the NT provision is the fact that the decision over the
common tax tD = tI will be made unilaterally by the importing country, and will thus likely
give rise to international externalities. To illustrate, modify the example above so that both
products are equally damaging to the environment, with efficiency requiring taxes tD = tI =
5%, The importing country may unilaterally prefer tD = 0% and tI = 20% absent NT. But
forced to set uniform taxes, it might balance the benefits from taxing the imported product
against the costs of the taxation of the domestic product, by setting an inefficient common
tax tD = tI = 10%.91 This would be a higher level than would be called for from the point of
view of combating the environmental problem. But the resulting distortion would be
worthwhile from the importing country government’s point of view, since the government
puts a value on the restraining effect on imports. More generally, whenever the policy
decision neglects foreign interests, there are almost always alternative policies that are more
efficient internationally.
This example reflects a more general asymmetry between the treatment of border
instruments and domestic instruments from an efficiency point of view. There is a
presumption that the negotiations over the bindings of border instruments will (at least
under certain circumstances) lead to efficient outcomes. In the case of domestic instruments
however, there is no presumption that NT‐compatible tax levels will be efficient.
2.3.2.2 The Interaction between Tariffs and Taxes
As argued earlier in this Chapter, the purpose of NT is to prevent tariff concessions from
being undermined through subsequent opportunistic use of domestic instruments, in order
to provide incentives for countries to make such concessions. It is therefore essential to take
into consideration the interplay between tariff setting and subsequent unilateral
determination of domestic instruments. The literature has so far concentrated on the
interplay with tax setting, so we concentrate on this case.92
First, as repeatedly stressed in the above, it may be desirable from an (international)
efficiency point of view to allow for higher taxation of imported products. It may therefore

We are here disregarding the possibility that trade agreements may serve as a commitment device; this
possibility will be discussed briefly in Section 4.
92 Tie arguments in this Section draws on Horn (2006, 2009).
91
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seem inevitable that a NT rule that does not allow for such differential treatment must be
inefficient when it is desirable to tax imported products higher than domestic products.
While there is something to this argument, some caution is needed. The reason is that the
argument implicitly rests on the assumption of constant tariffs. But what matters for the
market access of imported products is not only domestic taxation, but the total taxation these
products face. For instance, in the case where the domestic instrument perfectly substitutes
for the tariff, as with a sales tax on the imported product, what matters for imports is the
sum of the tariff and the sales tax.
To illustrate, consider a case where because of an environmental hazard from imports,
efficiency requires that the total taxation of the imported product exceeds that on the
domestic product. It is clear that if such an environmental hazard were to appear
unexpectedly after import tariffs have been agreed upon, an inability to impose a higher tax
on imported products would be costly. On the other hand, if the environmental hazard is
known at the time of tariff negotiations, and is taken into account by trade negotiators, the
tariff on this product can fully reflect the adverse environmental impact, even if taxes are set
equally, and the rigid NT rule hence is respected.
This example illustrates two related points. First, in order to assess the cost of an inflexible
imposition of NT it is necessary to take tariff setting into account. Second, the cost of this
inflexibility can be mitigated (and may in theory at least be dominated by the gains),
provided that trade negotiators take into consideration the noncommercial effects of their
tariff agreement.
Second, it was emphasized above that at the core of the rationale for NT is an informational
problem: the need for the provision stems from the fact that government preferences are not
easily observable. But very little work has been done to date on informational aspects of NT.
One of the few steps in this direction (Horn (2009)) suggests a reason why NT primarily
restrains governments with, from an efficiency point of view, legitimate reasons for
imposing higher taxes on imported products than on competing domestic products.
Consider the following illustrative example. An importing country government can have
two different motives to impose a higher tax on imports than on domestic competing
products: all governments have the standard protectionist motive, and some governments
face local environmental problems stemming from the transportation or consumption of the
imported product. Outsider observers cannot tell whether a higher tax on an imported
product is motivated by one or both of these motives. In economic jargon, we can thus think
of the governments as being of two “types” – those that have only protectionist motives for
differential taxation, and those that have both protectionist and environmental motives – and
governments’ types are unknown.
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Now note two features: First, since an environmentally affected government faces the same
protectionist motives as the other type of government, its unilaterally optimal tax differential
will be larger than if only protectionism motivated the tax setting, since the environmental
problem adds a reason for taxing the imported products higher. Second, if the negotiated
tariff is sufficiently high, there is no need to use domestic taxes to achieve any of these
objectives. The importing country can set the same tax rate (perhaps equal to zero), and can
achieve both its protectionist and a possible environmental target in a NT‐compatible
fashion through the tariff.
As the tariff is gradually lowered from this level however, it becomes increasingly likely that
there is not enough of a difference in total taxation between the imported and the domestic
product. The government to first experience this problem is the government that faces the
environmental problems from imports, since it has stringer incentives to maintain a large tax
differential than the government that is solely motivated by the protectionism. The
environmentally affected type of government type will hence be the first to switch to lower
taxation of the domestic product, and thus come under NT. In this sense, as trade is
liberalized, NT first affects those governments that desire high total taxation of the imported product
not only for protectionist reasons, but also for environmental reasons. NT in this sense starts to
bind from the wrong side of the spectrum of government types.
Of course, this feature of NT may be immaterial if the adjudication process flawlessly
determines whether countries have been exposed to environmental hazards of sufficiently
severe nature for it to be in the global interest to let these countries continue with their
differential taxation. But if there are, e.g., litigation costs, or adjudicating bodies occasionally
commit judicial mistakes, this aspect may take on significance.
2.3.2.3 The Nature of the Costs of Judicial Errors
Because of the difficulties in assessing the true nature of domestic measures, adjudicating
bodies are bound to make mistakes. These can broadly speaking take one of two forms. One
possible mistake is to permit measures that should be declared illegal. The cost of such
mistakes are borne by the affected trading partner, and will at least partly take the form of
reduced profits of exporters, and consequent losses of income for other interests associated
with the exporting firms.
The other type of mistake is to outlaw measures that should be allowed. Considering the
nature of the values that domestic regulations may seek to protect, such as human health
and the environment, it may appear as if the costs from judicial mistakes in the form of
erroneous impositions of an inflexible dictum to not set lower taxes on domestic products
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may be particularly severe. While there is something to this argument, it does not seem to be
entirely correct.93
To see why, consider the case where imports are associated with a severe health hazard; for
instance, it has just been discovered that asbestos constitutes a severe danger to human
health. With the tariff on an asbestos‐containing product bound, efficiency might require to
let the importing country set a higher domestic tax on the imported product, since
consumers who are oblivious to the dangers of asbestos would otherwise purchase the
cheaper asbestos‐containing product. But suppose the adjudicator erroneously declares the
measure to violate NT. In such case, despite the constraint imposed by NT, the importing
country is still not forced to accept health damage from the consumption of the imported
product: it can still set the common tax level high enough to completely choke off imports.94 This will
be optimal for the government to do if the health hazard is severe enough.
The point illustrated through this example is hence that a rigid application of NT always
leaves the importing country with the possibility to shut out imports completely. The cost of
the judicial mistake is in such an instance not in the form of reduced human health (other
than possibly indirectly through, e.g., reduced national income). The cost takes instead the
form of lost domestic consumer and producer welfare, since domestic production must face
the same prohibitive taxes as imports. Health effects might instead arise in situations where
the hazard is less severe, and where consequently it is not worthwhile for the government to
completely shut out imports.
2.3.3 An Alternative View of the Role of Trade Agreements
The theory laid out above sees trade agreements as means to limit international externalities
from unilateral policymaking. An alternative view of the purpose of trade agreements builds
on the notion that absent an agreement, each government pursues policies that are not in its
own long‐run interest. In particular, because of previous actions by private interests, a
government may find itself in a situation where it finds it optimal to behave in a more
protectionist fashion than it would normally prefer to do; for instance, a government may
find it necessary to bail out a domestic industry that has put itself in dire straits in
expectation of a bail‐out. A commitment to a trade agreement may make it more costly for a
government to give in to such a request. This may in turn induce private interests not to
behave so as to put the government in this position in the first place, knowing that the
commitment to the trade agreement will prevent the government from pursuing the policies
the private interests would like to see. The difference between this approach and the
international externalities approach is thus that a trade agreement in this view solves a
93
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The reasoning here builds on Horn (2009).
We disregard the possibility of a nonviolation complaint.
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domestic political problem, rather than an international problem. The international
dimension of the interaction concerns only the enforcement – the trade agreement provides a
commitment possibility.
In what follows, we will rely on an international externalities approach, partly since it is
used by all economic studies of the role of NT that we are aware of, and partly since it seems
to explain certain features of Art. III GATT better than the commitment approach. It seems
that if the main purpose of trade agreements were to commit governments to liberal trade,
agreements would have been drafted differently. Indeed, a main feature of the DSU is that it
limits the possibility for enforcement of concessions.95 This is by no means to deny the fact
that agreements may also serve other purposes, for instance, to help governments to commit
vis‐à‐vis against lobbies to liberal policies.
2.3.4 Summary of the Rationale of NT from an Economic Perspective
The main observations to stem from the discussion of the role of NT from the perspective of
economics are the following:
(a) The purpose of trade agreements is to limit the extent to which governments expose
trading partners to negative externalities from their unilateral policy decisions.
(b) The role of NT is to reduce the externalities that follow from the fact that it is
infeasible for governments to bind domestic instruments.
(c) NT is likely to constrain the use of domestic instruments for protectionist purposes,
but there are a number of reasons why NT will not achieve full efficiency, including
the fact that unilaterally set NT‐compatible (i.e., common) tax levels will not be
internationally efficient.
(d) The evaluation of the efficiency of a contested measure, whether it amounts to
“protectionism,” requires information concerning government preferences.

3 The Implementation of NT in Case Law
3.1 The Case Law Regarding Art. III GATT
In this Chapter, we discuss the completion of Art. III GATT through case law since 1948. The
main conclusions that stem from this study are as follows:
For instance, it puts an upper bound on the magnitude of counter‐measures that can be legally
imposed, and it can retard the implementation of counter‐measures by several years by requesting the case to
be reviewed by both a panel and the AB, and this despite the fact compensation is not possible.
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(a) Case law is not consistent in its interpretation of several core concepts in the
provision;
(b) Case law is often highly uninformative concerning the reasoning behind
determinations. The fears of the negotiators regarding the (in)appropriateness of some
of the terms used in the body of this provision have been confirmed: case law has not
managed to pin them down in one measurable dimension and, as a result, there is still
considerable uncertainty regarding the understanding of terms such as “like
products”and “less favorable treatment.” This is probably due to the fact that, in line with
the overall attitude especially of the AB, case law has privileged a textualist, a‐
contextual understanding of the various terms appearing in the body of Art.III GATT
and deprived them of their connecting thread, the objective of this provision which is
embedded in the first paragraph of Art. III GATT. References to the objectives of this
provision have been selective and self‐contained, in the sense that they have not
informed the interpretation of the key terms appearing in the body of Art. III GATT.
(c) Overall, it is unclear to what extent case law interpretations have implemented the
purpose of NT.
Recall that Art. III GATT requests from WTO Members not to afford protection to domestic
production through their domestic instruments; in other words, once (imported) goods have
paid their ticket to entry (e.g., tariff) into a market, they cannot be subjected to any burden
that the domestic products with which they are competing are not subjected to; as a result,
all protection through border instruments in the GATT is a matter of negotiation and can
take one form only: tariff protection. Art. III GATT does not enumerate one by one the
domestic instruments to which it applies, except for local content requirements that are
explicitly mentioned in Art. III.5 GATT. Two instruments (government procurement,
subsidies) are explicitly omitted, and all the remaining instruments (irrespective whether of
fiscal or nonfiscal nature) are, in principle, covered.
Recall further that the GATT does not impose any common policies on WTO Members; they
remain free to unilaterally define their fiscal, competition, public‐health, environment, etc.
policies in any manner they deem it appropriate. What matters is that, at the stage when they
regulate, they do not discriminate against imported products. The GATT is thus a negative
integration scheme. Put differently, Art. III GATT seeks to equate conditions of competition
within and not across markets.
The remaining part of this Chapter is divided as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the rationale
for NT as it has been explained in case law, and the case‐law interpretation of the various
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terms appearing in the provision; Section 3.3 discusses the exceptions to NT; in Section 3.4,
we revert to the critique that has been voiced against the manner in which case law has
interpreted NT: this Section, although not exhaustive, reproduces the quintessence of the
critique voiced so far. Section 3.5 briefly concludes the analysis of the case‐law
implementation of Art. III GATT.

3.2 The Legal Discipline
In theory, the argument could be made that all instruments affecting trade come under the
purview of Art. III GATT. This view finds ample support in the text of the provision, which
explicitly excludes two instruments only from its coverage, and has been endorsed, as we
will see in more detail infra, in case law. The fact, however, that all domestic instruments are,
in principle, covered by the NT provision does not mean that all of them can be legally used
by the importing state and imposed on imported products: for example, the text of Art. III.2
GATT leaves little doubt that a domestic (say consumption) tax is covered by its disciplines
and a WTO Member has obligation not to impose on imported goods a tax higher than it
imposes on domestic like goods. This obligation nonetheless is predicated on a right to apply
consumption taxes to domestic and imported goods. This right does not originate in the
GATT. In fact, the GATT framers did not spend any time discussing this issue. They took it
for granted that the GATT contracting parties (now, WTO Members) are all well‐defined
jurisdictional entities and will behave in line with the (public international law) rules
governing allocation of jurisdiction.96 These rules, nonetheless, are far from clear: one
distinguishes between the nationality‐principle (whereby a state regulates behavior of its
nationals wherever committed), and the territoriality‐principle (whereby a state regulates
behavior which either occurs in, or has an effect on home soil).97 Whereas it is clear in public
international law that, in case of conflict between the two, it is the territoriality‐principle that
prevails, it is unclear what happens if a transaction affects more than one jurisdiction. In
principle, more than one jurisdiction could decide this issue; this is so, for a number of
reasons: first, it is nowhere stated that a quantification of effects is an appropriate tool in this
context, and consequently it cannot to be excluded that, in practice, even minimal effects
might confer jurisdiction; second, it could be the case that the importance two states attach to
a particular effects differs (state A is not very risk averse and hence does not mind if acid
rain hits it one day, whereas state B is quite risk averse and wants to avoid even a couple of
drops); third, it is unclear whether effects must be tangible, physical effects, or whether
‘moral’ effects (such as for example, distress in country A caused by the fact that country B
See Horn and Mavroidis (2008).
There are other bases conferring jurisdiction : there is for example, universal jurisdiction; it covers
however, specific transactions. The two bases mentioned here are the default bases applicable whenever
another, more specific rule does not kick in, see various contributions in Meessen (1996) on this score.
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practices child labor, even if such products are not being exported to A), also confer
jurisdiction. As a result, it is not unheard of that, in practice, a transaction is often submitted
to various jurisdictions with the resulting burden in terms of transaction costs, and that
disputes arise regarding the question who is competent to regulate a particular transaction.

3.2.1

Which Measures Come Under the Scope of NT?

The precise boundary between border and domestic instruments is unclear, and has been a
recurring theme in case law. With regard to domestic instruments, Art. III.1 GATT stipulates
an extremely broad coverage by referring to
. . . internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and
requirements . . .

having the effect of
. . . affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution
or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture,
processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions . . .

The same broad approach is continued in Art. III.2 GATT, which states that exports of a
Member shall not be subject,
. . . directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products . . . . [emphasis added]

Similarly, Art. III.4 requests no less favorable treatment of imported products with respect to
. . . all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use.

There are two exceptions to this approach:
(a) Art. III.5 GATT explicitly outlaws local content requirements: all measures whereby a
government privileges goods containing a set amount of domestic added value are
outlawed. This prohibition has been further underscored through the advent of the
TRIMs Agreement which contains an illustrative list of such measures. No other
domestic instruments (other than local content requirements), are explicitly
prohibited by Art. III GATT;
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(b) two measures are explicitly exempted from the NT obligation by virtue of Art. III.8
GATT: producer subsidies, and government procurement. Hence, with respect to
these measures, WTO Members can behave unconstrained by the NT obligation.
The wording that the framers privileged was quite wide: the term directly or indirectly in Art
III.2 GATT were inserted at the initiative of the UK delegate, and replaced the terms in
connection with previously used.98 It was felt that limits to the discretion of the regulating
state were in order. At Havana, for example, it was recorded that:
. . . neither income taxes nor import duties fall within the scope of Art 18 (of the Havana
Charter—Art III of the GATT) which is concerned solely with internal taxes on goods.99

The preparatory work thus suggests that the intent of the negotiators was to exclude at least
some taxes from the coverage of this provision, even though the wording they agreed upon
gives the opposite impression. It should be recalled however, as pointed out above, that the
intention was to renegotiate some of the key terms of Art. III GATT in the ITO. This
renegotiation never took place however, nor did GATT Members renegotiate the provision
in subsequent GATT rounds. The failure of the ITO did lead to one attempt to clarify the
ambit of Art. III GATT – the creation of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments. Some
clarification with respect to the coverage of NT was provided through the negotiations in
this context, although no full agreement was achieved regarding the coverage, but as we will
argue below, the outcome did not resolve the core issues concerning the interpretation of the
provision. We discuss this further in Section 3.3.
There is probably less ambiguity with respect to internal measures of nonfiscal nature. Art.
III.4 GATT covers all internal laws, regulations and requirements affecting imported
products. The term affecting suggests a will to cast the net widely. This view is also
supported by the fact that there is no negotiating record indicating that specific transactions
were intended to be excluded.100
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See § 13 of the annex to the Working Party report on Border Tax Adjustments (GATT Doc. BISD 18S/87ff).
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See § 12 of the annex to the working party report on Border Tax Adjustments, op cit.

See on this score, Irwin et al. (2008). This is not to suggest that NT can equally meaningfully apply to all
domestic policies/measures. Its application on substantive (as opposed to procedural) antitrust laws is, for
example, problematic: a WTO Member which accepts a merger between two domestic companies and,
subsequently, rejects a merger between a foreign and a domestic company operating all four in the same
relevant product market has not necessarily violated NT; moving from say six to five or from five to four
companies in a market involves different considerations (inter alia, because the degree of concentration as
measured in Herfindhal‐Hirschmann Index terms will be different).
100
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We now leave the letter of the law and its negotiating history, to turn to the case law. Case
law has further clarified that NT covers transactions relating to both bound (i.e., goods on
which a tariff concession has been concluded) and unbound items as well. The AB left no
doubt in this regard (Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, p 17):
. . . The Article III national treatment obligation is a general prohibition on the use of internal
taxes and other internal regulatory measures so as to afford protection to domestic
production. This obligation clearly extends also to products not bound under Article II.

Note that domestic measures enforced at the border come, according to the Interpretative Note
ad Art III of the GATT, under the purview of Art. III GATT. Thus, a sales ban which is
enforced at the border (and could be viewed as a trade embargo) will still be considered to
be a sales ban (and, consequently, come under the purview of Art. III GATT, and not that of
Art. XI GATT).
Finally, GATT panels and WTO adjudicating bodies have consistently held that not only de
jure, but also de facto discrimination is covered by Art. III GATT.101

3.2.2

The Right to Regulate

As mentioned above, the GATT contracting parties did not spend any time during the
negotiation of the GATT discussing the right to regulate for example, the level of customs
duties or domestic taxes. One can thus reasonably assume that they took it for granted that
the default rules governing the permissible jurisdictional reach of national legislation would
be applicable in the trading context as well.
The default rules do solve some problems, but not others.102 One deficiency is that the default
rules do not exclude the possibility of concurrent exercise of jurisdiction (that is, cases where
more than one sovereignty is awarded jurisdiction over a transaction and exercises its right
to regulate it). Disputes concerning cases where countries concurrently exercising
jurisdiction impose different forms of regulation often find their way to courts and arbitral

In the former case, imported and domestic products are treated differently solely by virtue of their
different origins. De facto discrimination is less well‐defined. It arises in situations where domestic and foreign
goods are subject to the same policy rule, and in this respect are treated identically. But due to differences in the
characteristics of the two products the application of the policy rules results in differential treatment, even
though there is no regulatory motive for this other than protectionism.
102 For a concise description, see Horn and Mavroidis (2008).
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tribunals, if one (some of them) dispute the right of others to regulate the particular
transaction. The GATT contracting parties entertained a discussion on this issue subsequent
to the entry into force of the GATT in the above‐mentioned Working Party on Border Tax
Adjustments. This Working Party was not intended to discuss all issues associated with
jurisdictional reach. In fact, its origins were much humbler: some GATT contracting parties
felt that the GATT was not neutral towards the basic properties of a domestic fiscal system
and was not treating in even‐handed manner direct and indirect taxation. By attempting to
determine which fiscal instruments could (and could not) be adjusted at the border by either
the importing or the exporting state, this Working Party provided nevertheless, a partial
response to the question which fiscal instruments can a particular jurisdiction lawfully
employ. 103
The Working Party did not manage to reach a total solution, as we will see in more detail
infra. Consequently, disagreements on the permissible jurisdictional reach would have to be
submitted to adjudication. However, at the time of writing, there has not been one single
case where a WTO adjudicating body was requested to directly address the core
jurisdictional issue: how are the rights to regulate distributed among WTO Members.
Indirectly, nonetheless, WTO adjudicating bodies did provide scarce evidence regarding
their understanding of this issue. They have not managed though, to complete the contract
in this regard. For example, in US – Shrimp, the AB did state that the US should have shown
a “nexus” between its interest to regulate and the transaction at hand, but the AB did not
specify the precise meaning of this concept, nor did the AB explain what the implications
would be if parties on both sides of the dispute could demonstrate a nexus. We tend to
believe that the AB is mindful of the jurisdictional issue as prerequisite for lawful exercise of
jurisdiction but we still lack a test that explains in concrete terms how to discern lawful
exercise jurisdiction.

3.2.3

Fiscal Measures

Art. III.2 GATT reads:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other
An origin principle is often taken to mean that the taxation of a traded product is determined by the
exporting country, while the importing country is assumed to set the tax on the product under the destination
principle. However, the issue of origin versus destination principle is in principle separate from the allocation
of the jurisdiction.
103
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internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set
forth in paragraph 1.

The Interpretative Note ad Art. III.2 of the GATT reads:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be
considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases where
competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other
hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.

Art. III.1 GATT (to which Art. III.2 GATT refers) reads:
The Members recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations
and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture,
processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.

Therefore, a complaining party can choose between two possible routes. One is to argue that:
(a) the domestic and the foreign products are like; and
(b) the latter is taxed in excess of the former.
The other is to claim that:
(a) the two products are directly competitive or substitutable (DCS);
(b) the two products are not similarly taxed; and that
(c) the dissimilar taxation is applied so as to afford protection (ASATAP) to domestic
production.
Central to the scope of NT is the adjudicating bodies’ interpretation of the italicized terms.
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3.2.3.1 The Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments
The adoption of the report by the Working Party (WP) on Border tax Adjustments (BTAs)104 was
preceded by intermediate reports that remain unpublished105 and that reflect the earlier
discussions among the members of the WP.
The WP was asked to discuss which border tax adjustments were permissible by exporting
and importing GATT contracting parties: could for example, the importing state lawfully
adjust (lower) payroll taxes imposed by the exporting state? Could it adjust sales taxes?
Conversely, could the exporting state exempt from domestic sales taxation exported
products without running the risk of being accused for violating Art. XVI GATT? In short,
how much regulatory authority do the exporting and importing states have when taxing
traded goods?

3.2.3.1.1 The Findings in the Working Party Final Report
The negotiators agreed on the so–called destination principle, which was understood to
circumscribe the taxes that can be lawfully adjusted. Section 4 of the final report of the WP
explains this principle in the following terms:
. . . which enable exported products to be relieved of some or all of the tax charged in
the exporting country in respect of similar domestic products sold to consumers on the
home market and which enable imported products sold to consumers to be charged
with some or all of the tax charged in the importing country in respect of similar
domestic products.

Taxation could thus, in principle, be adjusted by both the importing and the exporting state:
the key was that if the destination of the good was a market other than the market where the
good had been produced either the exporter or the importer could adjust the level of taxation
imposed when the same good were sold in the market where it had been produced. The
GATT contracting parties had before them a rather detailed document that explained how
adjustment took place across various countries practicing it (GATT Doc. L/3389), and that
served as background information.

Art. II.2 GATT provides the legal basis for border tax adjustments since it explicitly provides that tax
adjustments are lawful provided that they meet the requirements of Art. III GATT. It does not, however,
explain whether adjustments can be lawfully made on all or only on some taxes.
105 GATT Docs. L/3138 and L/3190.
104
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The GATT contracting parties reached agreement on some measures, but failed to do so on
many others. The extent of their agreement is reflected in the following paragraph:
. . . the Working Party concluded that there was convergence of views to the effect that
taxes directly levied on products were eligible for tax adjustment. Examples of such
taxes comprised specific excise duties, sales taxes and cascade taxes and the tax on
value added. It was agreed that the TVA, regardless of its technical construction
(fractioned collection), was equivalent in this respect to a tax levied directly—a retail
or sales tax. Furthermore, the Working Party concluded that there was convergence of
views to the effect that certain taxes that were not directly levied on products were not
eligible for tax adjustment. Examples of such taxes comprised social security charges
whether on employers or employees and payroll taxes.106

The GATT contracting parties also agreed to provide information if requested, regarding the
reasons for, and the calculation of, any tax adjustment (§ 17 of the final report):
It was generally agreed that countries adjusting taxes should, at all times, be prepared,
if requested, to account for the reasons for adjustment, for the methods used, for the
amount of compensation and to furnish proof thereof.107

There was also agreement between negotiators that some taxes, such as cascade taxes,108 were
eligible for adjustment, the modalities for adjusting were not clear though (§ 16 of the final
report):
The Working Party noted that there were some taxes which, while generally
considered eligible for adjustment, presented a problem because of the difficulty in
some cases of calculating exactly the amount of compensation. Examples of such
difficulties were encountered in cascade taxes. For adjustment, countries operating
cascade systems usually resorted to calculating average rates of rebate for categories of
products rather than calculating the actual tax levied on a particular product. It was
noted, however, that most cascade tax systems were to be replaced by TVA systems,
and that therefore the area in which such problems occurred was diminishing. Other
examples included composite goods which, on export, contained ingredients for
which the Working Party agreed in principle it was administratively sensible and
sufficiently accurate to rebate by average rates for a given class of goods.

106

See § 14 of the final report.

107

On the allocation of burden of proof in GATT/WTO, see Horn and Mavroidis (2009).
A cascade tax is a turnover tax which is applied in every stage of the production process.

108
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There was a divergence of views regarding the eligibility for adjustment of taxes occultes and
some other taxes such as property taxes. The scarcity of complaints with respect to either of
these two taxes however, persuaded negotiators to stop negotiating on them (§ 15 of the final
report):
The Working Party noted that there was a divergence of views with regard to the
eligibility for adjustment of certain categories of tax and that these could be sub‐
divided into
(a) “Taxes occultes” which the OECD defined as consumption taxes on capital
equipment, auxiliary materials and services used in the transportation and production
of other taxable goods. Taxes on advertising, energy, machinery and transport were
among the more important taxes which might be involved. It appeared that
adjustment was not normally made for taxes occultes except in countries having a
cascade tax;
(b) Certain other taxes, such as property taxes, stamp duties and registration duties . . .
which are not generally considered eligible for tax adjustment. Most countries do not
make adjustments for such taxes, but a few do as a few do for the payroll taxes and
employers’ social security charges referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 14.
It was generally felt that while this area of taxation was unclear, its importance ‐ as
indicated by the scarcity of complaints reported in connexion with adjustment of taxes
occultes ‐ was not such as to justify further examination.

The Working Party did not manage to resolve all ambiguities and disagreements regarding
tax adjustability: for instance, no agreement with respect to tax occultes was possible;
moreover, besides the agreement on the two outer sides of the continuum (consumption
taxes on the one hand, property taxes on the other) this Working Party did not manage to
design a legal test that would guide future practice with respect to the adjustability (or not)
of domestic instruments.
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3.2.3.1.2 The Legal Significance of the Working Party Final Report109
The report of the Working Party on BTAs was adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING
PARTIES, the GATT‐organ that had the authority to do so.110 The legal value of similar acts is
addressed in GATT (as it has been amended following the successful conclusion of the
Uruguay Round) albeit in unclear terms: there is doubt whether the Working Party report
should qualify as a decision by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, and thus come under the
purview of Art. 1(b)(iv) GATT 1994, or whether it should be considered as part of the GATT
acquis, and then come under the purview of Art. XVI of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
But no matter how it is classified, the WP report will have legal significance: if however, it
comes under the former it should be regarded as binding on all WTO Members, whereas if it
comes under the latter it should be regarded as merely creating legitimate expectations across
WTO Members to the effect that WTO practice will be guided by its content.
Recall that the GATT 1994 is not content‐wise the same agreement as GATT 1947. The latter
was substantially modified through the negotiations during the Uruguay Round during
which it was agreed to add to the original text all decisions adopted by the GATT
CONTRACTING PARTIES since 1947. The GATT 1994 (as the new GATT is known)
comprises a series of decisions by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES aiming at clarifying
the original text.
Among the instruments included, Art. 1(b)(iv) GATT 1994 mentions “other decisions” of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The meaning of this term is unclear. The panel report on Japan–
Alcoholic Beverages II addressed the issue of whether GATT panel reports that had been
adopted by way of a decision of the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES are in fact “decisions”
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 within the meaning of Art. 1(b)(iv) GATT
1994. The panel was of the view that adopted panel reports had the status of any other
decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Consequently, the panel held that adopted panel
reports form an integral part of GATT 1994 as they are “other decisions of the Contracting
Parties to GATT 1947” within the meaning of Art. 1(b)(iv) of GATT 1994.” (§ 6.10). The
Appellate Body (AB) disagreed with the panel, and held that the “decision” to adopt a panel
report is not a “decision” within the meaning of Art. 1(b)(iv) GATT 1994, though it did
acknowledge that adopted reports are “an important part of the GATT acquis.” (p. 15). The
term “GATT acquis” is a creation of the AB, which only clarified the meaning of this concept
subsequently in US – Shrimp (Art. 21.5 – Malaysia). We quote from §§ 108 ‐ 109:

109
110

This Section relies heavily on Mavroidis (2007).
When using block letters we refer to the statutory organ that has legal authority to decide a particular

issue.
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In this respect, we note that in our Report in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, we
stated that:
‘Adopted Panel Reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are
often considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations
among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they
are relevant to any dispute.’
This reasoning applies to adopted Appellate Body Reports as well. Thus, in taking into
account the reasoning in an adopted Appellate Body Report  a Report, moreover,
that was directly relevant to the Panelʹs disposition of the issues before it  the Panel
did not err. The Panel was correct in using our findings as a tool for its own reasoning.
Further, we see no indication that, in doing so, the Panel limited itself merely to
examining the new measure from the perspective of the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB.

Hence, it turns out that what the AB meant by the term acquis was the legitimate
expectations of WTO Members to see that the relevant prior case law will duly be taken into
account in future disputes, even though there is no legal obligation to follow the findings and
conclusions of GATT panels that had previously dealt with the same issue. This issue arose
again in the context of the dispute that led to the panel report on US – FSC, where the panel
was of the view that decisions to adopt reports should come under Art. XVI of the Agreement
Establishing the WTO (WTO Agreement). Such decisions are not legally binding on
subsequent panels. Nevertheless, they are not totally irrelevant from a pure legal perspective
either. Art. XVI WTO Agreement reads:
. . . the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices
followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947.

Consequently, the legal effect of adopted GATT reports is to provide “guidance.” On
appeal, the AB in its report on US – FSC followed a rather convoluted reasoning even though
it ended up ultimately following the panel’s conclusion (§§ 108‐115).
Previous decisions by GATT panels are usually referred to as support for findings already
reached. This trend is observable in WTO practice. In light of this discussion, it seems that
the better arguments lie with the view that the Working Party report should come under Art.
1(b)(iv) GATT 1994: the Working Party was not convened to adjudicate on a dispute between
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two GATT contracting parties;111 it was requested to discuss the treatment of tax adjustments
at the GATT‐wide level. In subsequent practice, a number of WTO panel and AB reports
have referred to this report, without however, classifying it either as part and parcel of Art.
1(b)(iv) GATT 1994 or under Art. XVI WTO Agreement.112 But, as already argued, even if one
takes the view that it should be considered to be part of the GATT acquis, it would still retain
legal value as explained above. The fact that it has been often cited in WTO case law leaves
little room for doubt that recourse to it will be made again if, for example, the question
whether payroll taxes can be adjusted comes up. Consequently, at the very least, we should
understand Art. III GATT as excluding from adjustment by the importing state some taxes
such as payroll taxes.113

3.2.3.2 DCS Products114
The AB in its report on Korea—Alcoholic Beverages held that like products are a sub‐set of DCS
products: if two products are like, they are, by definition, DCS as well (§ 118):
‘Like’ products are a subset of directly competitive or substitutable products: all like products
are, by definition, directly competitive or substitutable products, whereas not all ‘directly
competitive or substitutable’ products are ‘like’.

It follows that case law regarding the definition of DCS is ipso facto relevant for the
interpretation of the term like products.
The AB in its report on Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II provided its understanding of DCS
products. This dispute arose because of a Japanese taxation scheme which, while on its face
neutral, subjected predominantly Western products to a heavier taxation than predominantly
Japanese products: as a result, sochu (an alcoholic beverage predominantly produced in
Japan) was subjected to less burdensome taxation than, inter alia, whisky (an alcoholic
beverage predominantly produced in Europe and the United States). Europe and the United
States protested arguing that the products at hand were at least DCS, if not like, products.
The panel had already accepted that all of the products concerned (with the exception of
111 Although the term WP was often reserved to what is now always referred to as a GATT panel, that is,
an adjudicating body.
112 See for example, the panel and AB report on Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II.
113 To some extent this report is consonant with the default rules regulating allocation of jurisdiction:
whereas sales taxes should be prescribed by the country where a sale takes place, payroll taxes should be
prescribed by countries where production takes place.
114 We start with the interpretation of the term DCS products because, as we will see, case law has clarified
that DCS is a necessary but not sufficient property of like products.
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vodka that was deemed to be like product to sochu) were DCS products. The AB upheld the
panel’s findings in this regard. In its view:
(a) physical characteristics;
(b) common end‐uses; and
(c) tariff classification
are appropriate elements to take into account when defining whether two products are DCS.
Importantly, upholding the panel’s findings in this regard, the AB made it clear that the test
to define whether two products are DCS is in the marketplace, in the sense that, it is
consumers who will ultimately decide whether two products are indeed in competition with
each other. To this effect, econometric indicators (for instance, the cross‐price elasticity)115 are
relevant to define whether two products are indeed in competition with each other. The
European Community had submitted some consumer surveys to this effect, suggesting that
Japanese consumers in the absence of discriminatory taxation would be prepared to
substitute a host of Western drinks for sochu (p 25):
In this case, the Panel emphasized the need to look not only at such matters as physical
characteristics, common end‐uses, and tariff classifications, but also at the ‘market place.’ This
seems appropriate. The GATT 1994 is a commercial agreement, and the WTO is concerned,
after all, with markets. It does not seem inappropriate to look at competition in the relevant
markets as one among a number of means of identifying the broader category of products
that might be described as ‘directly competitive or substitutable’.
Nor does it seem inappropriate to examine elasticity of substitution as one means of
examining those relevant markets. The Panel did not say that cross‐price elasticity of demand
is ‘the decisive criterion’ (footnote omitted) for determining whether products are directly
competitive or substitutable. The Panel stated the following:
In the Panel’s view, the decisive criterion in order to determine whether two products are
directly competitive or substitutable is whether they have common end‐uses, inter alia, as
shown by elasticity of substitution.

The cross‐price elasticity of demand provides information about the demand relationship between two
products, by capturing how a price increase for one product increases the demand for another product.
(Formally, it is defined as the percentage change in quantity demanded of some good X divided by the
percentage change in price for good Y). Adjudicating bodies have not so far provided any guidance on what
values of the cross‐price elasticity that would normally be necessary for two products to be considered DCS.
115
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We agree. And, we find the Panel’s legal analysis of whether the products are ‘directly
competitive or substitutable products’ in paragraphs 6. 28–6.32 of the Panel Report to be
correct. (italics and emphasis in the original).

In Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, the AB kept the same test for defining whether two products
are DCS, reducing, however, econometric indicators to be but one of several possible
avenues to show that a DCS‐relationship between two products exists. In this case, the facts
were similar to those in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II: beverages predominantly produced in
Korea (soju) were hit by a substantially lower tax burden than their counterparts which were
predominantly produced in the European Community, Canada, and the United States
(vodka, whisky, etc). The European Community, Canada, and the United States complained,
arguing that the Korean regime was GATT‐inconsistent. Korea argued that its system could
not be held to be GATT‐inconsistent since, the products concerned were not DCS in the first
place: the price of (diluted) soju116 was a small fraction of the price of the Western drinks at
hand, claiming thus that changes in the price of soju would not lead its consumers to
consumption of Western drinks. Consequently, following the analysis in Japan—Alcoholic
Beverages, and the relevance of econometric indicators in deciding whether two products are
DCS, Korea argued that with respect to (diluted) soju at least no claim under Art. III.2 GATT
could be sustained.
Complaining parties claimed that the fact that the western drinks hit by higher taxation were
in DCS‐relationship with a similar drink (sochu) in a similar market (Japan) provided enough
evidence that soju as well was DCS product to the same drinks. The panel essentially upheld
the complaining parties’ view, holding that the products were indeed in a DCS relationship:
only a reading of the AB report on Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II whereby cross‐price elasticity
would be elevated to the decisive criterion conferring DCS status, would lead the panel to
rule otherwise; such a reading of Art. III.2 GATT, however, was in the panel’s eyes
unwarranted. The absence of systematic information concerning consumer purchasing
behavior thus did not prevent the panel from finding that the two products were like in the
eyes of Korean consumers. The AB upheld the panel’s findings without any modification in
this regard. It thereby explicitly reduced the importance of econometric indicators, claiming
that it is but one of the various ways to show that two products are in DCS‐relationship. The
AB did not explain itself as to which other ways are available. It did however mention
several factors that it took into account in order to confirm that soju and the western drinks
were indeed in a DCS relationship. Price was not one of them (§§ 114 ff. and especially 133–
134, 135–138):

116

The price of non‐diluted soju was substantially higher.
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1. Potential Competition
. . . In our view, the word ‘substitutable’ indicates that the requisite relationship may exist
between products that are not, at a given moment, considered by consumers to be substitutes
but which are, nonetheless, capable of being substituted for one another . . . .
2. Expectations
As we have said, the object and purpose of Article III is the maintenance of equality of
competitive conditions for imported and domestic products.
3. ‘Trade Effects’ Test
. . . the Panel stated that if a particular degree of competition had to be shown in quantitative
terms, that would be similar to requiring proof that a tax measure has a particular impact on
trade. It considered such an approach akin to a ‘type of trade effects test’.
We do not consider the Panel’s reasoning on this point to be flawed.
4. Nature of Competition
The Panel considered that in analyzing whether products are ‘directly competitive or
substitutable,’ the focus should be on the nature of competition and not on its quantity . . . . For
the reasons set above, we share the Panel’s reluctance to rely unduly on quantitative analyses
of the competitive relationship. In our view, an approach that focused solely on the
quantitative overlap of competition would, in essence, make cross‐price elasticity the decisive
criterion in determining whether products are ‘directly competitive or substitutable’. We do
not, therefore, consider that the Panel’s use of the term ‘nature of competition’ is questionable.
5. Evidence from the Japanese Market
. . . It seems to us that evidence from other markets may be pertinent to the examination of the
market at issue, particularly when demand on that market has been influenced by regulatory
barriers to trade or to competition. Clearly, not every other market will be relevant to the
market at issue. But if another market displays characteristics similar to the market at issue,
then evidence of consumer demand in that other market may have some relevance to the
market at issue. This, however, can only be determined on a case‐by‐case basis, taking
account of all relevant facts. (emphasis in the original).117

The AB report on Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages represents the state of the art as far as
the definition of DCS products is concerned in WTO case law. It is, hence, now accepted that:

In the case at hand, the argument was made that demand in Korea was latent because of the regulatory
barriers that impeded access for Western drinks. It did not however, beyond the generic references in the
passage included above, refer specifically to these barriers. Hence, evidence from third‐country markets was
necessary to establish whether soju and a series of Western beverages were indeed DCS products. Korea
pointed out that the price of shochu was higher than that of soju, and closer to that of the Western drinks. Note
also that there have not been any serious challenges regarding likeness in subsequent case law.
117
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(a) two products will be DCS if they are viewed as such by consumers (that is, the test is
in the marketplace);
(b) recourse to econometric indicators is not passage obligé: a DCS‐relationship can also be
established through recourse to criteria such as physical characteristics, end uses,
consumer preferences.
These criteria have been consistently referred to in subsequent case law.118

3.2.3.3 Applied So as to Afford Protection (ASATAP)
Art. III.2 GATT makes it clear that taxation of two DCS products is GATT‐inconsistent, if it
operates in a manner that is not consistent with Art. III.1 GATT; recall that Art. III.1 GATT
outlaws domestic instruments that operate so as to afford protection (ASATAP) to domestic
production. The Interpretative Note ad Art III of the GATT (to which Art. III.2 GATT refers)
further explains that taxation operates ASATAP if a pair of products is not similarly taxed: it
does, in other terms offer (at least) one instance where taxation across DCS products operates
ASATAP, that is, the case of dissimilar taxation.
Two interrelated interpretative questions arise in this context:
(a) how should we understand the terms “not similarly taxed” appearing in the
Interpretative Note ad Art III of the GATT?
(b) does any dissimilar taxation suffice for a tax scheme to operate ASATAP?
The AB addressed these issues in various reports. In its report on Japan—Alcoholic Beverages
II, it held that, with respect to like products, taxation in excess should be understood as an
instance of a measure operating ASATAP precisely because the imported product was taxed
higher than the domestic like good (in other words, taxation in excess equals ASATAP as far
as like goods are concerned); consequently, a complainant who has established that taxation
on imported products is in excess of that on domestic like products, does not have to also
establish that the measure at hand operates ASATAP (pp. 18–19):

Sharing the same tariff classification is not a necessary criterion to decide whether two products are
DCS. It has been used, however, in order to decide whether two products are like (as we will see infra). Since like
products in case law are a sub‐set of DCS products, it is reasonable to assume that this criterion is relevant
(albeit not necessary) to decide whether two products are DCS.
118
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Article III:1 informs Article III:2, first sentence, by establishing that if imported products are
taxed in excess of like domestic products, then that tax measure is inconsistent with Article
III. Article III:2, first sentence does not refer specifically to Article III:1. There is no specific
invocation in this first sentence of the general principle in Article III:1 that admonishes
Members of the WTO not to apply measures so as to afford protection. This omission must
have some meaning. We believe the meaning is simply that the presence of a protective
application need not be established separately from the specific requirements that are
included in the first sentence in order to show that a tax measure is inconsistent with the
general principle set out in the first sentence. However, this does not mean that the general
principle of Article III:1 does not apply to this sentence. To the contrary, we believe the first
sentence of Article III:2 is, in effect, an application of this general principle. The ordinary
meaning of the words of Article III:2, first sentence leads inevitably to this conclusion. Read in
their context and in the light of the overall object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, the
words of the first sentence require an examination of the conformity of an internal tax
measure with Article III by determining, first, whether the taxed imported and domestic
products are ‘like’ and, second, whether the taxes applied to the imported products are ‘in
excess of’ those applied to the like domestic products. If the imported and domestic products
are ‘like products,’ and if the taxes applied to the imported products are ‘in excess of’ those
applied to the like domestic products, then the measure is inconsistent with Article III:2, first
sentence. (italics in the original).119

With regard to DCS products, nevertheless, a similar reading was rejected (p. 27):
Unlike that of Article III:2, first sentence, the language of Article III:2, second sentence, specifically
invokes Article III:1. The significance of this distinction lies in the fact that whereas Article III:1
acts implicitly in addressing the two issues that must be considered in applying the first sentence,
it acts explicitly as an entirely separate issue that must be addressed along with two other issues
that are raised in applying the second sentence. Giving full meaning to the text and to its context,
three separate issues must be addressed to determine whether an internal tax measure is
inconsistent with Article III:2, second sentence. These three issues are whether:
(1) the imported products and the domestic products are ‘directly competitive or substitutable
products’ which are in competition with each other;
(2) the directly competitive or substitutable imported and domestic products are ‘not similarly
taxed’; and
(3) the dissimilar taxation of the directly competitive or substitutable imported domestic products
is ‘applied . . . so as to afford protection to domestic production.’ (emphasis in the original).

119

As we will see infra, any tax differential, even if infinitesimal, satisfies the in excess criterion.
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Hence, in the AB’s view, Art III.1 GATT is relevant for the whole of Art. III.2 GATT, but its
impact on the interpretation of the first sentence (dealing with like products) is not
symmetric to its impact on the second sentence (dealing with DCS products):
(a) with respect to like products, taxation in excess of the imported like product ipso facto
amounts to a violation of the ASATAP requirement;
(b) whereas with respect to DCS products, establishment of taxation in excess of the
imported product is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for finding that a measure
operates so as to afford protection.
Case law responded to the question what else, beyond differential taxation, the complainant
needs to demonstrate in order to satisfy that a tax scheme operates ASATAP to the domestic
DCS product in a series of reports.
In its report on Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II considered the distinction between in excess, on
the one hand, and ASATAP, on the other, in the following terms (pp. 29–32):
In the 1987 Japan—Alcohol case, the panel subsumed its discussion of the issue of ‘not similarly
taxed’ within its examination of the separate issue of ‘so as to afford protection’:
. . . whereas under the first sentence of Article III:2 the tax on the imported product and the
tax on the like domestic product had to be equal in effect, Article III:1 and 2, second sentence,
prohibited only the application of internal taxes to imported or domestic products in a
manner ‘so as to afford protection to domestic production.’ The Panel was of the view that
also small tax differences could influence the competitive relationship between directly
competing distilled liquors, but the existence of protective taxation could be established only
in the light of the particular circumstances of each case and there could be a de minimis level
below which a tax difference ceased to have the protective effect prohibited by Article III:2,
second sentence.
To detect whether the taxation was protective, the panel in the 1987 case examined a number of
factors that it concluded were ‘sufficient evidence of fiscal distortions of the competitive
relationship between imported distilled liquors and domestic shochu affording protection to the
domestic production of shochu.’ These factors included the considerably lower specific tax rates
on shochu than on imported directly competitive or substitutable products; the imposition of
high ad valorem taxes on imported alcoholic beverages and the absence of ad valorem taxes on
shochu; the fact that shochu was almost exclusively produced in Japan and that the lower
taxation of shochu did ‘afford protection to domestic production’; and the mutual substitutability
of these distilled liquors. The panel in the 1987 case concluded that the application of
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considerably lower internal taxes by Japan on shochu than on other directly competitive or
substitutable distilled liquors had trade‐distorting effects affording protection to domestic
production of shochu contrary to Article III:1 and 2, second sentence.
As in that case, we believe that an examination in any case of whether dissimilar taxation has
been applied so as to afford protection requires a comprehensive and objective analysis of the
structure and application of the measure in question on domestic as compared to imported
products. We believe it is possible to examine objectively the underlying criteria used in a
particular tax measure, its structure, and its overall application to ascertain whether it is applied
in a way that affords protection to domestic products.
Although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, nevertheless its
protective application can most often be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the
revealing structure of a measure. The very magnitude of the dissimilar taxation in a particular
case may be evidence of such a protective application, as the Panel rightly concluded in this case.
Most often, there will be other factors to be considered as well. In conducting this inquiry, panels
should give full consideration to all the relevant facts and all the relevant circumstances in any
given case.
In this respect, we note and agree with the panel’s acknowledgment in the 1987 Japan—Alcohol
Report:
. . . that Article III:2 does not prescribe the use of any specific method or system of
taxation . . . . there could be objective reasons proper to the tax in question which could justify
or necessitate differences in the system of taxation for imported and for domestic products.
The Panel found that it could also be compatible with Article III:2 to allow two different
methods of calculation of price for tax purposes. Since Article III:2 prohibited only
discriminatory or protective tax burdens on imported products, what mattered was, in the
view of the Panel, whether the application of the different taxation methods actually had a
discriminatory or protective effect against imported products.
We have reviewed the Panel’s reasoning in this case as well as its conclusions on the issue of ‘so
as to afford protection’ in paragraphs 6.33–6.35 of the Panel Report. We find cause for thorough
examination. The Panel began in paragraph 6.33 by describing its approach as follows:
. . . if directly competitive or substitutable products are not ‘similarly taxed,’ and if it were
found that the tax favors domestic products, then protection would be afforded to such
products, and Article III:2, second sentence, is violated.
This statement of the reasoning required under Article III:2, second sentence is correct.
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However, the Panel went on to note:
. . . for it to conclude that dissimilar taxation afforded protection, it would be sufficient for it
to find that the dissimilarity in taxation is not de minimis . . . . the Panel took the view that
‘similarly taxed’ is the appropriate benchmark in order to determine whether a violation of
Article III:2, second sentence, has occurred as opposed to ‘in excess of’ that constitutes the
appropriate benchmark to determine whether a violation of Article III:2, first sentence, has
occurred.
In paragraph 6.34, the Panel added:
(i) The benchmark in Article III:2, second sentence, is whether internal taxes operate as to afford
protection to domestic production, a term which has been further interpreted in the
Interpretative Note ad Article III:2, paragraph 2, to mean dissimilar taxation of domestic and
foreign directly competitive or substitutable products.
And, furthermore, in its conclusions, in paragraph 7.1(ii), the Panel concluded that:
(ii) Shochu, whisky, brandy, rum, gin, genever, and liqueurs are directly competitive or
substitutable products and Japan, by not taxing them similarly, is in violation of its obligation
under Article III:2, second sentence, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
Thus, having stated the correct legal approach to apply with respect to Article III:2, second
sentence, the Panel then equated dissimilar taxation above a de minimis level with the separate
and distinct requirement of demonstrating that the tax measure ‘affords protection to domestic
production.’ As previously stated, a finding that ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’
are ‘not similarly taxed’ is necessary to find a violation of Article III:2, second sentence. Yet this is
not enough. The dissimilar taxation must be more than de minimis. It may be so much more that it
will be clear from that very differential that the dissimilar taxation was applied ‘so as to afford
protection.’ In some cases, that may be enough to show a violation. In this case, the Panel
concluded that it was enough. Yet in other cases, there may be other factors that will be just as
relevant or more relevant to demonstrating that the dissimilar taxation at issue was applied ‘so as
to afford protection.’ In any case, the three issues that must be addressed in determining whether
there is such a violation must be addressed clearly and separately in each case and on a case‐by‐
case basis. And, in every case, a careful, objective analysis, must be done of each and all relevant
facts and all the relevant circumstances in order to determine ‘the existence of protective
taxation.’ Although the Panel blurred its legal reasoning in this respect, nevertheless we conclude
that it reasoned correctly that in this case, the Liquor Tax Law is not in compliance with Article
III:2. As the Panel did, we note that:
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. . . the combination of customs duties and internal taxation in Japan has the following
impact: on the one hand, it makes it difficult for foreign‐produced shochu to penetrate the
Japanese market and, on the other, it does not guarantee equality of competitive conditions
between shochu and the rest of <white = and <brown= spirits. Thus, through a combination of
high import duties and differentiated internal taxes, Japan manages to ‘isolate’ domestically
produced shochu from foreign competition, be it foreign produced shochu or any other of the
mentioned white and brown spirits. (italics in the original).

In Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the AB almost verbatim reproduced this view (§ 150):
Although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, nevertheless its
protective application can most often be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the
revealing structure of a measure. The very magnitude of the dissimilar taxation in a particular
case may be evidence of such protective application . . . Most often, there will be other factors
to be considered as well.

In Chile—Alcoholic Beverages, the AB had the opportunity to apply this test in a particular
case. In this case, the AB was asked to pronounce on the consistency of the Chilean tax
system for alcoholic beverages with the GATT: the scheme distinguished between two
categories of alcoholic beverages, using alcoholic content as the distinguishing criterion:
below 35° and above 39°.120 The complaining party (European Community) had argued that
many western products of slightly more than 39° were DCS products to Chilean products of
less than 35°, and, that the tax differential operated ASATAP. In the view of exporters of
“western” alcoholic drinks, the Chilean tax regime favored predominantly locally produced
alcoholic beverages (some categories of pisco). Chile responded that its scheme did not
condition the payment of the higher tax on the origin of the product, and, moreover, that in
the 39° and above tax category the majority of the products hit by high taxation were
domestic. As a result, in Chile’s view, no protection could result from such a taxation scheme
(§ 58).
The AB condemned the Chilean fiscal scheme. It first held that the tax differential (27% and
47%) across the two categories of lower and higher alcoholic content drinks was more than
de minimis (§§ 44ff).
The AB then asked the question whether the dissimilar taxation supported the conclusion
that it was ASATAP to the domestic product. In this context, it repeated and clarified the
test it had developed to decide whether such was the case. Although the quoted passage is
120

All cases discussed so far are cases of alleged de facto discrimination.
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quite lengthy, we believe it deserves to be cited since it sheds precious light on the manner in
which the AB understands the ASATAP test in case of differential taxation across two DCS
products (§§ 62 – 66):
. . . . The subjective intentions inhabiting the minds of individual legislators or regulators do
not bear upon the inquiry, if only because they are not accessible to treaty interpreters. It
does not follow, however, that the statutory purposes or objectives – that is, the purpose or
objectives of a Memberʹs legislature and government as a whole – to the extent that they are
given objective expression in the statute itself, are not pertinent. To the contrary, as we also
stated in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages:
Although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily
ascertained, nevertheless its protective application can most often
be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the revealing
structure of a measure. (emphasis added)
We turn, therefore, to the design, the architecture and the structure of the New Chilean
System itself. That system taxes all alcoholic beverages with an alcohol content of 35° or below
on a linear basis, at a fixed rate of 27 per cent ad valorem. Thereafter, the rate of taxation
increases steeply, by 4 percentage points for every additional degree of alcohol content, until
a maximum rate of 47 per cent ad valorem is reached. This fixed tax rate of 47 per cent applies,
once more on a linear basis, to all beverages with an alcohol content in excess of 39°,
irrespective of how much in excess of 39° the alcohol content of the beverage is.
We note, furthermore, that, according to the Panel, approximately 75 per cent of all domestic
production has an alcohol content of 35° or less and is, therefore, taxed at the lowest rate of
27 per cent ad valorem. [footnote omitted] Moreover, according to figures supplied to the Panel
by Chile, approximately half of all domestic production has an alcohol content of 35° and is,
therefore, located on the line of the progression of the tax at the point immediately before the
steep increase in tax rates from 27 per cent ad valorem. The start of the highest tax bracket,
with a rate of 47 per cent ad valorem, coincides with the point at which most imported
beverages are found. Indeed, according to the Panel, that tax bracket contains approximately
95 per cent of all directly competitive or substitutable imports. [footnote omitted]
Although the tax rates increase steeply for beverages with an alcohol content of more than 35°
and up to 39°, there are, in fact, very few beverages on the Chilean market, either domestic or
imported, with an alcohol content of between 35° and 39°. [footnote: Chile’s response to
Question 1 of the Panel, 26 November 1998. These figures indicate that approximately 5 per
cent of all distilled alcoholic beverages have an alcohol content in this range. At the oral
hearing, Chile confirmed that very few beverages have an alcohol content of between 35° and
39°.] The graduation of the rates for beverages with an alcohol content of between 35° and 39°
does not, therefore, serve to tax distilled alcoholic beverages on a progressive basis. Indeed,
the steeply graduated progression of the tax rates between 35° and 39° alcohol content seems
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anomalous and at odds with the otherwise linear nature of the tax system. With the exception
of the progression of rates between 35° and 39° alcohol content, this system simply applies
one of two fixed rates of taxation, either 27 per cent ad valorem or 47 per cent ad valorem, each
of which applies to distilled alcoholic beverages with a broad range of alcohol content, that
is, 27 per cent for beverages with an alcoholic content of up to 35° and 47 per cent for
beverages with an alcohol content of more than 39°.
In practice, therefore, the New Chilean System will operate largely as if there were only two
tax brackets: the first applying a rate of 27 per cent ad valorem which ends at the point at
which most domestic beverages, by volume, are found, and the second applying a rate of
47 per cent ad valorem which begins at the point at which most imports, by volume, are found.
The magnitude of the difference between these two rates is also considerable. The absolute
difference of 20 percentage points between the two rates represents a 74 per cent increase in
the lowest rate of 27 per cent ad valorem. Accordingly, examination of the design, architecture
and structure of the New Chilean System tends to reveal that the application of dissimilar
taxation of directly competitive or substitutable products will ʺafford protection to domestic
production.ʺ (italics and emphasis in the original).

Note that the AB agreed that, as a matter of fact, most of the alcoholic drinks hit by the
higher taxation were of Chilean origin. However, it dismissed the relevance of this
observation for the interpretation of the ASATAP requirement in the following terms (§ 67):
This fact does not, however, by itself outweigh the other relevant factors, which tend to reveal
the protective application of the New Chilean System. The relative proportion of domestic
versus imported products within a particular fiscal category is not, in and of itself, decisive of
the appropriate characterization of the total impact of the New Chilean system under Article
III:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994. This provision, as noted earlier, provides for
equality of competitive conditions of all directly competitive or substitutable imported
products, in relation to domestic products, and not simply, as Chile argues, those imported
products within a particular fiscal category. The cumulative consequence of the New Chilean
System is, as the Panel found, that approximately 75 percent of all domestic production of the
distilled alcoholic beverages at issue will be located in the fiscal category with the lowest tax
rate, whereas approximately 95 percent of the directly competitive or substitutable imported
products will be found in the fiscal category subject to the highest tax rate. (emphasis in the
original).

It should also be noted that the AB does not compare in absolute terms the size of the
domestic production that is being hit by the higher tax to the absolute volume of imports
being hit by the tax – it only compares proportions. But what if the domestic industry,
despite representing a relatively small share of the total domestic industry, were much larger
than imports, and therefore carried most of the burden of the tax? Could this not be
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interpreted to mean that the tax distinction serves some other purpose than protectionism, a
purpose that deserves to be taken into consideration in the evaluation of the measure? Chile
argued that domestic producers were carrying most of the tax burden in the high tax
category. In the view of the AB, however, this was not enough to establish that the
legislation at hand did not operate ASATAP; in the view of the AB, the purpose of Art. III
GATT is to establish equality of competitive conditions with respect to all DCS products.
Since, in the AB’s view, drinks slightly above and slightly below 39° are DCS products, and
since some western drinks above 39° were hit harder than some domestic drinks containing
alcohol below 39°, the Chilean tax scheme operated ASATAP.
Chile offered a more ‘regulatory’ defense as well in an effort to justify the tax differential
(§ 69):
Before the Panel, Chile stated that the New Chilean System pursued four different objectives:
ʺ(1) maintaining revenue collection; (2) eliminating type distinctions [such] as [those which]
were found in Japan and Korea; (3) discouraging alcohol consumption; and (4) minimizing
the potentially regressive aspects of the reform of the tax system

The AB was not persuaded (§ 71):
The conclusion of protective application reached by the Panel becomes very difficult to resist,
in the absence of countervailing explanations by Chile. The mere statement of the four
objectives pursued by Chile does not constitute effective rebuttal on the part of Chile.

It follows that in this case the AB confirmed and clarified the basic approach that a 20
percent tax differential may satisfy the ‘not similarly taxed’ requirement; in this case it is the
sharp tax differential across the two categories of alcoholic drinks (the lower category being
predominantly of national origin, the higher of foreign origin) that reveal the protective
character of the legislation. The fact that de facto it is domestic goods that bear the bulk of the
tax burden in the higher‐taxation category was judged immaterial since neither effects nor
intent is relevant in the context of Art. III GATT.

3.2.3.4 Like Products
Recall that, for a complainant to demonstrate a violation of Art. III.2 GATT, first sentence, it
will have to demonstrate that:
(a) the domestic and the foreign products are like; and
(b) the latter is taxed in excess of the former.
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The term like products has been interpreted in many GATT/WTO panels, and not always in
consistent manner. GATT case law evidences two trends:
(a) there are a number of cases that follow a marketplace test: likeness is defined by
reference to consumers’ reactions;121
(b) there are two cases which reveal a willingness to take into account regulatory intent
when establishing likeness among domestic and foreign products.
Let us start with the former. The Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments 122 established four
criteria to define likeness (§ 18):
(a) the properties, nature and quality of the products;
(b) the end‐uses of the products;
(c) consumers’ tastes and habits—more comprehensively termed consumers’ perceptions
and behavior—in respect of the products; and
(d) the tariff classification of the products.
It did not assign a particular weight on each of them. Relying on these four criteria, the panel
report on Japan—Alcoholic Beverages I held that, alcoholic beverages (§ 5.6):
. . . should be considered as ‘like products’ in terms of Article III:2 in view of their similar
properties, end‐uses and usually uniform classification in tariff nomenclatures.

The two reported cases that dismissed marketplace as the relevant criterion to decide on
likeness are the panel reports on US—Malt Beverages and on US – Taxes on Automobiles (‘Gas
Guzzler’, as it is widely known).123
In US—Malt Beverages, the panel defines likeness in § 5.25:

So far, there is not one single case where supply‐substitutability has been accounted for when defining
likeness or DCS relationship.
121

122

See GATT Doc L/3464, adopted on 2 December 1970, GATT Doc. BISD 18S/97.

123 This report remains unadopted and is, hence, of limited legal value. In fact, as we will see infra, it was
totally rejected by a subsequent WTO panel dealing with the same issue.
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Consequently, in determining whether two products subject to different treatment are like
products, it is necessary to consider whether such product differentiation is being made ‘so as
to afford protection to domestic production’. While the analysis of ‘like products’ in terms of
Article III:2 must take into consideration this objective of Article III, the Panel wished to
emphasize that such an analysis would be without prejudice to the ‘like product’ concepts in
other provisions of the General Agreement, which might have different objectives and which
might therefore also require different interpretations.

In US—Taxes on Automobiles,124 the panel had the opportunity to elaborate further on this
proposition by introducing the so‐called aims and effects test (§§ 5.7 and 5.10):
In order to determine this issue, the Panel examined the object and purpose of paragraphs 2
and 4 of Article III in the context of the article as a whole and the General Agreement.
...
The Panel then proceeded to examine more closely the meaning of the phrase ‘so as to afford
protection.’ The Panel noted that the term ‘so as to’ suggested both aim and effect. Thus the
phrase ‘so as to afford protection’ called for an analysis of elements including the aim of the
measure and the resulting effects. A measure could be said to have the aim of affording
protection if an analysis of the circumstances in which it was adopted, in particular an
analysis of the instruments available to the contracting party to achieve the declared domestic
policy goal, demonstrated that a change in competitive opportunities in favour of domestic
products was a desired outcome and not merely an incidental consequence of the pursuit of a
legitimate policy goal. A measure could be said to have the effect of affording protection to
domestic production if it accorded greater competitive opportunities to domestic products
than to imported products. The effect of a measure in terms of trade flows was not relevant
for the purposes of Article III, since a change in the volume or proportion of imports could be
due to many factors other than government measures. (emphasis in the original).

According to this view, consequently, likeness will not be defined by reference to prevailing
perceptions in the marketplace about the products concerned but, instead, by reference to
the regulatory aims pursued by the intervening government.
In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the panel explicitly rejected for various reasons (ranging from
the insurmountable burden that such a test would impose on the complainant to the fact that
In this case, the European Community challenged the consistency of the U.S. tax scheme applicable to
cars, according to which, the total fleet of a producer would be taken into account in order to decide on the tax
that would be imposed. Producers with a fleet that consisted of large cubism cars (gas guzzlers) would suffer
most, as a result. Many European producers belonged to this category. The U.S. regime was apparently enacted
at a time when those suffering most were U.S. producers, in an effort to dissuade consumers eager to buy such
cars from buying them.
124
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adoption of the test would lead Art. XX GATT to redundancy) the relevance of the aims and
effects test (§§ 6.15 – 6.19). The AB endorsed the panel’s approach (pp. 16ff.).
In the same report, the AB (pp. 19ff.) ruled that the term like products should be defined by
reference to the marketplace. The AB did not explicitly hold in this report that for two
products to be like they have to be DCS. It did so, however, in a subsequent report that we
mentioned above, in its report on Korea—Alcoholic Beverages (§ 118). In Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II, the AB did state explicitly that the term like products invites a narrow reading,
that is, a reading narrower than DCS, and that customs classification is relevant to establish
likeness, beyond the criteria traditionally used to establish DCS relationship. In this often‐
quoted passage, the AB held that:
The concept of ‘likeness’ is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The
accordion of ‘likeness’ stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the
WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any one of those places must be
determined by the particular provision in which the term ‘like’ is encountered as well as by
the context and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that provision may
apply. We believe that, in Article III:2, first sentence of the GATT 1994, the accordion of
‘likeness’ is meant to be narrowly squeezed.

However, not just any customs classification can assist in the definition of likeness. A
necessary condition is that the classification be precise (pp. 23–24):
If sufficiently detailed, tariff classification can be a helpful sign of product similarity.
...
It is true that there are numerous tariff bindings which are in fact extremely precise with
regard to product description and which, therefore, can provide significant guidance as to the
identification of ‘like products.’

This would usually be the case with respect to six‐digit classifications. Four‐digit
classifications are usually uninformative, and eight‐digit classifications are a matter of
national definition , and not of worldwide acceptance.
We can conclude that case law in its totality suggests that two products will be like if they
are DCS and if they share a detailed (six digit for the overwhelming majority of cases) tariff
classification.
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3.2.3.5 Taxation in Excess
The AB has stated that even a minimal tax differential suffices to satisfy the in‐excess
criterion. In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the AB relevantly held (p. 23):
Even the smallest amount of ‘excess’ is too much. ‘The prohibition of discriminatory taxes in
Article III:2, first sentence, is not conditional on a ‘trade effects test’ nor is it qualified by a de
minimis standard. (italics in the original).

This approach is very much in line with the GATT panel report on US—Superfund: a mere
arithmetic difference suffices for a demonstration of violation of the in excess requirement.

3.2.4

Nonfiscal Instruments

Art. III.4 GATT deals with domestic nonfiscal instruments. The list of such instruments is
endless as per our discussion supra on incomplete contracting, covering areas such as public
health, environmental protection, human rights, antitrust, consumer protection. Irrespective
of the precise subject matter, a complainant aiming to establish that this provision has been
violated, will according to Art. III.4 GATT have to demonstrate that:
(a) with respect to a law, regulation, or requirement;
(b) affecting internal sale, offer for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use;
(c) a foreign good is afforded in comparison to a domestic like good;
(d) less favorable treatment.

3.2.4.1 Laws, Regulations, or Requirements
GATT/WTO case law has understood the term ‘laws, regulations and requirements’ featured
in Art. III.4 GATT as equivalent to the term ‘measure’ featured in Art. XXIII.1b GATT, and
Art. XI GATT. Case law under these provisions has consistently the term ‘measure’ in a
broad manner.125 The same should consequently hold true in the context of Art. III.4 GATT
as well; indeed, so far we have witnessed no case where a WTO adjudicating body has
rejected a claim because the complainant failed to show that a ‘law, regulation or
requirement’ was being challenged. The inclusion of the term ‘requirements’ definitely

See, for example, the Panel report on Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, discussed in Chapter 2, which has
been cited in every single case dealing with Art. XI GATT ever since. See also the Panel report on Japan – Film
(Kodak/Fuji) on this score.
125
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supports this construction: it was meant to ensure that the provision is not restricted to
formal laws only.
The next question is to what extent a measure is attributed to a government, since the GATT
does not regulate private behavior. WTO case law has addressed attribution in the context of
Art. III.4 GATT in parallel with the approach followed in the context of Art. XI GATT: not
only acts of governments, but also acts of private parties can be challenged under Art. III.4
GATT, provided that they can be attributed to a government.126 We read in the Panel report
on US—FSC (§ 10.376):
A literal reading of the words all laws, regulations and requirements in Article III:4 could suggest
that they may have a narrower scope than the word measure in Article XXIII:1(b). However,
whether or not these words should be given as broad a construction as the word measure, in
view of the broad interpretation assigned to them in the cases cited above, we shall assume
for the purposes of our present analysis that they should be interpreted as encompassing a
similarly broad range of government action and action by private parties that may be
assimilated to government action. In this connection, we consider that our previous
discussion of GATT cases on administrative guidance in relation to what may constitute a
‘measure’ under Article XXIII:1(b), specifically the panel reports on Japan—Semi‐conductors
and Japan—Agricultural Products, is equally applicable to the definitional scope of ‘all laws,
regulations and requirements’ in Article III:4. (italics and emphasis in the original).

It follows that government behavior that is channeled through private actors can be
challenged under Art. III.4 GATT. This observation might have practical import in the field
of antitrust where, following government authorization, private practices that might restrain
trade could come under the purview of Art. III.4 GATT.

3.2.4.2 Affecting Sale, Offering for Sale
This term has been interpreted to cover measures that not only actually, but also potentially
and/or indirectly affect trade. The AB report on US—FSC confirmed the wide interpretation
of the term ‘affecting’ (§§ 208–210):
. . . the word ‘affecting’ assists in defining the types of measure that must conform to the
obligation not to accord ‘less favourable treatment’ to like imported products, which is set out
in Article III:4.

Note that attribution is a nonissue in the context of Art. III.2 GATT: fiscal measures can only be
imposed by governments, or by nongovernmental organs, following delegation of authority by governments.
126
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The word ‘affecting’ serves a similar function in Article I:1 of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (the ‘GATS’), where it also defines the types of measure that are subject to the
disciplines set forth elsewhere in the GATS but does not, in itself, impose any obligation . . . .
In view of the similar function of the identical word, ‘affecting’, in Article III:4 of the GATT
1994, we also interpret this word, in this provision, as having a ‘broad scope of application.”
(italics in the original).

There is not one single case where a challenged measure failed to meet the ‘affecting’
requirement.

3.2.4.3 Like Products in Art. III.4 GATT
Art. III.4 GATT does not distinguish between like and DCS products, in contrast to Art. III.2
GATT. The question hence arises whether the term like should have the same meaning
across the two paragraphs. The AB decided that this should not be the case, as we detail in
what follows. In its report on EC—Asbestos, the WTOP adjudicating bodies were called to
pronounce on the GATT‐consistency of a French ban on the sales of asbestos‐containing
construction material. The sales ban was nondiscriminatory, that is, it applied irrespective of
the origin of the asbestos‐containing construction material. France’s prohibition
(administrative decree) of sales of asbestos‐containing construction material was based on
scientific evidence: the chrysotile fibers in the asbestos in the imported product was a known
carcinogen. But Canada argued that construction material containing chrysotile fibers was a
like product to construction material containing PCG fibers, the corresponding asbestos‐free
substance in the domestically produced construction material. Construction material
containing PCG fibers was being legally sold in France. Canada argued that by allowing
sales of the material containing PGG fibers but not chrysotile fibers, the French ban accorded
the Canadian good less favorable treatment than that accorded to the French like good.127
The Panel had decided that the two products were indeed like since the end uses of the two
products were the same. The differential treatment of the two products meant that France
was according imported products less favorable treatment than that accorded to domestic
like products. Consequently, Art. III.4 GATT was violated. The Panel therefore moved to
examine the French (or rather EU) defense under Art. XX GATT.

127

See the discussion of the AB report in Horn and Weiler (2007), which forms the basis for the analysis

here.
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The AB first addressed the issue whether asbestos‐containing and asbestos‐free materials
were like products. In order to respond to this question, the AB as a first step held that the
term like products in Art. III.4 GATT should be interpreted in light of the over‐arching
purpose of Art. III GATT: absent parallelism in the coverage across paragraphs III.2 and III.4
GATT, WTO Members would be incurring obligations of different scope with respect to
fiscal and nonfiscal instruments; this view was not in the eyes of the AB supported by the
negotiating record. The AB consequently held that the term like products in Art. III.4 of the
GATT should be understood as covering products that are in competitive relationship with
one another. It explicitly accepted a wide coverage of the term like products (wider than that
of the corresponding term featured in Art. III.2 GATT), but not wider than the combined
coverage of the terms like and DCS coming under the purview of Art. III.2 GATT (§§ 98–
100).
Then, the AB reversed the Panel’s findings with respect to likeness. In its view, the Panel
should have examined all four criteria mentioned in the WP on BTAs (border tax
adjustments) to confer likeness and not just end uses. Had it done so, the Panel would in the
AB’s view have observed the differences in physical characteristics between the two
products. In the AB’s view, the composition of a product is very much part of the physical‐
characteristics analysis. Chrysotile fibers and PCG fibers are not the same: the first are
carcinogenic, whereas the latter are not. The health hazard would in the AB’s view most
likely have led ultimate consumers of construction material to avoid purchase material
containing chrysotile fibers, had it been marketed. Professional buyers of construction
material, who would often not be exposed themselves to the health risk, but would take such
reactions into account, would therefore purchase less of such material. Based on such
reasoning, the AB found the two products to be unlike (§§ 101–154). The finding of non‐
likeness was hence based on the AB’s assessment of the construction companies’ assessment
of how the latter would be affected, through the market mechanism, of the assessment of
their customers of differences in risk.
The AB effectively held that the presence of health risk in asbestos containing‐construction
material only raised a presumption that the two products were unlike, increasing the burden
of proof for Canada. In casu, Canada did not rebut this presumption and consequently lost
the case.128

In a separate but concurring opinion, an unnamed member of the AB held the view, that the scientific
proof cited in this case was sufficient to conclude that the two products were unlike. One way to understand
the need for a separate opinion is probably that, in this member’s eyes, the difference in physical characteristics,
and the ensuing consumers’ reaction, does not merely raise a presumption, but amounts to a home run: Canada
could never rebut such evidence.
128
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The EC‐Asbestos dispute hence contains a novelty from a burden‐of‐proof point of view.
When making its likeness determination, the AB did not rely on studies or information
concerning actual buyer behavior, the AB uses instead its own interpretation of what buyers
would reasonably do, if facing a choice between the two products (§ 122):
In this case especially, we are also persuaded that evidence relating to consumers’ tastes and
habits would establish that the health risks associated with chrysotile asbestos fibres influence
consumers’ behaviour with respect to the different fibres at issue. We observe that, as regards
chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibres, the consumer of the fibres is a manufacturer who incorporates
the fibres into another product, such as cement‐based products or brake linings. We do not
wish to speculate on what the evidence regarding these consumers would have indicated;
rather, we wish to highlight that consumers’ tastes and habits regarding fibres, even in the
case of commercial parties, such as manufacturers, are very likely to be shaped by the health
risks associated with a product which is known to be highly carcinogenic. A manufacturer
cannot, for instance, ignore the preferences of the ultimate consumer of its products. If the
risks posed by a particular product are sufficiently great, the ultimate consumer may simply
cease to buy that product. This would, undoubtedly, affect a manufacturer’s decisions in the
marketplace. Moreover, in the case of products posing risks to human health, we think it
likely that manufacturers’ decisions will be influenced by other factors, such as the potential
civil liability that might flow from marketing products posing a health risk to the ultimate
consumer, or the additional costs associated with safety procedures required to use such
products in the manufacturing process. (§ 122, italics in the original, underlining added).

In the preceding recital to the above‐quoted passage, the AB had however, noted:
Furthermore, in a case such as this, where the fibres are physically very different, a panel
cannot conclude that they are ʺlike productsʺ if it does not examine evidence relating to
consumersʹ tastes and habits . . . (italics in original).

Still, the AB did not think it was necessary to look for market evidence when deciding on the
likeness of the products concerned. So the test for likeness is a market test in name only,
since it is the hypothetical reactions of a reasonable consumer that will define, according to
this test, whether two products are like.129 In other words, the AB here effectively reduced
the probative value of quantitative evidence.
This finding in the report raises a number of issues:
The AB found additional support for its overall finding in the fact that chrysotile fibers and PCG fibers
do not share the same tariff classification, and, also, in the fact that scientific evidence was cited in support of
the carcinogenic nature of chrysotile fibers.
129
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(a) if as the AB asserts, consumers would treat the two products as like, what was then
the need for France to impose the sales ban in the first place? Arguably, France
imposed the measure precisely because consumers would treat the two goods as
substitutes. The axiomatic distinction that the AB drew is probably not supported by
facts;130
(b) this is not to say that France should have lost this case. On the contrary, France
produced highly credible scientific evidence of the health hazard from exposure to
asbestos. In our view, the question before the AB should have been whether France’s
measures afforded less favorable treatment to the imported goods, an issue that we
discuss in what immediately follows.131

3.2.4.4 Less Favorable Treatment
The function of this requirement has occupied a number of reports, and in particular the
question regarding the relationship between less favorable treatment (LFT) and the
ASATAP‐requirement which appears in Art. III.1, and III.2 GATT. In EC—Bananas III, the AB
held that:
Article III:4 does not specifically refer to Article III:1. Therefore, a determination of whether
there has been a violation of Article III:4 does not require a separate consideration of whether
a measure afford[s] protection to domestic production. (emphasis in the original).

In its report on EC—Asbestos, the AB explicitly held that LFT echoes the principle set forth in
Art. III.1 GATT: WTO Members should not use domestic measures so as to afford protection
to domestic production (§ 100):
The term ‘less favourable treatment’ expresses the general principle, in Article III:1, that
internal regulations ‘should not be applied . . . so as to afford protection to domestic
Lydgate (2011) reaches similar conclusions.
The report received mixed reactions in doctrine. On one end of the spectrum, Yavitz (2002) criticizes
this case law for not interpreting the key terms in this provision in a manner that would honor its agreed
function, that is, to avoid that WTO Members use nonfiscal instruments so as to afford advantages to their
domestic production. In contrast, Howse and Tuerk (2001) agree with the basis of the reasoning of the AB
report, and disagree vehemently with the Panel approach. The authors defend a comprehensive discrimination
test that should take place within the four corners of Art. III GATT (instead of moving the discussion to Art. XX
GATT). They thus see the AB report as a positive step in this direction. These and other views are not
necessarily mutually inconsistent, since their focus is on different parts of the report.
130
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production.’ If there is ‘less favourable treatment’ of the group of ‘like’ imported products,
there is, conversely, ‘protection’ of the group of ‘like’ domestic products. However, a Member
may draw distinctions between products which have been found to be ‘like,’ without, for this
reason alone, according to the group of ‘like’ imported products ‘less favourable treatment’
than that accorded to the group of ‘like’ domestic products. (emphasis in the original).

Two consequences stem from the quoted passages:
(a) the complainant who is asked to show LFT, does not have to also show that a law is
ASATAP;
(b) distinctions can be drawn between like goods without necessarily violating Art. III.4
GATT.
The natural questions to follow are: What needs to be shown besides differential treatment?
And who should carry the burden of proof? This is an area where case law has not
progressed smoothly and coherently.
The AB report on Korea—Various Measures on Beef was the first report that discussed in detail
the nuts and bolts of the LFT test. This dispute, between Korea on the one hand, and a host
of beef exporters on the other, concerned the distribution of beef in the Korean market.
Korea had enacted a law whereby traders at the retail level could sell either domestic or
imported beef but not both; this was denoted the “dual retail system.” The complainants
argued that as a result of this system, there were only 5000 points of sale for imported beef,
compared to over 45,000 points of sale for domestic beef. Since this made it more difficult to
sell imported than domestic beef, the dual retail system therefore violated Art. III.4 GATT.
Korea pointed to the fact that it had in place an import quota for beef, the legality of which
was not put into question during the proceedings: indeed, Korea had invoked the balance‐
of‐payments provisions of the GATT to impose a quota on the import of beef, and
complainants had not questioned the legitimacy of this action. Korea added that the quota
had been absorbed all years when the system was in place, with one exception only:
following the financial crisis in 1997, when overall consumption (of both domestic and
foreign beef) fell dramatically. Hence, in Korea’s view complainants suffered trade damage
only one year.
Korea also argued before the Panel that the dual retail system was not discriminatory, in
light of the fact that traders were free to choose whether they would sell domestic or foreign
beef, and that there was no legal compulsion obliging them to choose one category of beef
over the other; they could further subsequently switch at no cost from selling beef of one
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origin to selling the other.132 Korea claimed that a legislation that provides equality of
competitive conditions passes the test of consistency with Art. III GATT, even if some trade
effects might look harmful to exporters; it was effectively arguing that the complainants
cannot on the one hand claim that trade effects are immaterial, and on the other, base their
complaint on trade effects. 133 The Panel rejected all of Korea’s claims, and found in favor of
the complainants.
On appeal, the AB held that this system, although formally nondiscriminatory, still modified
the conditions of competition to the detriment of the imported product, and found Korea’s
practices to be inconsistent with Art. III.4 GATT since it afforded LFT to imported like
products. The modification of conditions of competition was evident, in the AB’s view, by
the fact that fewer retailers decided to sell imported beef (§§ 143–151). The AB accepted that
the choice to distribute domestic or imported beef was in the hands of private retailers. In a
rather cryptic passage it held that LFT resulted from Korea’s decision not to stick to the prior
regime (§ 146):
We are aware that the dramatic reduction in number of retail outlets for imported beef
followed from the decisions of individual retailers who could choose freely to sell the
domestic product or the imported product. The legal necessity of making a choice was,
however, imposed by the measure itself. The restricted nature of that choice should be noted.
The choice given to the meat retailers was not an option between remaining with the pre‐
existing unified distribution set‐up or going to a dual retail system. The choice was limited to
selling domestic beef only or imported beef only. Thus, the reduction of access to normal
retail channels is, in legal contemplation, the effect of that measure. In these circumstances,
the intervention of some element of private choice does not relieve Korea of responsibility
under the GATT 1994 for the resulting establishment of competitive conditions less
favourable for the imported product than for the domestic product. (emphasis in the original).

The AB was quick to highlight what it had not been prejudging through its decision (§ 149):
It may finally be useful to indicate, however broadly, what we are not saying in reaching our
above conclusion. We are not holding that a dual or parallel distribution system that is not
imposed directly or indirectly by law or governmental regulation, but is rather solely the

Korea did not contest before the Panel the assertion of complainants that domestic and imported beef
were like goods.
133 Korea also made claims under Art. XX GATT, and argued that the system was in place in order to
combat tax fraud: traders had the incentive to sell imported beef for domestic, in light of the very substantial
price‐differential between imported and domestic beef (the latter being substantially more expensive than the
former).
132
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result of private entrepreneurs acting on their own calculations of comparative costs and
benefits of differentiated distribution systems, is unlawful under Article III:4 of the GATT
1994. What is addressed by Article III:4 is merely the governmental intervention that affects the
conditions under which like goods, domestic and imported, compete in the market within a
Member’s territory. (emphasis in the original).

So, the AB did not go so far as to outlaw exclusivity contracts signed between suppliers and
retailers. Arguably, exclusivity contracts, assuming market power in the upstream (or even,
in some legal orders, in the downstream) market, will be judged illegal under many national
antitrust statutes, unless they have benefited from antitrust exemption. Is a government anti‐
trust exemption sufficient for the AB to outlaw similar practices? The AB did not provide a
comprehensive response to this question, although it did note that purely private contracts
that provide for exclusivity have not been outlawed as a result of this report.
This case raises many questions casting serious doubt on the intellectual legitimacy of the
AB’s reasoning:
(a) What exactly is the LFT here? Is it the fact that imported beef was previously being
sold through the same channel as domestic beef, or is it the fact that only 5000 outlets
sell imported beef whereas 45,000 outlets sell domestic beef? It cannot be the former,
since the same requirement was imposed on domestic beef (it cannot be sold through
the same channels as imported beef), hence no LFT results from this modification of
conditions of competition. It cannot be the latter either since trade effects, so says
consistent case law, are immaterial. Or are they?
(b) If trade effects do matter, how can we judge whether availability of imported beef in
5000 as opposed to 45,000 outlets operates to the detriment of imported beef unless if
we have information about the sales volumes in these outlets as well as the sales
volumes in the policy‐unconstrained case?
(c) What exactly is the detriment to imported beef when the quota was absorbed all the
years that it was in place except for one when indeed extraordinary circumstances (by
any reasonable account) occurred? We should add here that it cannot be that the
modification of conditions of competition per se constitutes a GATT violation: the
GATT is a negative integration contract and trading partners retain the right to design
and modify their laws as they find appropriate, as long as they observe the basic
nondiscrimination obligation. Hence, it is the notion that the modification of
conditions of competition is to the detriment of imported goods that must form the
basis of the AB judgment; and
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(d) Since LFT equals ASATAP, should not the AB inquire into the design, structure, and
architecture of the law? Well, it did so in the context of Art. XX GATT and did not cast
doubt on the Korean justification that it was done for consumer‐protection purposes:
Korean beef sold at a much higher price than imported beef, and Korea argued that
the dual retail system (along with other measures) were meant to guarantee that
traders would not fraudulently sell imported beef as Korean. The acceptance by the
AB of this reasoning leads to the question of how does the design, structure, and
architecture of the measure support a finding of LFT?134
Without explicitly deviating from this case law, the AB in fact reversed it in a subsequent
case: In its report on Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the AB upheld the
Panelʹs rejection of Hondurasʹs claim under Art. III.4 GATT. It agreed with the Panel that a
detrimental effect of a measure (the measure here was a bond requirement, under which
cigarette importers had to post a bond to ensure payment of taxes) on a given imported
product does not necessarily imply that the measure accords less favorable treatment to
imports, if the effect is explained by factors unrelated to the foreign origin of the product; in
this case, the factor explaining the treatment was the market share of the importer, in the
sense that the level of the bond requirement depended on the market share that the importer
(or the domestic producer) attained in the Dominican Republic market (§ 96):
The Appellate Body indicated in Korea – Various Measures on Beef that imported products are
treated less favorably than like products if a measure modifies the conditions of competition
in the relevant market to the detriment of imported products. However, the existence of a
detrimental effect on a given imported product resulting from a measure does not necessarily
imply that this measure accords less favorable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is
explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, such as
the market share of the importer in this case. In this specific case, the mere demonstration that
the per‐unit cost of the bond requirement for imported cigarettes was higher than for some
domestic cigarettes during a particular period is not, in our view, sufficient to establish ʺless
favourable treatmentʺ under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. Indeed, the difference between
the per‐unit costs of the bond requirement alleged by Honduras is explained by the fact that
the importer of Honduran cigarettes has a smaller market share than two domestic producers

134 In §§ 172ff. of its report, the AB held that Korea had violated its obligations under Art. XX(d) GATT not
because the measure was not authentically pursuing consumer protection, but because it was unnecessary, in
the sense more trade‐restrictive than necessary. We discuss this aspect of the report in Chapter 4. Suffice,
nonetheless, to mention here that there is no necessity requirement in Art. III GATT: if the measure did indeed
modify conditions of competition to the detriment of imported goods (a highly doubtful proposition for the
reasons mentioned above), and was not origin‐based (as the Panel and the AB accepted), then it should have
passed the test of consistency under Art. III GATT as the AB report on Dominican Republic‐Import and Sale of
Cigarettes that we discuss infra has held.
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(the per‐unit cost of the bond requirement being the result of dividing the cost of the bond by
the number of cigarettes sold on the Dominican Republic market). In this case, the difference
between the per‐unit costs of the bond requirement alleged by Honduras does not depend on
the foreign origin of the imported cigarettes. Therefore, in our view, the Panel was correct in
dismissing the argument that the bond requirement accords less favorable treatment to
imported cigarettes because the per‐unit cost of the bond was higher for the importer of
Honduran cigarettes than for two domestic producers. (italics and emphasis in the original).

The argument here differed from the approach in Korea‐Various Measures of Beef, where the
principle laid down was that a measure afforded LFT if the detrimental effect for imported
goods was a function of their origin. The AB did not explain the exact nature of the test that
determines whether the detriment is due to the origin of goods (or not). In this case, it found
in favor of the defendant because on its face the law did not link the level of bond
requirements to anything other than market share. There is thus a marked difference
between the two reports: a measure that operates to the detriment of imported goods is in
violation of Art. III.4 GATT in the world of Korea‐Various Measures of Beef; this is not
necessarily the case in the world of Dominican Republic‐Import and Sale of Cigarettes: if the
measure is justified on reasons other than the origin of the goods then, even in presence of
detrimental effects to imported goods, it will pass muster under Art. III.4 GATT.
In a similar vein, the AB held in its report on US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) in § 215:
The examination of whether a measure involves ʺless favourable treatmentʺ of imported
products within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 must be grounded in close
scrutiny of the ʺfundamental thrust and effect of the measure itselfʺ. This examination cannot
rest on simple assertion, but must be founded on a careful analysis of the contested measure
and of its implications in the marketplace. At the same time, however, the examination need
not be based on the actual effects of the contested measure in the marketplace. (emphasis in the
original).

Yet, in a more recent case, we see no mention to the AB report on Dominican Republic–Import
and Sale of Cigarettes. In Thailand‐Cigarettes, the AB was asked to pronounce on the
consistency of a Thai tax measure with Art. III.4 GATT. Thailand had argued before the
Panel and the AB that its measures were not origin‐related and hence not in violation of Art.
III.4 GATT. In § 126 of its report, the AB discusses LFT referring time and again to Korea‐
Various Measures on Beef and avoiding any reference to Dominican Republic–Import and Sale of
Cigarettes. To make things even more confusing on this front, in US‐Clove Cigarettes, a Panel
report released in September 2011, the Panel discusses the LFT requirement exclusively in
light of the findings of the AB report on Dominican Republic–Import and Sale of Cigarettes (pp.
79

79ff.). This Panel report was issued months after the AB report on Thailand‐Cigarettes, and it
is quite legitimate to suspect that its authors were fully aware of its content. The only fitting
conclusion here is that WTO adjudicating bodies are still struggling with the test that should
be applied in order to decide whether the LFT requirement has been established or not.

3.2.4.5 No Effects and No Intent Either? The Standard of Review
Note that in all cases discussed so far, the complainants were not asked to produce evidence
regarding harmful effects resulting from the violation of Art. III GATT. A violation of Art. III
GATT can in other words be established irrespective whether it has produced harmful trade
effects to imported goods. Case law, at least in its original form went one step further: it did
not request from the complaining party to demonstrate protectionist intent either. A
complainant arguing a case under Art. III GATT would thus be requested to show that:
(a) either an imported product was taxed in excess of a domestic like product;
(b) or an imported product was taxed differently than a domestic DCS product, in the
sense that the taxation operates ASATAP to the domestic DCS product;
(c) or a domestic nonfiscal scheme affords, to an imported product, treatment less
favorable than that afforded to a domestic like product.
In none of these three scenarios would the complaining party be required to demonstrate
harmful trade effects or protectionist intent. This point was made clear in a GATT case, the
panel report on US—Superfund. The United States had been taxing imported petroleum
products slightly higher than its domestic counterpart. When the measure was challenged
before the GATT dispute‐settlement process, the U.S. response was that the difference was
so minimal that it could not reasonably have an impact on the prices in the U.S. market. The
products concerned by the U.S. taxation scheme were like products, a point conceded by the
United States, which did not, however, advance any defense other than the absence of
impact on the prices.
The GATT panel dismissed the U.S. argument. In its view, the fact that the effects on the
market were negligible was a nonissue: Art. III GATT should be constructed and understood
as a mechanism protecting legitimate expectations as to the quality of competitive conditions
(§ 5.1.9):
. . . Article III:2, first sentence, cannot be interpreted to protect expectations on export
volumes; it protects expectations on the competitive relationship between imported and domestic
products. A change in the competitive relationship contrary to that provision must
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consequently be regarded ipso facto as a nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
under the General Agreement. A demonstration that a measure inconsistent with Article III:2,
first sentence, has no or insignificant effects would therefore in the view of the Panel not be a
sufficient demonstration that the benefits accruing under that provision had not been
nullified or impaired even if such a rebuttal were in principle permitted. (underlining in the
original; emphasis added).

So this report concluded that there is no need to show trade effects in order to establish a
violation of Art. III.2 GATT when two like products have been treated differently.135
The holding in this report did not change at all over the years as far as the absence of need to
demonstrate trade effects is concerned: if at all, subsequent panel and AB reports expanded
its coverage and held that there is no need to show trade effects when DCS products are
concerned, or when nonfiscal measures are at stake.
The AB in its report on Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II reproduced this idea in the following
terms (p. 16):
. . . it is irrelevant that ‘the trade effects’ of the tax differential between imported and domestic
products, as reflected in the volumes of imports, are insignificant or even non‐existent; Article
III protects expectations not of any particular trade volume but rather of the equal
competitive relationship between imported and domestic products.

Consequently, in this report the AB extended the irrelevance of a trade‐effects test to cases
where DCS products are involved. Recall that, with the exception of the pair vodka, shochu,
all other products were, in the AB’s view, DCS products.
We detect a similar attitude in the context of Art. III.4 GATT. The AB clarified, in its report
on US—FSC, that, in parallel with its case law under Art. III.2 GATT, for a complainant
successfully to absolve its burden of proof and demonstrate that the group of imported
products have been afforded LFT than the group of domestic like products, there is no
obligation to show trade effects (§ 215):

The panel did not explain its position any further. Probably what it had in mind is that prices fluctuate
and a small tax differential can become quite big in the future. What it did, however, explicitly state is that
trading partners expect a certain kind of behavior by the other GATT contracting parties, and that there should
be no need to check the outcome of a particular behavior that is not accepted in the treaty language negotiated.
A violation establishes a prima facie case that is clearly rebuttable as per the DSU (and before, in the GATT years,
as per Art. XXIII.2 GATT), although as yet no respondent has made the rebuttal successfully.
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The examination of whether a measure involves ‘less favourable treatment’ of imported
products within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 must be grounded in close
scrutiny of the ‘fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself.’ This examination cannot
rest on simple assertion, but must be founded on a careful analysis of the contested measure
and of its implications in the marketplace. At the same time, however, the examination need
not be based on the actual effects of the contested measure in the marketplace. (emphasis in the
original).

Following this line of thinking, the AB condemned an EC scheme that provided traders with
an incentive to trade EC goods at the expense of imported like products, even in the absence
of any tangible evidence suggesting that there was a quantified trade impact stemming from
this measure (§§ 213–214 of the AB report on EC—Bananas III). By the same token, the panel,
in its report on Canada—Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, found that a routine authorization
scheme was GATT‐inconsistent simply because it was not being imposed on domestic
products (§ 6.193). The fact that the scheme was not onerous at all (§ 6.193), that economic
operators were familiar with it (§ 6.197), that in the past authorization had always been
granted (§ 6.200), that the agency at hand had enough discretion to always grant
authorization (§ 6.203), that there was an institutional possibility to obtain advance
authorization (§ 6.207), that a more attractive, than the authorization scheme, alternative was
available to foreign products (§ 6.213) were not reason enough for the panel to change its
mind on this issue.136
The relevance of an intent test is a slightly different story. A couple of GATT panel reports
(US—Malt Beverages, and US—Taxes on Automobiles) held, as we saw supra, that intent
matters in the context of analysis under Art. III GATT. WTO panels explicitly overruled this
approach. WTO panels did not, nevertheless, totally exclude the relevance of an intent test:
case law has time and again stated that the subjective intent of the legislator does not matter,
leaving thus room for the relevance of objective intent. As we will see, in what immediately
follows, the substantive content of the two terms has not, alas, been clarified in case law.
In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the AB distinguishes between subjective intent and the
purpose of a regulatory intervention, as disclosed by objective features of the design of the

WTO Members might have to quantify the effects of a trade measure they have successfully
challenged, at a later stage of the proceedings: assuming no compliance has occurred and the complainant
requests authorization to impose counter‐measures, it will have to quantify the trade damage it suffered, in
light of the obligation enshrined in Art 22.4 of the DSU, that the overall level of counter‐measures should not
exceed that of the trade damage incurred.
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measure. The former is irrelevant when it comes to establishing an Art. III.2 of the GATT
violation; the latter could be relevant (p. 27):
This third inquiry under Article III:2, second sentence, must determine whether ‘directly
competitive or substitutable products’ are ‘not similarly taxed’ in a way that affords
protection. This is not an issue of intent. It is not necessary for a panel to sort through the
many reasons legislators and regulators often have for what they do and weigh the relative
significance of those reasons to establish legislative or regulatory intent. If the measure is
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production,
then it does not matter that there may not have been any desire to engage in protectionism in
the minds of the legislators or the regulators who imposed the measure. It is irrelevant that
protectionism was not an intended objective if the particular tax measure in question is
nevertheless, to echo Article III:1, ‘applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production.’ This is an issue of how the measure in question is applied.
...
As in that case, we believe that an examination in any case of whether dissimilar taxation has
been applied so as to afford protection requires a comprehensive and objective analysis of the
structure and application of the measure in question on domestic as compared to imported
products. We believe it is possible to examine objectively the underlying criteria used in a
particular tax measure, its structure, and its overall application to ascertain whether it is
applied in a way that affords protection to domestic products. (emphasis in the original).

In the same report as well as in Chile—Alcoholic Beverages, the AB went one step further: it
brought objective regulatory purpose, that is, the purpose as revealed through the design and
architecture of the measure, within the analysis of the ASATAP criterion. At the same time,
however, it continued to explicitly reject a subjective intent test. Moreover, it did not establish
any criteria as to how it will evaluate the objective regulatory purpose, other than referring
to the design and the architecture of the measure at hand. It discussed summarily the four
regulatory objectives advanced as justification of the measure by Chile, and it explicitly
rejected the relevance of the necessity criterion when evaluating a claim under Art III of the
GATT (§§ 71–72):
We recall once more that, in Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, we declined to adopt an approach to
the issue of “so as to afford protection” that attempts to examine “the many reasons
legislators and regulators often have for what they do.” We called for examination of the
design, architecture and structure of a tax measure precisely to permit identification of a
measure’s objectives or purposes as revealed or objectified in the measure itself. Thus, we
consider that a measure’s purposes, objectively manifested in the design, architecture and
structure of the measure, are intensely pertinent to the task of evaluating whether or not that
measure is applied so as to afford protection to domestic production. In the present appeal,
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Chile’s explanations concerning the structure of the New Chilean System—including, in
particular, the truncated nature of the line of progression of tax rates, which effectively
consists of two levels (27 per cent ad valorem and 47 per cent ad valorem) separated by only 4
degrees of alcohol content—might have been helpful in understanding what prima facie
appear to be anomalies in the progression of tax rates. The conclusion of protective
application reached by the Panel becomes very difficult to resist, in the absence of
countervailing explanations by Chile. The mere statement of the four objectives pursued by
Chile does not constitute effective rebuttal on the part of Chile.
At the same time, we agree with Chile that it would be inappropriate, under Article III:2,
second sentence, of the GATT 1994, to examine whether the tax measure is necessary for
achieving its stated objectives or purposes. The Panel did use the word “necessary” in this
part of its reasoning. Nevertheless, we do not read the Panel Report as showing that the Panel
did, in fact, conduct an examination of whether the measure is necessary to achieve its stated
objectives. It appears to us that the Panel did no more than try to relate the observable
structural features of the measure with its declared purposes, a task that is unavoidable in
appraising the application of the measure as protective or not of domestic production.
(emphasis in the original).

Regulatory intent can, consequently, be an issue in the limited case where two products are
DCS, and the tax differential is not large enough, keeping in mind that case law has not
provided a quantitative benchmark to decide what large actually means.
Case law regarding the relevance of objective intent when the consistency of a fiscal measure
with the GATT is being challenged, can usefully be summed up as follows:
(a) there is a threshold issue: not any tax differential is ASATAP; the tax differential must
be more than de minimis. We do not know, however, what exactly constitutes de
minimis, since case law did not provide a quantitative estimate in this regard. We do
know, nonetheless, that mere arithmetic difference satisfies the in excess requirement,
but not the de minimis requirement. Consequently, when dealing with claims
regarding DCS products, if a WTO adjudicating body reaches the conclusion that a
tax differential is less than de minimis, it will reject the complaint;137
(b) assuming that the de minimis criterion has been satisfied, if the tax differential is
substantial, then it will suffice, in and of itself, to establish a violation of Art. III.2
GATT. Once again, WTO adjudicating bodies have not provided an arithmetic
benchmark. In Chile—Alcoholic Beverages, nevertheless, a 20 percent tax differential
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Hence, infinitesimal tax differentials will satisfy the in excess—but not the ASATAP—criterion.
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between two DCS products was judged substantial. There has been no case so far
where a tax differential was judged more than de minimis but less than substantial; and
(c) if a tax differential is more than de minimis but less than substantial, then an
inconsistency with Art. III.2 GATT can be established only through recourse to other
factors as well.138
Now, of course, one might legitimately wonder whether in practice inquiries into the
objective intent will be necessary: indeed, a government that wishes to confer an advantage to
its domestic production will, in all likelihood opt for substantial tax differentials assuming
that this term covers cases where the tax differential affects prices. One will be hard pressed
to find cases where, given protectionist intent, governments will opt for small tax
differentials that might not affect prices at all.
Finally note that case law has clarified that the objective intent will be revealed through the
design and the architecture of the measure challenged, but it has not explained in what way
it differs from subjective intent. Indeed, in the absence of explanation, one might legitimately
ask the question whether the distinction between objective and subjective intent is meaningful
at all.

3.2.5

Allocation of the Burden of Proof

As conventional, we divide the burden of proof into the burden of production (who must bring
forward evidence?), and the burden of persuasion (how much evidence is necessary for the
burden to shift to the other party?). The GATT does not explicitly address this central issue,
but it has been dealt with in case law.
Consider first the burden of production. The allocation of burden of proof is not explicitly
addressed in the DSU. Panels however, have consistently made references to general maxims
of law regulating this issue; even when they did not refer to them explicitly, they addressed
the issue in a manner consistent with those maxims. By virtue of the maxim actori incumbit
probatio, it is for the party making a claim to provide the necessary evidence that the claim
holds. This maxim is the direct consequence of another maxim, in dubio mitius, which
essentially means that there should be a presumption of legality of the challenged measure.
If the law distinguishes between a rule and an exception, then legal orders follow the maxim
quicunque exceptio invokat ejudem probare debet: the party invoking the exception carries the
burden of proof to demonstrate compliance with the conditions reflected in the exception. In
This is a theoretical possibility that has been flagged by the AB. So far, as noted above, no such case has
been submitted to WTO adjudication.
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this case, there is a presumption of illegality since the party invoking an exception has by
definition broken the rule; that is the legal canon for which the presumption of legality has
been agreed.
The situation in case law is somewhat confusing, but essentially follows these two maxims.139
There is no doubt that Art. III GATT is a rule and not an exception to a rule. As a result, the
burden of production of proof stays with the complainant. The next question is, how much
proof must the complainant contribute for the burden to shift to the other party? This takes
us straight into the discussion regarding the burden of persuasion.
Let us next turn to the burden of persuasion. It is by now clear, that the complainant, in
general (that is, not only in Art. III GATT cases) need not provide full proof that its claim
holds; a prima facie case suffices. What exactly constitutes a prima facie case is difficult to
specify: there is discrepancy across panel reports but, in general, some sort of reasonableness
standard seems to emerge. Assuming a prima facie case has been made, the burden will shift
to the other party which will aim at refuting the evidence against it. Absent effective
refutation of prima facie, the complainant will prevail. Note that the defendant will prevail
even in the case of equipoise between its own evidence and that provided by the complainant.
WTO adjudicating bodies will not shift the burden of proof from one party to the other
depending on whether a prima facie case has been made; dispute adjudication in the WTO is
nothing like a game of tennis where the ball has to fly above the net for the other party to
respond: they will typically request from both parties to provide all evidence they wish to
submit, and they will make their judgment whether a prima facie case has been made against
this background, that is, by reviewing all of the evidence submitted before them. In this vein,
we note that the panel, in its report on Turkey – Rice, summing up prior case law, held that it
would not request from the defendant to respond only after the complainant had
successfully made a prima facie case; rather, it would decide whether a prima facie case had
been made on the basis of the totality of evidence brought by the parties to the dispute.
There is not one single case so far that does not evidence this approach.

3.2.5.1 Making a Prima Facie Case
This requirement was first introduced by the AB in its report on US ‐ Wool Shirts and Blouses.
It has been cited in practically all disputes ever since when a burden of proof issue arose
(§ 14):

In three cases (EC – Sardines, EC – Hormones, EC – Tariff Preferences) where the text of the agreement
clearly indicates that we are dealing with an exception, case law still assigned the burden of production of
proof with the complaining party. None of these cases is a GATT case though.
139

86

It is a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law, and, in fact,
most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining
or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defense. If that party
adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the
burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption.

This passage provides only an indication as to the burden of persuasion; making a prima facie
case is shorthand for observing the burden of persuasion. In subsequent cases, panels have
used the term “to make a prima facie case” as equivalent to the obligation to “raise a
presumption” that what is claimed is true (US – Stainless Steel at § 6.2). Raising a presumption is
not a self‐interpreting term either and, as a result, the question of the quantum of proof
needed to discharge the obligation of burden of persuasion can only be evaluated on a case‐
by‐case basis in WTO jurisprudence. Nevertheless, raising a presumption cannot amount to
providing full proof by any reasonable understanding of this term. So it seems that what
matters is that panels are satisfied that enough proof has been submitted regarding a
particular claim and that the submitted proof, absent counter proof, could reasonably lead to
the conclusion the complainant should prevail.140

The panel on Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks ruled that the duty of the complainant to make a
prima facie case is not affected by the defendant’s decision not to challenge the claims and
arguments made. In the case at hand, Mexico had chosen not to raise any defense in some of
the claims advanced by the United States. The panel implicitly held that Mexico’s inaction
did not amount to admission that the United States had made a prima facie case (§§ 8.16ff.).
The panel went on and examined to what extent, in its view and in absence of a Mexican
response, such was indeed the case.

3.2.5.2 Refuting a Prima Facie Case
In theory, assuming a presumption that a claim holds has been raised, the burden of proof
will shift to the other party which will have to effectively refute the presumption: the panel
report on Thailand – H‐Beams for example, requests (§ 7.49) from Thailand to provide
“effective refutation” against Poland’s prima facie case. In practice, nonetheless, as already
noted, WTO adjudicating bodies do not raise a flag anytime a presumption has been created;
A claim is the identification of a factual situation and the ensuing breach of a legal rule: by imposing a
quota on imports of widgets, country X acts inconsistently with its obligations under Art. XI GATT.
140
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rather, WTO adjudicating bodies will make a global evaluation based on what has been
pleaded before them by the parties to the dispute. As the AB noted in its report on Korea –
Dairy there is:
. . . no provision in the DSU . . . that requires a panel to make an explicit ruling on
whether the complainant has established a prima facie case of violation before a panel
may proceed to examine the respondent’s defence and evidence. (§ 145 italics in the
original).

Consequently, the issue whether a party has indeed established a prima facie case, and/or the
adjunct issue whether the prima facie case was effectively refuted will form an integral part of
the general evaluation by the panel. This does not mean however, that panels cannot, at the
end of the process decide that the complainant did not make a prima facie case (see, for
example, India – Autos §§ 7.231 – 7.233). That is, the fact that the defendant has attempted to
rebut a claim presented by the complainant does not necessarily mean that, in the panel’s
view, the complainant has established a presumption.
(c) Equipoise
The panel, in its report on US – 1916 Act (EC) concluded that evidence submitted by the
complainant and the defendant was in equipoise. It then asked itself what the legal
consequence of this finding should be. It held that, in such cases, the advantage rests with
the party responding to the claim (§ 6.58):
If, after having applied the above methodology, we could not reach certainty as to the most
appropriate court interpretation, i.e. if the evidence remains in equipoise, we shall follow the
interpretation that favours the party against which the claim has been made, considering that
the claimant did not convincingly support its claim.

3.2.5.3 Art. III GATT Case Law141
In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the complainant provided econometric evidence (based on
consumer surveys) that the products in question were DCS. It also pointed to the fact that
the defendant had not invoked any rationale for the tax differential across the various
products. The defendant claimed that there was some policy rationale which was however,
discarded by the panel (and the AB) since it was considered to be an ex post facto justification:
the Japanese law providing for the tax differential across sochu and a series of western

In line with the approach in this paper, we will limit our observations to the leading, in our view of
course, cases.
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drinks did not contain any policy justification for the differential treatment of the various
drinks coming under its purview.
In Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, the complainant provided evidence from the Japanese market
regarding the relationship between the products in question arguing, inter alia, that the two
markets (Japan, Korea) were highly comparable. However, as facts make it clear, western
drinks did exist in the Korean market, the tax differential notwithstanding. The defendant
claimed that the price differential between soju and the predominantly western drinks was
such that Korean consumers would never treat interchangeably (at least diluted) soju and
the western drinks involved. Nevertheless, neither the panel nor the AB explained why such
evidence could not have been appropriately taken into consideration; they discussed
evidence from the Japanese market without adequately explaining why evidence from the
Korean market did not fit the bill. The panel and the AB further rejected the claims by Korea
arguing that recourse to econometric indicators is not the only way in which likeness can be
established. In the AB’s view, two products would be considered like to the extent that they
share physical characteristics, and end uses and consumers perceive them as such even if a
price difference between the two exists.
In Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, the complainants provided evidence to the effect that some
western drinks were being taxed substantially higher than some foreign drinks although the
difference in alcoholic content was minimal. They submitted as evidence the Chilean law
which contained sharp tax differentials across alcoholic drinks with various alcoholic
contents. The defendant responded that it was Chilean producers of alcoholic drinks that
were shouldering the majority of the tax burden in the higher category and provided
evidence to this effect. Still the AB held that on balance the evidence submitted by Chile did
not detract from the fact that imported goods were being taxed more onerously than
domestic like/DCS products.
In EC – Asbestos, the complainant argued that the two products (construction material with
and without asbestos) were like products and that the French measure was treating
imported goods less favorably than their domestic counterparts. The defendant replied that
the measure was based on scientific evidence pointing to the health hazards stemming from
exposure to asbestos containing construction material. The panel and the AB reached
divergent conclusions: in the panel’s view the evidence submitted was not sufficient to show
that the products were unlike. So it held that Canada won its claim under Art. III GATT, but
it went on to find for the defendant under Art. XX GATT. In the AB’s view, the evidence
submitted supported a conclusion that the two products were unlike, because of consumers’
perceptions regarding the health hazard associated with the imported goods.
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In Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the complainants submitted evidence to the effect that,
following the introduction of the dual retail system, most traders opted for selling domestic
rather than imported beef. Korea responded arguing that this was only normal in light of the
fact that a legitimate import quota was in place as a result of which total imports amounted
to less than 10 percent of the total consumption. Korea also submitted evidence to the effect
that the import quota had always been absorbed except for the years of the financial crisis
when consumption was heavily reduced (with respect to consumption beef as well). The
panel and the AB rejected Korea’s arguments finding that the measure had modified
conditions of competition to the detriment of imported goods since fewer stores were now
carrying imported beef; they did not deem the evidence on absorption of quota to be
relevant since, in their view, the standard of review under Art. III GATT does not require
analysis of trade effects. They further found against Korea under Art. XX GATT holding that
while this measure was genuinely aiming at consumers’ protection, it was unnecessary since
it was overly restrictive of trade.
In Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the complainant presented evidence
regarding the bond requirement that imported cigarettes had to pay arguing that it was in
excess of the similar burden on domestic like goods. The defendant did not dispute that
occasionally this would be the case. It did, however, claim that the payable amount was a
function of the size of the market of the producer involved in the transaction and,
consequently, it was not linked to the foreign origin of the goods. The AB sided with the
defendant stating that, to the extent that the regulator can point to a ground for adopting a
measure other than the origin of goods, a measure will pass the test of consistency with Art.
III GATT (even if occasionally it produces a negative trade outcome for imported goods).
There is little to disagree with the AB’s attitude on the original assignment concerning
burden of production. For the rest, however, the AB’s attitude is hard to discern:
(a) In name, the AB suggests that neither the regulatory intent nor trade effects will be
taken into account: but in Korea – Various Measures on Beef the AB does in a way look at
effects; how can it rule that conditions of competition have been modified to the
detriment of importing goods without taking into account that there are fewer stores
now (than before) selling imported beef?
(b) By the same token, in Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the AB held
that origin must not be the rationale for law, otherwise a measure will run afoul of
Art. III GATT. How different is that from saying that the intent of the regulator cannot
be to punish imported goods because of their origin? In the same context, in Chile –
Alcoholic Beverages the AB attempts a difficult‐to‐understand distinction between
objective (as opposed to subjective?) intent;
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It is clear by now that panels and the AB will not turn the green light on every time the
complainant has adduced enough proof to switch the burden to the other party. Unless,
however, the standard of review, that is, all issues regarding burden of production and
burden of persuasion, becomes clear, both parties might be disadvantaged when preparing
themselves for adjudication at the WTO.

3.3 Exceptions to NT
A WTO Member that has been found to be in violation of its obligations under Art. III GATT
can still exonerate itself from liability by invoking one of the exceptions mentioned in the
GATT. To this effect, however, the regulating WTO Member will carry the burden of proof
to show that its measures, although in violation of Art. III GATT, are not GATT‐inconsistent.
We are not concerned here with temporary deviations, such as for example, a waiver, but
rather with permanent exceptions that is, legal grounds that justify departures from NT
without imposing any time constraints.

3.3.1

Art. IV GATT: Film

The letter and the negotiating history of Art. IV GATT make it clear that WTO Members can
treat domestic cinematographic film better than foreign.142 To this effect, they can, for
example, establish screen quotas and thus, treat imported films less favorably than domestic
films that might run quota free. From a pure legal perspective though, film quotas should
not be treated as exceptions to NT, but rather as lex specialis to this provision. This is so since,
otherwise, the burden of proof would have to shift to the country imposing the film quota.
Art. XX GATT entitled ‘General Exceptions’ is prima facie an exception to Art. IV GATT as
well, and it is in this context that the WTO Member imposing a film quota will be request it
to defend it, that is, only assuming that the complainant had previously successfully
challenged the consistency of a measure with Art. IV GATT.
So far, there have been no cases adjudicated under Art. IV GATT.

3.3.2

Art. XX GATT: General Exceptions

The title of this provision leaves no doubt that it was intended to be an exception to, in
principle, all GATT provisions. Case law has confirmed that Art. XX GATT is an exception to
Deciding on the origin of films might be a quixotic test. This is not, however, an issue for the purposes
of this work.
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NT: an appropriate illustration is offered by the aforementioned report on Korea – Various
Measures on Beef: it was a domestic instrument of nonfiscal nature (dual retail system) that was
judged to be inconsistent with Art. III GATT; Korea attempted (unsuccessfully) to justify it
through recourse to Art. XX GATT: both the panel and the AB examined the consistency of
the challenged measure with Art. XX GATT, in accordance with Korea’s claims.

3.3.3

Art. XXI GATT: Security Exception

The security exception is, like Art. XX GATT, an exception to, in principle, all GATT
provisions. There has been no case law so far regarding domestic instruments in this context;
indeed, there has been no case law at all under this provision since the inception of the WTO:
the European Community attempted to challenge the consistency of the US Helms Burton Act
with the WTO rules, but requested suspension of the panel established to this effect before it
issued its report, and did not request that it reconvene within the statutory deadlines. As a
result, the panel’s authority lapsed (Art. 12.12 DSU). During the GATT years, one case was
actually litigated: in US – Nicaraguan Trade, a rather idiosyncratic GATT panel, since it was
clear that the final report was not going to be implemented anyway. In this case, the
measures at stake were border measures (two‐way embargo).143 Still, there should be no
doubt that a WTO Member can legitimately depart from NT if this is necessary to safeguard
its national security: the wording of this provision leaves no room for doubt in this regard. It
pertinently reads:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
...
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests. (emphasis added).

3.4 Critique of the Case Law
In what follows, we provide an overview of the debate and the critique expressed in the
doctrine concerning the application of Art. III GATT in specific instances by the WTO
adjudicating bodies, as well as the overall understanding of this provision by the WTO
adjudicating bodies. 144

See Mavroidis (2007) at pp. 322ff.
Hundreds of papers have directly or indirectly discussed either specific applications of Art. III GATT
or the WTO judges’ overall understanding of this provision. We thus have to be selective in our description of
the literature.
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A significant part of the criticism regarding the case‐law approach to Art. III GATT borrows
from doctrinal work on the understanding of Art. III GATT, and on the role it is called to
play within the world trading system. The question that many authors have asked concerns
the limits that NT places on the regulatory authority of WTO Members. There are, of course,
many variations regarding this basic question. Almost unanimously the doctrine condemns
the tendency in (at least some) case law to base its findings in the perception that the terms
of Art. III GATT should be understood in a contextual manner, without adequate regard to
the role that NT has been committed to play by the GATT framers. Voices in the doctrine
have not condemned the institutional architecture of the GATT or the drafting of Art. III
GATT: critique has centered on the understanding of this provision by GATT/WTO
adjudicating bodies.
There is still scarce analysis of NT in economics, and in particular of the NT case law. The
same largely applies to the law‐and‐economics literature. It is illustrative that the two
volumes coedited by Bhagwati and Hudec (1996), while containing many interesting
contributions addressing the harmonization of domestic policies, did not contain any paper
specifically addressing NT.145
We first present a summary of the general critique, that is, papers which do not discuss
specific case law but rather the general approach of GATT/WTO panels when dealing with
disputes coming under the purview of Art. III GATT (including a normative discussion, that
is, the manner in which GATT/WTO panels should – rather than do – understand this
provision). We then discuss critiques against specific reports by GATT/WTO panels.
We divide the doctrinal discussion into four parts: papers dealing with the mandate and
coverage of NT, its legal nature, the standard of review that GATT/WTO panels do and/or
should apply across cases, and finally the understanding of specific terms appearing in the
body of Art. III GATT.
The mandate and coverage of NT: In a series of papers and books authored alone or with
coauthors, Jackson (1989, 1998, 2003, 2006) explains the changing role of domestic regulation
in a world where border instruments are becoming less and less meaningful.146 Jackson
recognizes the problems posed by the extension of NT to cover cases of de facto
discrimination, but argues that, unless construed this way (that is, to encompass de facto
discrimination as well), this provision would be easily circumvented. The extension of the
ambit of NT to cover cases of de facto discrimination is thus a necessary evil; adjudicating
145
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See Bhagwati and Hudec (1996).
Jackson (1969) provided the first comprehensive assessment of the negotiation of this provision.
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bodies then face the task of devising the appropriate test to ensure that in such cases they
will be punishing only discriminatory (origin‐wise) behavior and nothing else.
Staiger and Sykes (2009) deal with the limits of the current draft of Art. III GATT. They
observe that WTO rules and disputes center on complaints about excessively stringent
regulations. Employing the international externalities (terms‐of‐trade) framework for the
modeling of trade agreements, they show how large nations may have an incentive to
impose discriminatory product standards against imported goods once border instruments
are constrained, and how inefficiently stringent standards may emerge under certain
circumstances even if regulatory discrimination is prohibited. They then assess the WTO
legal framework in light of their results, arguing that it does a reasonably thorough job of
policing regulatory discrimination, but that it does relatively little to address excessive
nondiscriminatory regulations.
The legal nature of NT: Surprisingly this area has not attracted a lot of interest. Petersmann
(2002) is probably the only paper that squarely addresses this issue. He does not put into
question the historic role for Art. III GATT. However, he does question its continued
legitimacy in today’s world. In Petersmann’s view, the nondiscrimination principle in Art. III
GATT should be understood as a ‘constitutional’ provision (using this term to denote
hierarchy across the various GATT provisions) and should be anchored in human rights,
that is, it should be interpreted in light of jurisprudence in the field of protection of human
rights.
The standard of review: A number of papers have dealt with the aims and effects test and this
should not come as surprise: in GATT/WTO, total reversals of case law are quite rare.
Moreover, explicit over‐turnings are even less frequent. Yet this is what happened, as we
saw supra, in the context of disputes relating to Art. III GATT: the very first case that was
adjudicated under the WTO (Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages) explicitly rejected the
standard of review employed in the last GATT case that came under the purview of this
provision (US – Taxes on Automobiles).
There are authors who have taken an unambiguous stance in favor of reinstating the aims
and effects test (or a version of this test that would essentially ask the question what is the
regulatory intent of the challenged measure and would subject the ultimate decision
regarding violation on the response to this question). Hudec is one of many authors who
devoted considerable efforts analyzing the standard of review that should be applied in
cases dealing with Art. III GATT. Hudec (1988, 1998, 2000) explains the shortcomings of an
Art. III test that disregards protective intent: in Hudec’s view, this can cause GATT/WTO
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judges to strike down domestic measures that should be considered legitimate. Hudec’s
criticism has been echoed by many other scholars.
Howse and Regan (2000) agree that intent should matter, and take a stance in favor of an
aims and effects test à la US – Taxes on Automobiles. They mentioned the relevance of PPMs
(process and production methods) when defining like products, arguing that, for example,
environment‐friendly and ‐unfriendly products should not be treated as like goods.
Building on his work with Howse, Regan (2000, 2002, 2003) has argued that the judge should
inquire into the legislative intent in order to decide whether a measure is consistent with Art.
III GATT: only measures pursued with the intent to protect should be judged GATT‐
inconsistent. Regan maintains, like others as well, that de facto the WTO judge does inquire
into intent. At a principle level, he does not take distance from the aims and effect test as
applied in GATT case law.
Roessler (1996) takes the view that panels have only paid lip service to the overarching
purpose of Art. III GATT, that is, to combat protectionism. Consequently, in his view,
domestic measures that serve a purpose other than protectionism should be exonerated from
liability under Art. III GATT. To ensure that this indeed the case, Roessler calls for an
understanding of the term like products that would be inspired by the regulatory objective
pursued. Roessler also takes issue with the standard of review adopted by adjudicating
bodies: in his view, recourse to Art. XX GATT is no panacea since this provision includes
only an exhaustive list of justifying grounds whereas there are arguably many more
potential policy goals that a society might legitimately wish to achieve. He thus argues in
favor of a refocus of the nondiscrimination test as embedded in Art. III GATT.
Charnovitz (2002) expresses disagreement with the manner in which WTO adjudicating
bodies have, by applying an erroneous standard of review that does not inquire into the
intent of the challenged measure, de facto subjected the pursuit of social preferences (often
pursued in nondiscriminatory terms) to trade concerns. This goes against the negotiating
intent (that Charnovitz has explored in this and other work), and undoes the balance of
rights and obligations as struck by the WTO Members during negotiations.
Porges and Trachtman (2003) use a legal‐realist methodology and hypothesize that tribunals
will, when examining domestic regulation under Art. III GATT, always look at aim and effects
(no matter what they say). The authors then review the post‐Japan – Alcoholic Beverages case
law to prove that, indeed, tribunals have looked at aim and effects. This paper shows that
the category of de facto discrimination cannot be determined except through a judicial
evaluation of the aim and effects of domestic measures – discrimination is not otherwise a
coherent concept.
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There are also papers that do not espouse the aims and effects test. Davey and Pauwelyn
(2000) express some dissatisfaction with the test applied by WTO adjudicating bodies in the
context of Art. III GATT, and argue for the introduction of a discriminatory‐effect test that
should be introduced in order to decide for example, whether a tax has been imposed in
excess. To them, the decisive question that panels and the AB should always ask when
dealing with claims under the NT provision should be: is there discriminatory impact related
to origin?
In similar vein, Di Mascio and Pauwelyn (2008) look at both the negotiating work and the
case‐law understanding of Art. III GATT and conclude that it serves a dual purpose: to
protect tariff concessions and to prevent protectionism. They lament, nonetheless, the
manner in which WTO adjudicating bodies have applied this principle in concrete cases.
They argue that WTO panels and the AB have had recourse to ‘cyclical’ interpretations of
this provision, moving from inquiries into the regulatory intent to marketplace tests and
back, without always paying attention to its overarching objective. They conclude that, as a
result, we still lack a compass against which we can judge the consistency of domestic
instruments with the GATT.
Verhoosel (2002) and Bartels (2009) have advanced more or less the same argument: they call
for the application of an ‘integrated necessity test’ (the term first coined by Verhoosel)
whereby the WTO adjudicator will decide whether de facto discrimination has occurred by
engaging in a two‐prong test: first ask whether a measure specifically affects imported
products, and if the response to this question is affirmative, then check whether the measure
is necessary to achieve a legitimate policy goal.
A number of papers argue in favor of an economics‐informed standard of review. There are
differences, sometimes important, across these papers which typically reject the aims and
effects test as applied in case law but do not necessarily reject an inquiry into the regulatory
intent of the challenged measure. In fact, some of them explicitly call for this to happen.
Sykes (1999) observes that a wide array of policy instruments can protect domestic firms
against foreign competition. Regulatory measures that raise the costs of foreign firms relative
to domestic firms are exceptionally wasteful protectionist devices however, with deadweight
costs that can greatly exceed those of traditional protectionist instruments such as tariffs and
quotas. He examines the welfare economics of regulatory protectionism, and undertakes a
related political‐economy analysis of the national and international legal systems that must
confront it, including the WTO, the NAFTA, the European Union, and the U.S. federal
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system. Sykes explains why regulatory measures that serve no purpose other than to protect
domestic firms against foreign competition will generally be prohibited in politically
sophisticated trade agreements, even when other instruments of protection are to a degree
permissible. He further suggests why regulatory measures that serve honest,
nonprotectionist objectives will be permissible in sophisticated trade agreements even
though their regulatory benefits may be small and their adverse effect on trade may be great
– that is, he explains why trade agreements generally do not authorize ʺbalancing analysisʺ
akin to that undertaken in certain dormant Commerce Clause cases under U.S. law.
Horn and Mavroidis (2004) point to the relevance of regulatory intent but disagree with the
aims and effects test. But since intent normally is difficult to determine directly, adjudicating
bodies have to seek recourse to indirect evidence, as is frequently done in legal practice.
Trade effects may be one such indicator.
Palmeter (1993, 1999) argues that WTO Members do not, by signing the WTO agreement,
usurp each other’s sovereignty; they agree only to limit the exercise of their own sovereignty
when they believe that such limitation is to their advantage. It is this understanding of trade
agreements that should inform the role that the NT provision is called to play. He further
makes the point that the earlier negative reaction of environmentalists to GATT rulings (such
as US – Tuna/Dolphin), although probably grounded in solid arguments, was
disproportionate: after all, it is not the text of the GATT that is a threat to environmental
protection, but one application of it. Gains from trade liberalization on the other hand, can
help finance environmental protection. The attention of adjudicating bodies should be
shifted towards honoring the objective of the NT provision: in his view, when discussing the
Tuna/Dolphin litigation, the GATT is quite explicit that WTO Members may impose
nondiscriminatory environmental standards. It is when standards imposed on trading
partners are more onerous than those imposed on the regulator that the NT provision is
being violated.
Trebilcock and Fishbein (2007) take the view that if every attempt by governments to pursue
domestic policy objectives is subjected to the imperative to facilitate imports, then regulatory
autonomy would have been seriously impaired. In their view, this is not the appropriate
standard of review to apply in cases dealing with NT. The authors believe that WTO
adjudicating bodies have not managed to successfully distinguish cases of legitimate exercise
of regulatory autonomy from cases of regulatory protectionism, precisely because of their
incapacity to design the proper standard of review to be applied in similar cases.
Ortino (2003) does not espouse an economics‐based approach but does point to similar
observations. In his view, the lack of methodology by WTO adjudicating bodies has resulted
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in lack of coherence across cases. This author finds it difficult to decipher the standard of
review that WTO adjudicating bodies have employed, arguing that, while it is clear that they
have rejected the aims and effects test, it still remains unclear what they have replaced it with.
In his view, the quasi mechanistic application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is
probably an important contributing factor to the situation he describes: the insistence of
adjudicating bodies on a contextual understanding of key terms has had an involuntary by‐
product, that is, the non advent of a methodology to deal with Art. III cases.
The understanding of specific terms: Recall our discussion supra, that some of the terms were
chosen faute de mieux, and that there was even an in‐principle understanding that some key
terms (like products) would have to be renegotiated following the advent of the ITO.
The view has been expressed that it is never too late to address any deficiencies in this
respect through legislative action: Bronckers and McNelis (2000) are of the view that, in light
of the experience so far, it is probably too risky to leave it to adjudicating bodies to continue
interpreting terms such as like products. They argue that it would be wiser to legislate further
(in an effort to attempt to complete the contract to the extent possible) and preempt judicial
action by clarifying this concept.
Others believe, without explicitly addressing the issue of legislative interference, that these
terms could be clarified through adjudication. What these papers have in common is that
they all argue for a contextual interpretation of the key terms, that is, an interpretation that
would take into account the legislative objectives and the committed instruments to attain
them. Horn and Mavroidis (2004) argue for a clear market‐based interpretation of the term
like and DCS products. They also argue however, for an understanding of terms such as
ASATAP and LFT whereby the key question would be whether the contested measure is
indeed protectionist or not, that is, whether the rationale for regulatory differentiation
reflects the origin of the good.
Giri and Trebilcock (2005) agree with this understanding of the terms like and DCS products.
With respect to the terms ASATAP and LFT, they argue that the question WTO adjudicating
bodies should ask is whether the equality of competitive conditions across domestic and
foreign products has been affected as a result of the challenged regulatory intervention.
In the same vein, Melloni (2005) agrees with the view espoused by adjudicating bodies that
the NT provision is there to guarantee that no recourse will be made to regulatory
protectionism. In his view, however, this test has been misapplied largely because the WTO
adjudicating bodies (and more especially the AB) have refused to entertain any analysis
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grounded on economics. In his view, recourse to simple econometric indicators such as
cross‐price elasticity for example, would greatly reduce the current uncertainty regarding
the understanding of terms such as DCS and/or like products.
Dunoff (2009) discusses how WTO Members can through domestic instruments advance
social goals, paying particular attention to cases where the regulating government acts as
purchaser. He points to the difficulties that might arise in this context as a result of the
manner in which WTO adjudicating bodies have understood the key terms that appear in
the body of Art. III GATT.
Choi (2003) discusses exhaustively all of the case law until 2003. Her main conclusion is that
the key term in the NT provision, like products, has been interpreted inconsistently. She
pleads for an interpretation in light with the overall WTO aims, that is, trade liberalization
that takes sufficient account of the negative integration model established by the GATT.
A number of authors have criticized specific applications of the NT provision in WTO
disputes. Mattoo and Subramanian (1998) have argued that the panel ruling on US – Taxes on
Automobiles has certain important implications. The manner in which Art. III GATT has been
interpreted and applied tilted the balance heavily in favor of regulatory freedom, diluting
the disciplines of Art. III GATT, which is one of the keystones in the construction of the
GATT system. Two factors contributed to this dilution: first, very high standards are set for
establishing that origin‐neutral measures are protectionist; and second, the inconsistent or
selective application of measures by a government is not given due consideration in
determining whether the national‐treatment obligation is violated. The combination of these
two factors could make it difficult to establish that origin‐neutral measures are inconsistent
with Art. III GATT.
The report on Chile – Alcoholic Beverages has provoked substantial criticism. Ehring (2002)
asks the pertinent question how many transactions should be affected for a scheme like the
Chilean to be found inconsistent with NT? Would it suffice that one unit of account only (say
one bottle of European whisky) be discriminated against for a violation of NT to occur, even
if all other European exports to the Chilean market are treated in a nondiscriminatory
manner? This author’s criticism stems from his dissatisfaction with the AB’s decision to
totally neglect the fact that Chilean pisco was carrying the overwhelming majority of the tax
burden in the higher‐taxed category of alcoholic drinks, and not western drinks.
Horn and Mavroidis (2004) do not agree with the methodology the AB used in its report on
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages to define whether the products concerned were like/DCS. In
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particular, in their view, the AB does not seem to recognize that the characteristics it refers to
assess the extent of consumer likeness – end‐uses, physical characteristics, etc. – are reflected
in a cross‐price elasticity estimation. In the authors’ view, statistical analysis should be the
primary method of establishing consumer preferences for the products at stake. These other
indicators are imperfect substitutes to employ in cases where there is not enough data, or its
quality is too poor, to undertake statistical analysis. In contrast, the AB seemed to view
neither of the two approaches as being conceptually superior.
Charnovitz (1996) takes issue with the Japan – Alcoholic Beverages panel’s rejection of the aim‐
and‐effect test. Noting first how two GATT panels had interpreted Art. III.2 GATT, the first
sentence “narrowly in order to reduce interference with national tax sovereignty,”
Charnovitz warned that the decision “has important implications for the autonomy of
national governments” and explained that with the door to Art. III GATT closed,
environmental regulations will be reviewed under the restrictive rules of Art. XX GATT.
After the Appellate Body upheld the panel, Charnovitz wrote again to criticize the
abandonment of the aim‐and‐effect test. Charnovitz (1997) He noted that the new broader
interpretation of like product “could spell trouble for policy‐based taxes.” He also suggested
that Art. III GATT “may be even more important” than Art. XX GATT because no
environmental defense under Art. XX GATT had succeeded (at the time of his writing, that
is, before the AB report on US – Shrimp).
The AB report on EC – Asbestos has also provoked a number of reactions. In general, the
environmental community took a favorable stance since it seemingly opened the door to
PPM‐based distinctions that the environmental community has been arguing in favor of for
years. Horn and Weiler (2007), however, point to a number of weaknesses they see in the
report. The authors are puzzled by the fact that the AB first expresses its intention to look for
market evidence regarding consumers’ reactions to asbestos‐containing and asbestos‐free
construction material, only to reverse itself in the next paragraph and decide the issue of
likeness in the absence of market evidence. They find the AB’s reasoning to be based on a
rather optimistic (or naïve) view of the working of the market, where for instance the threat
of future liability would deter buyers from using dangerous construction materials. A
number of arguments in their view instead suggest that the market should be expected to
work very poorly in the case of a product with the presumed characteristics of asbestos‐
containing products. Indeed, the regulation might be needed exactly because buyers would
not take the differences in hazards into account. But if so, the products are not like, contrary to
the argument by the AB.
According to Mavroidis (2007), in EC – Asbestos, the AB de facto adopted a “reasonable
consumer” test, speculating a fully informed consumer’s likely purchasing behavior. This
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approach is problematic for a number of reasons: first, if manufacturers, as the AB contends,
were indeed anticipating consumers’ reactions, then they would not be producing asbestos
containing products either; as a result, there would be no need for regulation in the first
place. Manufacturers stopped producing asbestos‐containing construction material, not
because of consumers’ reactions, but because of the statutory prohibition to produce; second,
if all that was needed was to inform buyers, in all likelihood, France would have financed an
information campaign, and it would not have enacted a statutory prohibition on sales of
asbestos‐containing products. The government was probably worried that private parties
would in any event impose health externalities on the society, and this is what prompted the
prohibition; third, some manufacturers at least do produce such products and some
consumers continue to buy them. They are located in Canada and not in France. Are they
unreasonable, the author asks. Assuming that the risk associated with the consumption of
such goods is, relatively speaking, low, and the price difference between asbestos‐containing
and asbestos‐free products substantial, a country might think it makes good sense to allow
for the production of both products, tax production/consumption of the former, and finance
research to combat associated health hazards. This is not to suggest that France should have
lost that case. In Mavroidis’s (2007) opinion, France should have won anyway: its victory,
however, should, in this author’s view, have come under the less favorable treatment analysis.
Yavitz (2002) appreciates that the AB aimed at removing some of the strain that prior case
law had caused on domestic regulators by interpreting key terms in Art. III.4 GATT in
mechanical, acontextual manner. Yavitz criticizes prior (to EC – Asbestos) case law for
avoiding to interpret the key terms in this provision in a manner that would honor the
agreed function of this provision, that is, to avoid that WTO Members use nonfiscal
instruments so as to afford advantages to their domestic production.
In similar vein, Howse and Tuerk (2001) agree with the basis of the reasoning of the AB
report, and disagree vehemently with the panel approach. The authors defend a
comprehensive discrimination test that should take place within the four corners of Art. III
GATT (instead of moving the discussion to Art. XX GATT). They thus see the AB report as a
positive step in this direction.

3.5 Concluding Remarks
We will not attempt to summarize the critique of the case law in the literature. But our
impression is that this critique points to the fact that adjudicating bodies have interpreted
Art. III GATT lacking a conceptual framework (basically, an economic theory) for the role of
Art. III GATT in the agreement. It also seems that WTO adjudicating bodies have been more
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concerned not to allow measures that are protectionist, than to avoid accepting measures
that are not protectionist. But as of EC—Asbestos the AB appears to have adopted a different
attitude: reading between the lines, in this dispute the AB seemed more concerned to not
make the error of striking down the legislation mistakenly. Also, in the subsequent case
Dominican Republic – Import of Cigarettes the AB states that the term less favourable treatment
must be understood as condoning differential treatment across like products if the rationale
for differentiation is not protectionism. These are both steps toward a different approach to
Art. III GATT. But the AB has still failed on a crucial point – to provide a conceptual
framework for defining protectionism for the purpose of Art. III GATT. One of the purposes
with the analysis to follow is to contribute toward this end.

4 How Should NT Be Interpreted?
We initiated the analysis above by examining the negotiating record of Art. III GATT. It was
argued that the basic purpose of the GATT, as it appears from the negotiating record, was to
liberalize trade, while at the same time preserving as much discretion for Members to pursue
their domestic policy objectives as possible—hence the choice of negative integration as the
modus operandi of the GATT. Indeed, a number of countries held the view that the ITO had
gone too far in disciplining certain policies such as employment and the GATT formula
(negative integration) was far more acceptable.
The following Section (Section 2) recapitulated some basic observations in the economic
theory literature on the role of NT. It started from the observation that an inherent feature of
domestic policy instruments is that they can be used both for protectionism, and for
purposes that would be in the collective interest of GATT Members to allow. Ideally, the
GATT should disallow the former but not the latter. The problem is, of course, that it is
difficult to assess whether a particular measure is desirable or not from an international
perspective, since this depends on the preferences of the regulating Member, as well as those
of other Members, and these preferences are not directly observable. It was also noted that
the fact that a measure harms trade partners is not sufficient to make it undesirable:
oftentimes the benefit to the regulating country may dominate the harm to trade partners.
The role of NT is then to sort the wheat from the chaff, that is, to prevent countries from
pursing internationally inefficient (beggar‐thy‐neighbor) policies, while allowing measures
that countries generally view as legitimate. Members will of course be harmed when NT
restricts them from pursuing the domestic policies they would prefer to pursue. But they
will also benefit from the imposition of NT as exporters. Since NT prevents measures that are
internationally inefficient, NT increases the total “size of the pie” to be shared among
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members of the trade agreement, and unless countries are highly asymmetric, they all share
the net gains.
Section 2 also presented the main features of the case law, as well as the scholarly critique,
which led us to conclude that adjudicating bodies have failed to honor the agreed rationale
for Art. III GATT, by not providing a contextual interpretation of the terms appearing in the
text of the provision:


While the basic purpose of Art. III GATT is to prevent domestic instruments from
being “applied so as to afford protection,” “protection” has not been defined in
satisfactory manner in case law.
Case law has further failed to clearly define central concepts such as “like” and “DCS”
products. Adjudicating bodies have, during the WTO era, interpreted these notions as
reflecting the market relationship between imported and domestic products, but
during the GATT era also devised different, and arguably internally inconsistent,
understanding of these terms.147



There is undeniably a need for a more coherent approach to interpreting Art. III GATT since
the understanding of this provision is central in the functioning of the GATT since it covers
all domestic policies (instruments) hinging on the interpretation of the terms mentioned
above. In particular, there is a need for a conceptual framework that can be applied across
Art. III GATT disputes, making outcomes more consistent with the rationale of the
provision, and for this reason, more predictable. In Section 4.1, we will suggest two
alternative approaches to interpreting Art. III GATT that we believe would serve such a
purpose. Both approaches rest on the idea that an examination of the legality of a domestic
measure requires an evaluation of the extent to which the measure constitutes protectionism.
The main difference between the approaches is the context in which this evaluation will be
performed. According to one approach, the evaluation is done primarily in connection with
the determination of whether the contested measure violates Art. III GATT. According to the
other approach the evaluation is instead performed if and when an Art. XX GATT exception
is sought.
The choice of approach would be immaterial if they were to yield the same adjudicated
outcomes; “possibly” since there might be other aspects than the outcome that matters, such
as legal fees. But as we will argue in Section 4.2, the two approaches would often yield

Indeed, even the very recent AB report on Philippines‐Distilled Spirits is unclear in this respect: it
advances first an interpretation of likeness to the effect that the competitive relationship among two products
must be more intense than in case of DCS products, only to return to the relevance of HS classification (which
does not necessarily reflect intense competitive relationship) a few paragraphs later.
147
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different outcomes. This raises the question of which of the two approaches is to be
preferred. Section 4.3 will discuss pros and cons of the two interpretations in light of the
differences between them that were identified in Section 4.2. It will be argued that it is
preferable to evaluate protectionism in the context of Art. III GATT. In Section 4.4, we will
deal in more detail with the preferred approach. Section 4.5 revisits the leading cases from
the perspective of the proposed interpretation. Our findings will be condensed into
“Principles,” presented in the concluding Section 5. Finally, an appendix lists all Art. III
GATT disputes since 1947.

4.1 Two Approaches to Evaluate Protection
The two interpretations to be proposed are both compatible with the economic view of NT
and they are both consistent with the legal text as well. Hence, both approaches start from
the notion that the general objective of the regulation of domestic instruments in the GATT is
to limit the use of domestic instruments for protectionism, while at the same time allowing
legitimate use of such instruments, even if this causes adverse consequences for trading
partners by shielding import‐competing products from foreign competition.
Broadly speaking, “Interpretation XX” largely continues the approach pursued in case law
until recently: for a violation of Art. III GATT it suffices that there is potential for disparate
effects in the sense that imported goods might be burdened more than domestic goods with
which they compete. The alternative approach, “Interpretation III” requires that the measure
is internationally inefficient, that is, that it can be said to constitute protectionism, in a sense
to be made more precise below. Interpretation XX undertakes the evaluation of the
protection as part of the determination of whether an Art. XX GATT exception can be
granted (assuming that respondents request such exceptions if found to violate Art. III), and
accepts as nonprotectionist only measures coming under the aegis of Art. XX GATT.
According to Interpretation III, the evaluation is performed as part of the determination of
whether Art. III GATT is violated and grounds beyond those reflected in Art. XX GATT
could serve as basis to conclude that a measure is not protectionist. Put differently,
Interpretation XX sees Art. III GATT as a net with fine meshes, and uses Art. XX GATT to
evaluate what in the catch should be thrown back to sea. Interpretation III instead lets Art. III
GATT take a more select catch, but one that for the most part is meant to be kept. The choice
between the two interpretations would be (with the caveat mentioned) immaterial if the
measures that are found to violate Art. III GATT according to Interpretation XX – measures
that protect in the sense of shielding from competition – are also invariably protectionist, and
thus internationally inefficient. However, as will be argued in Section 4.2, the outcomes of
the two approaches are likely to differ.
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One might legitimately ask how come Art. III GATT can be read in two so different ways?
The term “protection” is nowhere defined in the GATT: as noted, there is no list of explicitly
permitted and explicated prohibited policies, the GATT is ”incomplete” in this way.
Moreover, the term “protection,” which appears in both Arts. III.1 and XX GATT, is used in
the GATT with two different meanings. It is occasionally used to mean “to shield from
competition,” without any value judgment attached as to whether this is desirable or not. In
other instances, it is used to denote illegitimate measures, i.e., in our terminology
protectionist, or internationally inefficient, measures. This dual meaning of “protection” is
reflected in text of the GATT. For instance, when using the phrase “so as to afford
protection” concerning government mandated or operated monopolies, Art. II.4 states that
. . . such a monopoly should not . . . operate so as to afford protection on the average in excess
of the amount of protection provided for in that Schedule.

Hence, a certain degree of “protection” is legitimate – the protection provided for in the
Schedule – while any additional “protection” is illegal.148
It is clear that when Art. III.1 GATT sets the sight on domestic policy measures that are
“applied so as to afford protection,” it refers to an undesirable form of “protection.” But it is
also clear from negotiating history of the GATT, and from the general construction of the
agreement, that the purpose of the GATT is not to prevent countries from persecuting all
policies that protects in the sense of shielding import‐competing firms from competition.
This would effectively require positive discrimination of imported goods, since these could
not face higher taxation in cases where they would be taxed higher, had they been domestic
products (for instance, due to their environmental properties). A critical feature of the
regulation of domestic instruments in the GATT is hence that, among all measures with
protective effects, it manages to filter out only those that are harmful to the Membership,
whereas measures that are detrimental to the parties’ common joint interest are allowed.
Interpretation III is based on the idea that Art. III GATT should only capture measures that
are undesirable in this sense, and that the protectionism test should hence be performed
under this provision.
We now turn to a more detailed description of the two Interpretations, focusing in particular
on the more novel Interpretation III, starting with the more conventional Interpretation XX.

Economic theory would suggest that the legitimacy of the protection provided by the measures that are
bound in the Schedule stems from the fact that it has been negotiated.
148
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4.1.1

Interpretation XX

To reach Art. XX GATT the complainant must have first established a violation of a GATT
provision, in our discussion, Art. III GATT. WTO Members can justify violations of
obligations assumed under the GATT through recourse to one of the grounds mentioned in
Art. XX GATT. This list covers a variety of policy objectives, ranging from the protection of
public health to conservation of natural resources. The provision was modeled after the
corresponding provision included in the 1927 International Convention for the Abolition of
Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (World Economic Conference of 1927), the first
multilateral attempt to liberalize international trade.149
Art. XX GATT opens with the sentence:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures:
....

The words ”nothing in this agreement” leaves no doubt that the legislator’s intent was that
all grounds mentioned in this provision “trump” the trade liberalizing obligations in the rest
of the GATT. Art. XX GATT thus provides a hierarchy between trade commitments and
(national) social preferences: public morals, protection of human health, and all the other
grounds mentioned in the body of this provision are more important than trade
commitments. Trade thus is not elevated to the supreme common value that all WTO
Members must observe at any cost. This understanding of GATT commitments is, of course,
perfectly consistent with the negative‐integration character of the GATT.150
At the same time, it does not suffice that a WTO Member simply invokes a ground
mentioned in the body of this provision in order to lawfully violate its trade commitments.
Two types of restrictions are imposed. First, the actual purpose of a contested measure must
be to achieve one of the listed objectives. This is ensured by the qualifiers concerning the
measure not being an “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or “disguised restriction on
international trade,” in order to qualify for an exception. Second, there are some restrictions
imposed on the means by which the objectives are achieved. For instance, measures that
protect public morals, or human, animal, or plant life or health must be ”necessary.”

149 On the content of the negotiations, and the reasons for the nonratification of the final text, see Charnovitz
1991 , and Irwin et al. 2008 .
150 See the corresponding discussion in Chapter 3.
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There may have been some disagreement as to the ambit of the provision during the
negotiations. It seems that what the UK negotiator (one of the architects of this provision)
had in mind was to include a provision which would operate as exception to import and
export restrictions only, and not to internal measures:
The undertakings in Chapter IV of this Charter relating to import and export restrictions shall
not be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any member of measures for the
following purposes, provided that they are not applied in such a manner as to constitute a
means of arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction of international trade.151

It is unclear how widespread this view was. But GATT/WTO case law has by now accepted
that recourse to Art. XX GATT can be made in order to justify violations assumed with
respect to both trade and domestic instruments. An example of the former is offered by the
GATT Panel on Thailand–Cigarettes: in this case, the United States challenged the consistency
of the Thai Tobacco Act of 1966 with Art. XI GATT. According to this law,
the importation . . . of tobacco is prohibited except by license of the Director‐General (§63).

The Thai Tobacco Act of 1966 defined tobacco to include cigarettes. There was no dispute
between the parties that the measure at hand constituted a quota in the sense of Art. XI
GATT (§§ 21, 65); Thailand attempted to justify the quota in place by invoking, inter alia, Art.
XX(b) GATT (§§ 72ff.). An example of how case law has accepted the applicability of Art. XX
GATT to domestic instruments is offered in the report on EC–Asbestos, where the AB held
that Art XX GATT could serve as legal basis to justify domestic measures that had been
previously found to be inconsistent with Art. III GATT (§ 115).152 The Panel on China–Raw
Materials confirmed prior case law to the effect that Art. XX GATT could also serve as an
exception to obligations assumed under a Protocol of Accession; nevertheless, this would be
the case only if there is explicit or even implicit reference to this provision in the relevant
protocol (§§ 7.158‐7.160).
The AB has constructed Art. XX GATT akin to a two‐tier test. For example, assuming a WTO
Member invokes Art. XX(b) GATT in order to justify an import embargo on toxic waste
(which is considered to be harmful to human health), the WTO adjudicating body will first
examine whether such a measure is necessary to achieve the stated objective (protection of
151
152

E/PC/T/C.II/50, pp. 7ff.; E/PC/T/C.II/54, pp. 32ff.
For confirmation, see the AB report on Korea‐Various Measures on Beef §§ 152 ff.
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human health), that is, whether the measure at hand conforms with the requirement
included in Art. XX(b) GATT, before it examines whether the measure has also been applied
in a manner consistent with the chapeau of the GATT. Both obligations must be met for a
measure to be judged GATT‐consistent, as the AB stated in its report on US–Gasoline (p. 22):
In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at
issue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions—paragraphs (a)
to (j)—listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening
clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two‐tiered: first, provisional justification
by reason of characterization of the measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal of the
same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX.

The AB in its report on US–Shrimp expressed the view that it is the language of the chapeau
that makes it clear that all exceptions appearing in Art. XX GATT are limited and conditional
(§ 157). The AB, in its report on Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, eliminated any doubts on this score
(§ 139).
Case law has consistently held, by virtue of the maxim that the party invoking an exception
carries the associated burden of proof (quicunque exceptio invokat ejusdem probare debet), that
the party invoking Art. XX GATT carries the burden of proof to demonstrate that it has met
its requirements. The AB, citing prior case law to this effect (US–Gasoline, pp. 22‐23; US–Wool
Shirts and Blouses, pp. 15‐16; US–FSC (Article 21.5–EC), § 133) has confirmed this view in its
report on US–Gambling (§ 309).
The AB, in its report on Korea–Various Measures on Beef, clarified that its judicial review has to
be confined to the means used to achieve a particular objective, and cannot extend to an
examination of the ends themselves (§ 176). Over the years, the AB made it clear that it
would be more deferential when human health was at stake, and less so when WTO
Members were pursuing other regulatory objectives mentioned in the body of Art. XX
GATT. In its report on EC–Asbestos, the AB confirmed that this was indeed the case (§ 172).
Against this description of core features of the text and case law of Art. XX GATT, let us now
turn to our first suggested interpretation of how Art. III GATT can be interpreted—denoted
Interpretation XX—which largely continues the case‐law approach. Interpretation XX hence
stipulates that Art. III GATT is violated if an imported and a domestic product are “like” in
the sense of being in a highly competitive relationship, and that the imported product is
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directly or indirectly taxed “in excess” of the domestic product.153 There would also be an
Art. III GATT violation if the products are in a DCS‐relationship, meaning that they are in
competition albeit in less fierce competition than in the case of like products, provided that
the products are “not similarly taxed.”
The focus in Interpretation XX is hence on the degree of competition between the imported
and domestically produced goods, and the magnitude of the tax difference. If products are
like, but not necessarily policy‐like (a concept we explain in more detail infra) – perhaps
approaching perfect substitutes – then any price differential due to differential taxation has
the potential to have a significant impact on imports. As products become less substitutable,
and cross the line into DCS, a small price differential due to differential taxation may have
small effects on imports and be appropriately ignored. But a significant tax differential may
be presumed to have a nontrivial impact on imports.
It should be stressed again that the extent to which products are like and/or DCS does not
reflect possible differences between the products from a policy point of view. Similarly, the
evaluation of whether the taxation of the imported product is “in excess” or that the
products are “not similarly taxed,” does not take into consideration any policy rationale for a
tax distinction. Both like and DCS products hence measure the same qualitative feature of
the market situation – the extent of competition between the products – with like referring to
situations with more intense competition.
An application of Interpretation XX would not mean that business should continue as usual
in the case law, however. Until Philippines–Distilled Spirits (a report issued in January 2012)
likeness was not necessarily confined to goods with high substitutability between them. And
even there, as we stated supra, it is questionable whether the HS‐classification is irrelevant to
define likeness since the AB does mention it as a relevant criterion a few paragraphs later.
Recall that for example, vodka and sochu share the same tariff classification at the six‐digit
HS level, and would yet by many consumers be viewed as far from perfectly substitutable.

4.1.2

Interpretation III

The regulation of fiscal instruments in Art. III GATT combines a general statement in Art.
III.1 GATT with two specific restrictions in Art. III.2 GATT on the permissible difference in
the level of taxation of imported and domestic products (and for fiscal instruments more
generally). Interpretation III understands Arts. III.1 and III.2 GATT as jointly imposing a
prohibition on protectionist measures, but on protectionist measures only. There are several
ways in which the text could be read to harbor such an interpretation.
As stated, although not a very clear pronouncement to this effect, the AB report on Philippines‐Distilled
Spirits seems to side with this approach.
153
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A first possibility would be to interpret Art. III.1 GATT as imposing a substantive restriction,
requiring a demonstration that a measure is “applied so as to afford protection,” in order to
establish a violation of Art. III GATT.
A second possibility would be to interpret the terms “in excess” concerning like products,
and “not similarly taxed” concerning DCS products to reflect the rationale for any
differences in absolute levels: for instance, an imported and a domestic product could then
be viewed as being similarly taxed, even if they are burdened with different amounts of
environmental taxation, provided that they differ in environmental impacts.
Interpretation III relies on yet another way of requiring a meaningful protectionism test
under Art. III GATT, which is to interpret the notion of like products to reflect not only market
likeness, but also likeness from a policy point of view. In what follows we will explain how such
an interpretation is compatible with the text, and the associated interpretation of the
requirement for DCS products.

4.1.2.1 Like Products
Interpretation III, as well as Interpretation XX, follows the case law by interpreting “in
excess” in Art. III.2 GATT, first sentence, as requesting that there should be no difference at
all in tax burden in case of “like” products (a mere arithmetic difference suffices according to
case law to satisfy this criterion, US–Superfund). But which product pairs are “like”? A
distinguishing feature of Interpretation III is that it interprets products to be like if there is no
legitimate reason for imposing different tax burdens, where legitimacy is evaluated from the
point of view of the combined interests of the governments of the exporting and importing
countries. Somewhat loosely put, two competing (we will return to this aspect below)
products are “like” if an efficient agreement between the governments would stipulate
identical taxes. Interpretation III hence requires that for products to be like for the purpose of
Art. III.2 GATT:



products would be competitive if they had equal opportunities of market access (they
are “market‐like”); and
an internationally efficient agreement would entail no tax differential (they are “policy‐
like”).

Note two crucial features of this understanding of the ambit of Art. III.2 GATT:
First, Art. III.2 GATT, first sentence, plays the fundamental role for the whole regulation of
fiscal instruments of defining the level of ambition for the combat of internationally inefficient
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use of domestic fiscal instruments in the GATT.154 It achieves this by specifying necessary
and sufficient condition for a fiscal measure to not constitute illegal protection in a case of
particular importance: where there is no efficiency rationale for treating highly competitive
products differently. Put differently, Art. III.1 GATT sets the sight on (undesirable)
protectionist use of domestic instruments, but does not specify what precisely defines
protection. Art. III.2 GATT, first sentence, specifies exactly what constitutes the border
between protectionism and nonprotectionism in one special case – where there is no
(international) efficiency reason to allow differential taxation. For such a situation Art. III.2
GATT, first sentence, stipulates that it suffices for nonprotectionist behavior that each unit of
the imported product does not carry a heavier fiscal burden than does each unit of the
competing domestic product.
Second, the level of ambition that is laid down in Art. III.2 GATT, first sentence, is limited in
that it does not explicitly or implicitly request from Members to pursue policies that are
internationally efficient. As explained in Chapter 2, it should be expected that when
Members unilaterally decide on a common tax level for domestic and imported products,
they will disregard the interests of their trade partners, thus exposing them to international
externalities. Consequently, Art. III GATT‐consistent taxation is likely to be internationally
inefficient, even in the case of like products. Put differently, Art. III.2 GATT, first sentence, does
not require that the importing country refrain from measures that give rise to international
externalities, only not to use differential taxation to this end and/or effect (we will discuss aims
versus effects below).155

4.1.2.2 DCS Products
We next turn to Art. III.2 GATT, second sentence, and the Ad Article III Interpretative
Note.156 The latter explicitly refers to product pairs that are defined in terms of the extent to
It does so also in another respect, following from our interpretation of “in excess” as any strictly
positive tax difference, which is that it specifies the acceptable tax difference for like products to be 0%. This
might seem as a natural number to choose, but the provision could in principle allow a 10% difference, say.
155 The following statement by Harry Johnson was not made in the context of a discussion of NT, but
seems relevant here nevertheless:
. . . the principle of non‐discrimination has no basis whatsoever in the theoretical argument for
the benefits of a liberal international trade order in general, or in any rational economic theory
of the bargaining process in particular. [Johnson (1976), p. 18]
154

As a comment on the origin of the DCS notion, let us just recall from Chapter 2 that the negotiating
history suggests that the DCS category was added because some negotiators felt that the value of tariff
concessions would be too limited in case government behavior was not regulated for a wider set of
circumstances than those involving like products, since the latter required that products fall under the same
tariff heading in the predecessor to the Harmonized System, the tariff classification scheme being used at the
time.
156
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which they are in competition, i.e., in terms of the degree of market likeness, through the
notion of “directly competitive or substitutable.” But it does not solely refer to this criterion.
According to Interpretation III, the second sentence of Art. III.2 GATT requests that
imported products for such product pairs should respect the principles of nonprotectionism
embedded in Art. III.1 GATT, as given some precision through Art. III.2 GATT, first
sentence. But while III.2 GATT, first sentence, pertains to situations where there is no
efficiency basis to treat products differently, the second sentence of Art. III.2 GATT addresses the
situation where there is an efficiency rationale for yielding imported and domestic market‐like
products different policy treatment.
As repeatedly mentioned above, there are situations in which it is desirable to allow an
imported product to be burdened with a higher tax or fiscal duty than a competing domestic
product. But the importing country obviously cannot be given a free reign to tax domestic
and imported competing products differently. According to Interpretation III, Art. III.2
GATT, second sentence pertains to those instances where a higher tax on the imported
product would be allowed, but where the particular tax difference is excessive. In contrast to
the case of like products, it is not possible to specify exactly the property of the tax pairs that
make them permissible. This is what explains the reference back to Art. III.1 GATT, which
lays down a principle for how large the tax difference might be—it must not amount to
undesirable protection.
The question then arises: what criterion should be used to evaluate whether a higher tax on
an imported product than on a competing domestic product is acceptable?
From a theory point of view, the ideal would be to reject any tax pair other than the pair that
maximizes the joint welfare of the two parties (or even better, the global membership).
However, such an approach would request much more cooperation from the importing
country than it agreed to when entering the GATT. The (negative integration) spirit of the
regulation of domestic instruments in the GATT allows Members freedom to determine their
domestic policies, subject “only” to the proviso that they are not “applied so as to afford
protection.” The meaning of protection is generally speaking not clear, but as explained
above, the first sentence of Art. III.2 defines exactly what is required in the special case of a
policy‐ and market‐like product to behave in a nonprotectionist fashion, which is to not tax
the imported product higher than the domestic product. Since this provision refers to
situations where there is no ground for tax differentials, the requirements for DCS products
(where there are grounds for tax differentials) should be less strict.
To facilitate the discussion, we use the example of an importing country that levies a higher
“environmental” tax on an imported product than on a competing domestic product,
claiming that this is reasonable in order to achieve some emissions level that we denote E. It
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is clear that each unit of the imported product is emitting more of the harmful substance (E)
than does the corresponding domestic product, so there is a case from an environmental
point of view to tax the imported product higher. The case hence clearly concerns a pair of
DCS rather than a pair of like pair products. What is not clear however is whether the
taxation scheme, which levies 40% on an imported good, and 0% on a competing
domestically produced good, should be considered legal.
The fundamental problem is that, in principle, there are many tax pairs that could achieve
the emissions level E. It might for instance be possible to achieve E by completely shutting
out the imported product, by taxing it much higher than the domestic product.
Alternatively, one could levy the same tax on both products, but set this common tax level
high enough to achieve the target. There will also be tax pairs in between these extremes that
will achieve the particular target. Which tax pair among all those that can achieve the
emissions target should be considered legal? And could we for example envisage a situation
where more than one tax pairs are considered legal? And if yes, what criteria should be
fulfilled for this to be the case?
Let us here recall that the basic problem that the agreement seeks to address stems from the
fact that when countries set their policies unilaterally, they have no direct concern for the
interests of their trading partners. This is the source of the protectionism that the agreement
seeks to limit. Hence, when looking for acceptable tax pairs, it would be desirable to consider
the consequences for the joint welfare of the parties, rather than the welfare for the importing
country only. There are different ways in which this could be done.
One possibility would be to argue as follows. The gist of Art. III.2 GATT is to request equal
taxation of closely competing imported and domestically produced goods, while at the same
time acknowledging that there will be occasions where equal taxation is not warranted.
Differences in tax rates should then be permitted if, and only if, the gain to the importing
country government from pursuing the differential taxation (rather than imposing a uniform
tax), is large enough that the importing country could in principle compensate the exporting
country for the adverse effects it is being exposed to as a result of the differential taxation
and still benefit from pursuing its regulatory objective.157 It should be emphasized that the
idea is not that the importing country actually compensates the exporter in the industry at
stake. Instead, with countries sometimes in the role of exporters and sometimes in the role of
importers, there is a common interest in an NT‐regime that allows differential taxation if and
only if it increases aggregate welfare. What a Member might lose as an exporter, is then more
than compensated for by what it might gain as a regulating importer in another industry.
The logic is here exactly the same as in the case of reciprocal tariff liberalization: the
157

That is, the differentiation is desirable in the Kaldor‐Hicks sense.
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reduction in tariffs hurts the importing country government, but benefits the exporting
country government more. The compensation for the import country government comes in
the form of increased exports in other sectors, and due to the fact that overall there is too
little trade at the outset, this gain will be larger than the loss on the import side.
For instance, suppose in the example above the importing country government taxes the
imported product at 40% and the domestic product at 0% in order to achieve the
environmental emissions target E. Assume also that if forced to set equal taxes, the
importing country would set 8% on both products. The criterion for accepting the (40%, 0%)
pair would then be that it yields higher welfare for the countries combined than does the
pair (8%, 8%).
This approach would hence accept the pair (40%, 0%) provided that the importing country
government could in principle compensate the exporting Member government for the cost the
latter is exposed to as a result of facing the pair (40%, 0%) rather than the pair (8%, 8%).
Compensation would be possible, and the measure would be legal, only if the gains to the
importing Member from addressing the environmental problem were sufficiently
significant.158
Note that this criterion pays no attention to the alleged rationale for the regulation nor to the
desirability (or lack thereof) of the emissions target level (E). All it cares about is whether the
joint welfare of the parties is higher with the pair (40%, 0%) than with the pair (8%, 8%). But
the objective might still play a role in the evaluation of the gains from the differential
taxation.
Another possibility could be to accept the alleged purpose for the differential taxation—the
emissions target E—and still condition the acceptance of the measure on achieving the target
in a reasonable manner from a joint welfare point of view. As with the previous alternative,
this approach would take into consideration the possibility that it is desirable also from an
international point of view to let the importing country tax the imported product higher than
the domestic product, but in contrast to the previous alternative, the importing country
would not do the protectionist calculation unilaterally, since it would have to take into
account the costs for the exporting country. Suppose, for example, that the court concludes
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To avoid misunderstandings, it is not suggested that this compensation should take a monetary form,
but normally to come from the reciprocal nature of undertakings. If countries are highly asymmetric, so that
some countries cannot be fully compensated for allowing its trading partners to differentiate their domestic
taxation, the proposed solution is still desirable from the point of view of maximizing the size of the “pie,” but
may give rise to distributional problems between countries.
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that a 20% tax on the imported product and a 15% tax on the domestic product would be the
most efficient manner of achieving the emissions target E.
It would then be possible for the court to reject any pair of taxes, where the tax on the
imported product is higher than on the tax on the domestic product, other than the taxes
20% and 15%. The difference between this approach and the previous one is hence that
whereas in the previous case the evaluation seeks to determine whether the challenged
taxation is better than equal taxation (assumed to result in a common tax of 8%) regardless of
its purpose, the evaluation here asks whether the stated objective of having emissions at the
level E is achieved in an efficient manner.
Yet another possibility would be to follow the previous approach in accepting the emissions
target E, and to determine that taxes 20% and 15% would be efficient means to reach the
target E; but rather than rejecting any other differential taxes than those two, it would be
determined that a 5 percentage point difference in taxation is what is maximally legitimate.
The importing country could then set say 25% on the imported product and 20% on the
domestic product, if it so wanted. In light of the possible uncertainty regarding calculations,
providing for a leeway might be one way to reduce pressure on regulators and adjudicators
alike.
All three approaches have their pros and cons. They all have a certain logic from an
economic point of view, in that they build on some form of efficiency notion. But none of
them implements the ideal criterion that we discussed above. The first approach goes the
furthest in this direction, but the contested pair of taxes is in this approach only compared
with the common tax level that the country would set if unable to differentiate in its taxation
(which is not fully efficient since we are in the case of DCS products). The contested pair is
not compared with all other possible pairs of taxes (which would be required to ensure full
international efficiency). It hence imposes only a limited form of efficiency‐restriction. In the
second approach, the comparison is with an efficient tax pair, but only in the limited sense of
being the tax pair that best achieves the emissions target E. This aspect pertains to the third
approach as well. The third approach further suffers from the weakness that if the importing
country were to choose any other tax pair with a 5 percentage point difference, the target E
would be over‐ or undershot, which would cast doubt on the relevance of the calculation
based on E in the first place. Suppose, for instance, that with the adjusted taxes, the resulting
emissions level is E’ < E. The question could then be raised whether a 5 percentage point tax
difference is part of the optimal way for the parties to achieve E’.
On the other hand, while the second, and in particular the third, approach is less attractive
from an economic point of view, they are more consonant with the text of Art. III GATT,
because of their focus on whether tax differentials afford protection. The third approach in
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particular seems more in line with a with negative integration mode than the previous two
approaches – the unilaterally determined policy target E is accepted – and it operates by
defining legality in terms of the degree of deviation from the equal taxation benchmark. We
will therefore view it as the main candidate for how to more specifically understand
Interpretation III.

4.2 The Difference in Outcome with the Two Approaches
The choice between the Interpretations III and XX would (or at least could) be immaterial if
they accepted and rejected the same domestic policy measures. This section will argue that
this will not be the case. Instead, Interpretation XX is likely to impose a more restrictive regime on
domestic measures compared to Interpretation III. Following Interpretation XX, Art III GATT is
insensitive to whether a measure is pursued for legitimate purposes, as long as it protects
domestic production in the sense that it shields domestic goods from competition from
imported products. Hence, a measure that provokes this outcome will only be justified
through recourse to Art. XX GATT. This would not matter if the test is the same under both
provisions. But the test for protectionism that is performed under Art. XX GATT is more
demanding than the test performed under Art. III GATT, for at least two reasons.159 First, as
explained in more detail in Section 4.2.1, Art. XX GATT imposes some requirements in order
for a measure to be eligible for an exception that are found in Art. III. Second, as discussed in
Section 4.2.2, the two interpretations have different implications for the allocation of the
burden of proof. Interpretation III requires the complainant to establish that a contested
measure affords protection. With Interpretation XX, the burden will be much lighter for the
complainant however, if the respondent requests an Art. XX exception. In the resulting
protectionism test, it is instead the respondent who will have to show that a measure that
shields a domestic product from import competition is not “disguised protection” (or
undesirable protection, that is, protectionism in our terminology), in order to be allowed to
continue pursuing a contested measure. This difference will contribute to make
Interpretation XX a more stringent regime for the domestic instruments protectionism test is
what makes it a more stringent regime.
The fact that Interpretation XX imposes a more stringent regime for the domestic measures
would seem welcome if the measures that would be exposed to this additional
restrictiveness would all be protectionist. But as Section 4.2.3 will explain, there is no

There could be a difference between the two Interpretations even if the tests were the same, if they
could lead to judicial errors. With Interpretation III, if the respondent loses in the test performed under Art. III
GATT, the respondent can seek an Art. XX GATT exception, in which case the same test would be performed
twice, making it more likely that the contested measure would be allowed.
159
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presumption that the measures caught under Art. III GATT following Interpretation XX will
all be protectionist.

4.2.1

Interpretation XX Imposes Additional Restrictions for Measures Not
to Constitute Illegal Protection

One difference between a protectionism test performed under Art. III GATT and under Art.
XX GATT, is that Art. XX (and hence Interpretation XX) imposes some conditions for
measures to be granted an exception that have no counterpart in Art. III GATT. These
additional restrictions stem from two sources.
The first additional hurdle to pass in order to be granted an exception under Art. XX GATT,
is that the measure at hand must seek to achieve one of the policy objectives listed in the body of
Art. XX GATT. This list of justifications has in case law—reasonably in our view, in light of
the wording—been interpreted as closed: in the absence of a legislative acknowledgment
that the list is indicative, it is not possible to invoke grounds not explicitly appearing in this
list. Considering the fact that Art. III GATT applies to an extremely broad range of
government measures, and thus may have very significant impact on the possibility for
governments to pursue unilateral policies, the exhaustive nature of the list of objectives
embedded in Art. XX GATT might have important consequences on the overall ambit of
obligations assumed upon accession to the WTO.
Second, Art. XX GATT does not simply specify a list of policy objectives that serve as a
blanket basis for exceptions from undertakings in the rest of the GATT, provided they are
not disguised protection. It also qualifies the grounds for several of those exceptions, by
imposing requirements on how the listed objectives should be achieved. In particular, in order to be
eligible for some of the grounds for exceptions, the measures employed must be “necessary.”
For instance, Art. XX(b) GATT provides an exception possibility for measures “necessary” to
protect human, animal, and plant life or health. The case law has interpreted this concept to
require that no less trade restrictive alternative can achieve the same regulatory objective,
more recently with the specification that the alternative measure should be “reasonably
available.”160
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4.2.2

The Evidentiary Burden Falls Heavier on the Complainant with
Interpretation XX

The GATT does not explicitly regulate the burden of proof. The current practice has instead
been developed in case law. Case law has endorsed the in dubio mitius principle, according to
which WTO Members’ actions should be presumed legitimate, unless challenged and proven
inconsistent before a WTO panel (and/or the AB, as the case may be). This principle hence
imposes the original burden of production of proof on the complainant. Assuming the
complainant produces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption (an undefined notion in
case law), the burden shifts to the other party. Conversely, the respondent has the burden of
proof to establish eligibility for an Art. XX GATT exception.
As a consequence of these well‐established evidentiary standards, Interpretations III and XX
will differ in the extent to which it will fall on the complainant to provide evidence of illegal
protection, as per Interpretation III, or on the regulating country to defend its practices, as
advocated by Interpretation XX. In either case the demonstration will involve providing
evidence of the objective of the contested measure – that is, information concerning the
policy preferences of the regulating country. In a hypothetical situation of perfect
information, it would be immaterial whether the burden is put on one party or the other,
except that the distribution of the costs for judicial process might differ. But it may be
important in situations where the true rationales for pursued policies are not known before
the dispute‐settlement proceedings, as is typically the case in this in this context. As argued
in Chapter 2, at the heart of the rationale for Art. III GATT is an information problem; as
explained, if there were easily available information concerning the true motives for
regulations, it would be possible to contract these more directly, in which case there would
not be any need for Art. III GATT in the first place, at least not as we know it.

4.2.3

The Nature of Measures That Are Market‐Like But Not Policy‐Like

As we have argued in the above, Interpretation XX will impose a more demanding
protectionism test than Interpretation III. This would be desirable, if all these measures were
known to be protectionist. After all, it may reflect outright protectionism if a higher fiscal
burden is imposed on an imported product than on a competing domestic product. But there
can be no presumption that the measures caught under Art. III GATT following Interpretation
XX will be protectionist, however. On the contrary, such differences in fiscal burdens may
reflect the governments’ pursuit of some of the fundamental roles that economic theory identifies as
grounds for social‐welfare‐increasing government market interventions.
To see why, recall that one of the main efficiency‐enhancing motives for government
intervention identified by economic theory is to eliminate negative externalities between
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economic decisionmakers, such as consumers and producers. The distinguishing feature of
such externalities is that their adverse impact for other consumers and producers is
disregarded by those who cause them. A standard example is a negative environmental
consumption externality, which arises when buyers disregard the adverse environmental
impact of their consumption, treating polluting products as interchangeable with cleaner
products. It is very easy to point to real‐world examples of such behavior. For example,
consumers may disregard the environmental impact that arises when products are scrapped,
and will therefore not pay extra for more environmentally friendly product designs, unless
forced to. Or, buyers of automobiles disregard the fact that their brakes emit asbestos into
the air, since each buyer’s emissions have negligible impact on the buyer’s personal health
(in contrast to the combined emissions from automobiles). Or construction companies may
not take into consideration when buying construction material whether it will expose
residents, or future demolition workers, to asbestos. A central, efficiency‐enhancing role for
governments is to combat such negative externalities, by for example, inducing buyers of
polluting products to shift their purchases toward cleaner products.
Another rationale for government intervention might be informational problems. For
instance, consumers may not be aware of differences in the safety of products, or may not
take such information sufficiently into account in their consumption decisions, in the view of
the government. Progressive taxation of beverages according to their alcohol content is
occasionally motivated by such concerns (there are also other concerns, as the Art. III GATT
case law has revealed).
Both of the above types of situations provide reasons for government intervention that are
legitimate from an economic efficiency point of view. Indeed, they constitute two of the main
rationales that economic theory identifies for government intervention.161 The distinguishing
feature of these situations is precisely that consumers do not necessarily (very often for good
reasons) distinguish between the products, that is, that the products are market‐like but not
policy‐like. Indeed, environmental regulations are to a large extent predicated on the fact that
market likeness differs from policy likeness, and it is exactly because of the market likeness that
there is a need for government intervention.
The need for governments to remedy the above type of problems is obviously not confined
to situations where only domestic products are involved, but may also exist in case of
imports. Hence, a necessary condition in order for a trade agreement to be efficient is that in
situations where imported products are associated with more pronounced negative
externalities than those stemming from competing domestic products, importing country
Other rationales are that markets are imperfectly competitive, that the laissez/faire income distribution
is undesirable, and “non‐economic” policy objectives (national security, for instance).
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governments are allowed to levy higher taxes per unit of consumption or production on the
imported products. Such taxation would violate Art. III GATT according to Interpretation
XX, however. In contrast, the basic idea underlying Interpretation III is that such measures
should not by automaticity be understood to run afoul of Art. III GATT. By including policy
likeness in the definition of like and DCS, Interpretation III ensures that a test for
protectionism is undertaken under Art. III GATT. Consequently, internationally desirable
higher taxation of imports must seek exceptions through the more demanding Art. XX GATT
test.162
To conclude, the main difference in terms of the measures that violate Art. III GATT under
the two approaches, is that measures that put a heavier fiscal burden on imported products
than on competing domestic products, will be exposed to a more demanding protectionism
test following Interpretation XX compared to Interpretation III. This stricter test will be
applied to purely protectionist measures. But it will also be applied to measures that are
legitimate from an international perspective, despite imposing a higher fiscal burden on
imports, measures that would be compatible with Art. III GATT according to Interpretation
III.

4.3 Which Interpretation Is Preferable?
Section 4.2 showed that Interpretation XX will impose a stricter protectionism test than
Interpretation III. Is this desirable, or does it unduly restrict the freedom for WTO Members
to choose domestic policies? In this section, we explain why we believe that, on balance,
Interpretation III is to be preferred, even if there are arguments pointing in the opposite
direction.
In the discussion to follow, we will for analytical purposes distinguish between the
consequences of the choice of interpretation for the expected adjudicated outcome of
disputes, and for governments’ policy decisions, such as the choice of domestic policy
measures, and tariff concessions. Sections 4.3.1‐4.3.3 will discuss the former type of effects.
Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 will focus on the desirability of the additional restrictions that Art. XX
GATT imposes compared to Art. III GATT (as per the discussion in Section 4.2.1), and
Section 4.3.3 will focus on the difference in the allocation of the burden proof between the
two interpretations (as per the discussion in Section 4.2.2). The benchmark for evaluating the
two interpretations will here be the extent to which the NT provision manages to sort the
Recapitulating from above, following Interpretation III, measures that buyers treat interchangeably but
that differ from a policy perspective, will be viewed as DCS, since there is a policy rationale for taxing them
differently. The issue will instead be whether the magnitude of the tax differential is justified. If too large from
an international perspective, the measure will be illegal, if not too large it will be acceptable.
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wheat from the chaff: does it allow Members to achieve legitimate domestic policy
objectives, while at the same time prevent them from using domestic measures for
protectionist reasons?
The effects of choice of interpretation for expected adjudicated outcomes of disputes are
relatively clear. But as emphasized in Sections 2 and 3, the overriding purpose of NT is to
provide incentives for Members to increase trade, while still allowing them to use domestic
instruments for legitimate policy purposes. The effects on tariff and trade liberalization are
harder to determine, however. Section 4.3.4 will more briefly highlight such policy effects of
the choice of interpretation, and discuss their desirability.

4.3.1

The List of Permissible Objectives in Art. XX GATT

As highlighted in Section 4.2.1, Art. XX GATT contains a closed list of policy objectives that
may serve as a ground for an exception from other obligations in the GATT. A first question
is whether this list was intended to describe not only the policy objectives that can serve as
grounds for an exception from, e.g., Art. III GATT, but also as a complete description of all
permissible grounds for imposing heavier financial burdens on imported products than on competing
domestic products, as would be maintained according to Interpretation XX.
In our view, it does not seem plausible that Art. XX GATT was drafted with this role in
mind. It rather appears as if it was meant to serve as a safety valve, as an assurance that
despite efforts to ensure that core regulatory values would not be infringed upon, nothing in
the agreement would do so.163 This view of the original rationale for Art. XX GATT is
consistent with the view of the GATT as a negative integration scheme, in which domestic
policies will be defined unilaterally and only to the extent that they exhibit international
externalities will tend to be regulated through Art. III GATT (as well as the Most‐Favored‐
Nation Provision in Art. I GATT, which also applies to domestic instruments, by virtue of
Art. I.1). This view of Art. XX GATT speaks against letting the list define the set of situations
in which it would be permissible to treat imported products less favorably than competing
domestic products, that is, against Interpretation XX.
A second and related issue is whether the closed list should, by any reasonable benchmark,
be regarded as complete, in light of Members’ policy preferences. It is fairly easy to come up
with examples of common measures that might find it difficult to qualify as exceptions
under Art. XX GATT, if their consistency with the GATT is challenged. For example, a WTO
Member distinguishing between ”ordinary” and “luxury” items in such a manner as to
indirectly tax an imported product higher than a competing domestic product, will have a
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hard time finding justification under Art. XX GATT. Another example would be domestic
taxation that treats products originating from small and medium enterprises more favorably
than products of “bigger” players.164 According to current case law for a violation of Art. III
GATT, it suffices in both instances that just one imported product is taxed heavier than its
domestic counterpart. The defendant would have then a hard time justifying its measures
under Art. XX GATT since no exception enlisted in Art. XX GATT corresponds to the
examples provided for here. Yet another policy would be the promotion of culture.165 These
examples of real‐world policy objectives that would normally find it hard to find defense
under Art. XX GATT suggests that the list in Art. XX GATT is not complete from the point of
view of Member preferences, and thus that Interpretation III is preferable in this regard.
But there are counterarguments. A first argument is that the list in Art. XX(a) GATT includes
the reference to measures that are “necessary to protect public morals.” This interpretation of
this basis for exceptions is unclear, and negotiating history supports a narrow reading.166 It
can be noted, nevertheless, that in GATS, the negotiators opted for the most encompassing
expression of the notion of “public order” (Art. XIV GATS), according to which any
regulatory intervention is presumably done to serve public order. Were adjudicating bodies
to interpret Art. XX GATT in a similar fashion, the closed nature of the list in Art. XX GATT
would not be a severe constraint on the possibility to pursue nonprotectionist unilateral
policies.
Secondly, it can be noted that the GATT membership has not seen the need to expand the list
of exceptions in Art. XX GATT over its 60‐year history. It is also noteworthy that there has
been no dispute so far where a WTO Member found it impossible to fit a tax differential
under one of the grounds mentioned in Art. XX GATT. Of course, it could be the case that
WTO Members have preferred not to legislate fearing that their legislation would be struck
down as a result of the current construction of Arts. III and XX GATT. We do not have
sufficient information to conclusively decide on this point. However, at the very least it can
be concluded that the track record does not suggest that the closed list feature of Art. XX
GATT has so far unduly constrained Members (by providing an unacceptably short list of
permissible policy objectives). Indeed, had this been the case, one would have expected
much more movement toward change or amendment to loosen the grip of GATT on
The EU promotion of Small and Medium‐sized Enterprises may exemplify such a policy,
It can be argued that in several of these examples it would be easy to suggest alternative means of
achieving the same policy objectives, but without running afoul of Art. III GATT. We will discuss the question
of whether the GATT imposes restrictions on the means by which Members can achieve legitimate regulatory
objectives in the next subsection.
166 Based on the negotiating record, Feddersen (1998) argues that the term “public morals” was not
perceived to be equivalent to “public order.” Charnovitz (1998) does not exclude a more wide understanding of
the term without, however, disputing the evidence provided by Feddersen.
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domestic regulation.167 To the contrary, the clear trend in the history of GATT has been to
expand the obligations imposed on national regulators through the technical barriers
agreements.
Thirdly, it may possibly be argued that the closed‐list feature is actually desirable, in that
absent this limitation on the domain of possible exceptions to Art. III GATT, the door would
be open to questionable policy rationales. This raises the more general issue of whether the
GATT restricts the freedom of Members to pursue policy objectives beyond prohibiting
protectionist policies. Interpretation III and XX are based on different views on this issue, as
will be discussed later in this Chapter.
To conclude, Interpretations III and XX are supported by two rather different views on the
closed‐list feature of Art. XX GATT. Interpretation III is based on the notion that the
provision was never intended to serve as definition of the set of policy objectives that could
justify a less favorable treatment of imported products. Interpretation XX finds support
mainly in the practical experiences with the legislation. In our view, the former arguments
weigh significantly heavier, however, in particular when formulating principles for the
design of the regulation of domestic instruments.

4.3.2

The Additional Requirements Imposed by Art. XX GATT

The body of Art. XX GATT contains some qualifiers for the eligibility for exceptions that
have no counterpart in Art. III GATT, as pointed out in Section 4.2.1. In particular, it
requests, with respect to some of the grounds mentioned in the list at least, that the contested
measure be “necessary” to achieve the stated objective. The presence of such qualifiers raises
the central issue of whether the GATT should be generally construed as requesting Members
to not use policy instruments that impose different burdens on domestic and imported
competing products, when instruments with more symmetric effects are somehow available.
And if so, what should be meant by “available”? For instance, if the purpose of a luxury tax
is to redistribute income from the rich to the poor, there might be other instruments, such as
income taxation, that can be used to this end, and that possibly treat imported and domestic
products more equally. Similarly, if the goal of the different taxation of goods of small and
large enterprises is to subsidize small business, a government could tax all goods uniformly
and pay subsidies to small business without violating the NT provisions by virtue of Art.
III.8(b) GATT, which exempts from NT the payment of subsidies to domestic producers (but
possibly at the risk of facing, e.g., a countervailing duty). Is it a purpose of the GATT to
discipline Members in this sense? Interpretations III and XX are supported by different
views on this important issue.
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Interpretation III is based on the view that the GATT framers did not conceive the GATT as
an instrument for deregulation or for efficient domestic regulation, but rather for
nondiscrimination, where the disciplining of domestic instruments served one purpose only:
to ensure that the value of tariff concessions would not be impaired through their
discriminatory use.
Interpretation XX takes a rather different view, seeing the additional disciplines imposed by
Art. XX GATT as both valuable and intentional, fearing that the disciplines would be lost in
an open‐ended evaluation of protection under Art. III GATT, since regulations can often be
designed in multiple ways to achieve the same objective. To take an example: a measure
regulating acceptable levels of pollution created by automobiles might require that all
automobiles use a catalytic converter to reduce emissions. But perhaps some automakers can
achieve the same emissions target more cheaply by shifting to a different technology, like
hybrid propulsion. If such manufacturers are foreign, regulators may nevertheless require
that all manufacturers use catalytic converters simply because they have no regard for the
burden imposed on foreigners, even if the regulators’ objectives are legitimately related to
environmental protection, or worse, as a means for protectionism. The necessity test together
with the chapeau of Art. XX GATT make it impossible for the regulator to be indifferent to
international externalities since the measure chosen must be the least burdensome on
international trade.168
This raises the general question of how far WTO Members should be requested to go in
order to minimize adverse trade effects from domestic policies, in order to be eligible for an
Art. XX GATT exception? Case law has more recently added a “reasonably available”
qualification to the “least trade restrictive” interpretation of necessary in Art. XX.b GATT.
Even so though, Art. XX GATT imposes an extra discipline on regulators (when compared to
Art. III GATT) by requesting that measures are not only nondiscriminatory but further the
least restrictive means: a proxy (necessity) is thus elevated to a positive obligation. The
upside is that an appropriate proxy to detect protectionism (or absence thereof) becomes part
of the legal test for consistency with the GATT; the downside is it might lead to ”regulatory
chill,” definitely not part of the objectives the GATT was meant to pursue.
Art. 3.2 DSU clearly states that it is not for the interpreter to undo the balance of rights and
obligations as struck by the framers of the WTO. So, even if desirable to do so, the interpreter

In US – Shrimp, the AB requested from the U.S. to be flexible and accept in its market not only shrimps
fished with TEDs (turtle excluding devices, a U.S. technology that guaranteed a low incidental take of life of sea
turtles when fishing shrimps) but also shrimps fished with other technology as long as the rate of accidental
take of life of sea turtles was comparable to that of TEDs.
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should stop short of imposing its own rationality thus relegating negotiating intent to
second‐order consideration.

4.3.3

The Allocation of the Burden of Proof

As explained in Section 2, NT basically solves an informational problem—the lack of
information for adjudicators concerning factual circumstances of the cases they are to
adjudicate, and in particular with regard to government motives for contested regulation.
Due to these informational problems, the design of the rules for the burden of proof will be
important. In order to determine which interpretation is better in this regard, we will draw
on the law‐and‐economics literature, focusing on two of the main themes in this literature.
We thus start by analyzing how the possibility of judicial mistakes affects the desirable
choice between Interpretations III and XX, and then turn to how this choice may contribute
to the extraction of the parties’ private information considering the circumstances that lead
to the imposition of the contested measure. 169
A first fundamental aspect that is highlighted in the literature is the impact of the allocation
of the burden of proof for the occurrence of judicial mistakes. Generally speaking, the
allocation of the burden of proof needs to balance the costs of false positive findings of
violations (“Type I errors”) against the costs of erroneous acquittals (“Type II errors”). In the
present context, it seems plausible that what is at stake for the complainant, is market access
in its export market. For the respondent, what is at stake is instead the possibility to use
domestic instruments for protectionism, or for legitimate purposes, as the case may be. The
allocation of the burden of proof therefore needs to weigh the cost of erroneously denying an
exporter the market access it should legitimately have, against the cost of denying a
regulating country the possibility to pursue legitimate regulatory policies. The cost of the
latter type of mistake, which would force the regulating country to levy a higher fiscal
burden on the domestic product than it would otherwise do, will partly take the form of
reduced sales for its import‐competing industry. But, it may also suffer a cost if the
prohibition of its measure induces a lower level of ambition with regard to the policy
objective it was pursing.
It is hard to say anything definitive about the relative costs of Type I and Type II errors. But
a number of considerations would suggest that in dubio it is probably preferable to err on the
side of commercial rather than public‐order objectives. First, it is clear that WTO Members
A third consideration pointed to in the literature is the desire to minimize legal costs. This may not be a
prime concern to developed WTO Members, but may be of considerable importance to poorer Members. It is
not clear how the desirable choice between Interpretations III and XX would be affected by such a
consideration, however.
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have explicitly recognized that certain regulatory objectives are more important than
commercial export interests, the chapeau of Art. XX GATT being an example. Second, Type I
errors might comport negative implications for the institution itself: it is one thing for a panel
to keep a dubious health policy in place and impose a trade cost on those trading with the
country imposing it; it is yet another to strike down a health policy on dubious grounds and
provoke a disease as a result.
A second theme in the law‐and‐economics literature on the burden of proof is the notion that
it may be desirable to lay the burden on the party that is better informed concerning the
contested issue; this may stem from the fact that the other party simply does not have access
to information, or can only provide the information at a higher cost. By laying the burden of
production on the better informed party, information that would otherwise not be available
will be presented (or the information will be made available at lower cost). In the present
context, the importing country is likely to be better informed concerning the reasons for the
contested measure. The above reasoning would hence speak in favor of evaluating
protection under Art. XX GATT, since the importing country would then bear most of the
evidentiary burden. This would also be natural given the fact that a fundamental obstacle to
the implementation of NT is lack of information concerning the government preferences that
leads to the regulation.
To conclude, the choice between Interpretations III and XX should partly be influenced by
the implications of the choice for the allocation of the burden of proof. The literature here
points to a number of factors. One fundamental factor is the cost of judicial mistakes of
different types; from this perspective, Interpretation III seems preferable. Another factor is
the extent to which private information is extracted; Interpretation XX seems to perform
better in this respect.

4.3.4

Consequences for Trade Liberalization

The discussion of the pros and cons of the Interpretations III and XX has thus far focused on
how it would affect the outcome of adjudication, but has for analytical reasons disregarded
implications for Members’ policy choices. But the design of the adjudication mechanism will
likely affect a whole range of government decisions, such as whether to invest resources in
investigating domestic measures pursued by trading partners, whether to bring complaints,
whether to request the establishment of panels, whether to appeal, etc. By affecting the
likelihood of winning different types of claims, the choice of interpretation is likely to affect
all these decisions.
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What is of particular interest in this regard is whether Interpretation III or XX is more
conducive to tariff liberalization, since a main purpose of NT is to support trade
liberalization, while allowing governments to pursue legitimate domestic policies as they
like (as emphasized in Sections 2 and 3).
What matters for trade liberalization is the combined effect of changes in tariffs and in the
levels of domestic‐trade‐impeding instruments. We can here point to several mechanisms
through which trade liberalization will be affected.
First, governments are typically unwilling to curb their discretion when it comes to
regulation affecting their domestic market. They are therefore likely to respond to the
imposition of stricter NT regimes for domestic instruments by maintaining higher tariffs, so
as to ensure some policy space. The less restrictive Interpretation III may for this reason
allow more tariff reductions than Interpretation XX.
Second, in order for countries to find it meaningful, and be willing, to make tariff
concessions in the first place, it is necessary that they do not expect their trading partners to
undercut the concessions they have given through opportunistic changes in the domestic
policies. The stricter regime of Interpretation XX is likely to be better from this point of view.
It is not possible to say, however, whether the combined effect will be to make Interpretation
III or XX more conducive to reduced tariffs.
Third, trade liberalization requires not only tariff reductions, but also that domestic
instruments are not used to fully offset the tariff concessions that countries have promised.
Interpretation XX will be more efficient in preventing protectionist responses through
domestic measures.170
There is also a broader aspect to take into consideration here, which is the legitimacy of the
WTO more generally, since this affects the general willingness of countries to participate in
the process of trade liberalization. We believe that Interpretation XX may be more
problematic in this regard, since it puts on the regulating country the burden of proof to
establish that contested measures are not disguised protection. According to Interpretation
XX, a government would hence almost by automaticity violate one of the two fundamental
nondiscrimination principles underlying the GATT/WTO if it were to intervene against
regulatory problems that are particularly associated with imported goods. We believe that

Recall also, from the discussion in Section 3, that even if countries do not differentiate in domestic
taxation, they can still respond to tariff reductions by increasing the common level of taxation, in order to at
least partly dampen the effect of the tariff liberalization.
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Interpretation XX may, for this reason, be seen as imposing a more intrusive legal regime
than what is politically desirable.
To illustrate, consider the case of environmental policies. For instance, suppose an imported
car pollutes the air more than does a competing domestically produced car, per unit of
gasoline consumed. An environmental policy that imposes a tax in proportion to the fuel
consumption of cars would thus impose a higher fiscal burden on the imported product. It
would then be very simple for the exporting WTO Member to establish a violation of Art. III
GATT. According to Interpretation XX, the regulating country would then face the burden to
defend the environmental policy before a panel and possibly the AB, having to prove that
the taxation is not disguised protection, and that it fulfills the requirements in the body of
Art. XX GATT. The latter may or may not be simple, depending on the precise ground in
Art. XX GATT that is called upon. But to establish that the measure is not disguised
protection may be more onerous.
Even if it would often be straightforward to defend such measures, we believe that Members
would still be unwilling to let there be a presumption that environmental measures of this
kind violate one of the two core nondiscrimination principles in the WTO.171 The same issue
would arise for all public‐health measures that do not come under the purview of the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS): the regulating state
would have to show why the measure is necessary, despite the fact (according to
Interpretation III) that all it promised when acceding to the WTO was not to discriminate.
In sum, above we pointed to several counteracting mechanisms for how the choice between
Interpretations III and XX will affect trade liberalization, but it does not seem possible to say
anything conclusive about their net effect. We believe, however, that a major consideration
for longer‐run trade liberalization is the legitimacy of the WTO among Members. It would
politically and legally violate the spirit of the GATT if governments would have to request
exceptions for obviously legitimate policies, and in particular when they are denied such
exceptions. This is, in our view, a major drawback of Interpretation XX.

4.3.5 Concluding Discussion
Section 4.1 sketched out two different approaches to interpret the regulation of fiscal
instruments in Art. III GATT. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we discussed the merits of the two
See Horn and Weiler (2007) for a similar argument regarding the AB’s determination in the EC –
Asbestos dispute. They find it plausible that the AB simply could not accept the panel’s approach of classifying
the asbestos ban as violating one of the pillars of the WTO – NT – in light of the popular support of the
measure, and perhaps also their own belief in its desirability.
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approaches, paying particular attention to their implications for exercising the right to
regulate at the national level and we linked this discussion to the overarching purpose that
Art. III GATT was designed to serve. More specifically, Section 4.3.1 concluded that the list
of legitimate grounds in Art. XX GATT should not be construed as a complete list of all
permissible grounds for differential tax treatment of competing imported and domestic
products, and pointed to example of policy objectives that would be difficult to find
acceptance for under Art. XX GATT. Section 4.3.2 discussed the various requirements
imposed by Art. XX GATT, such as the “necessity” requirements for certain policy
objectives. The section concluded that the GATT should not be construed as requiring “good
governance,” and that what is required from WTO Members is that they refrain from
adopting some obviously beggar‐thy‐neighbor policies where they impose on imported
goods a burden higher than that imposed on their domestic counterparts. On balance, these
aspects point quite strongly in favor of Interpretation III.
Section 4.3.3 examined the desirable distribution of the burden of proof, highlighting two
aspects. First, the fact that respondents are likely to have better access to information
concerning the motives for regulations suggests that the evidentiary burden should be put
on respondents, as it is under Interpretation XX. Second, there is a significant likelihood that
judges will make mistakes, imperfectly informed as they are about the circumstances that
have led to the disputes they adjudicate. To the extent that Members are more troubled
when adjudicators erroneously strike down legitimate domestic regulation than when they
erroneously allow protectionist measures—which we believe typically is the case—
Interpretation III is preferable.
In our view, the analysis of Sections 4.3.1‐4.3.3 of how the choice of interpretation is likely to
affect the outcome of adjudication, speaks in favor of Interpretation III, although there are
some arguments to the contrary. But as emphasized in Sections 2 and 3, a basic rationale for
a NT provision is to induce countries to liberalize trade. We identified several differences
between the interpretations in this regard. We finally took a broader perspective,
highlighting the consequences of the choice of interpretation for the “legitimacy” of the
WTO, an admittedly amorphous concept. We here concluded that a serious drawback of
Interpretation of XX is that it is likely to be perceived as too severely restricting the “policy
space” that WTO Members want to retain with regard to domestic policies. Based on the
above, we conclude that Interpretation III is preferable. But we acknowledge that this
decision is not only based on a strict legal and economic analysis, but also on our intuition.
A final consideration for the choice between evaluating protection under Art. III and XX
GATT, is the consistency with existing practice. Changing practice comes at a cost, but so
does, of course also, the continuation of a bad practice. It is actually difficult to determine
where the case law currently stands with regard to the choice of whether to evaluate
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protection under Art. III or XX GATT. One thing is for sure though: case law slowly moves
towards an interpretation of Art. III GATT where the complainant will have to show that a
measure that seemingly (e.g., because of potential trade effects) imposes a higher cost on
imported goods is also linked to the origin of the good: first, in EC–Asbestos, the AB
“widened” the understanding of likeness; then, in Dominican Republic–Import and Sale of
Cigarettes, the AB confirmed that “mechanical,” acontextual understandings of the key terms
appearing in Art. III GATT are a thing of the past. It thus appears as if the AB has embarked
on a quest for a meaningful protectionism test. Interpretation III is very much in line with
this attitude.

4.4 Further Remarks on Interpretation III
Above we proposed two modes of interpreting the nexus of Arts. III and XX GATT, one
more in line with the earlier case law, and one more novel. We identified the differences
between the two interpretations, and discussed their pros and cons. We concluded that
Interpretation III is to be preferred. This Section will offer a number of further reflections,
further comments on, in particular, the proposed Interpretation III.

4.4.1

The Relevance of Art. III.1 GATT

It is sometimes argued that Art. III.1 GATT is hortatory and that the legally binding
language concerning fiscal instruments is contained in Art. III.2 GATT. However, absence of
legally binding language does not lead to irrelevance: Art. III.1 GATT might be given less
weight in the interpretative process than paragraphs 2 and 4, but should not be read to
redundancy. To this effect, the basic idea underlying Interpretation III is that Art. III.1 and
Art. III.2 GATT must be read in conjunction, since, because of their differentiated coverage
(one dealing with fiscal instruments, the other with nonfiscal instruments) none of them
could on its own serve as regulation of domestic instruments: both provisions aim at
expressing in operational (binding) language the principle embedded in Art. III.1 GATT
(Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II, AB). It is Art. III.1 GATT, for example, that gives the term “like
products” the meaning of referring to situations where there is no justification for treating an
imported product differently from a domestic product.
The constraint imposed on fiscal instruments by Art. III GATT is thus determined jointly by
Arts. III.1 and III.2 GATT. Unfortunately, part of the case law has relegated to quasi‐
redundancy the importance of Art. III.1 GATT; panels have often made their determinations
within the four corners of Art. III.2 GATT, and then simply confirmed their conclusion by
referring to Art. III.1 GATT as context. They have been thus led to acontextual
understandings of the key terms (like products, in excess, etc.), that is, they have improperly
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or inadequately accounted for the context as embedded in Art. III.1 GATT which calls for a
ban on protectionist‐only behavior. The most common mistake that panels have made is to
confuse disparate effects with discrimination, a term which is legalese for absence of
protectionism. Contextual readings of the key terms help avoid (or at least reduce) the
occurrence of this risk.172

4.4.2

The Relative Facility to Find Grounds for Complaints

An issue that is rarely discussed, but that could be of significant importance, is the
advantage complainants have in picking and choosing among trading partners’ fiscal
instruments. Tax systems are normally highly complex, consisting of a large number of
specific tax regulations, such as corporate taxation, value‐added taxation, environmental
taxation, income taxation, capital‐gains taxation, etc. Each of these tax schemes in turn
consists of intricate sets of rules. Indeed, these schemes are so complex that they represent
separate fields of specialization for, e.g., tax lawyers. As a result, when comparing the
components of tax schemes, it is quite likely that there will be some component that falls
heavier on the imported product than on a like domestic product.
To illustrate, assume that an imported product requires longer transportation routes in the
importing country compared to some competing domestic product. An environmentally
motivated tax on gasoline would then fall more heavily on the imported product than on the
locally produced good. Following Interpretation XX, such a tax could violate Art. III GATT,
since the tax falls more heavily on the imported product than on the competing domestic
product. At the same time, there may be no protectionist intent, and the whole set of
environmental taxes (or taxes even more broadly) may actually be favorable to the imported
product, and/or be internationally efficient. It would be significantly more difficult for the
complainant to win such a case following Interpretation III, since the complainant would
then have to show that the gasoline tax is protectionist.
The issue arises due to an incompleteness in the GATT: the agreement does not restrict the
way in which a Member can pick pairs of taxes out of a tax system to complain about.173 Of
course, the DS system has not witnessed a large number of frivolous complaints, so far. But
there is no assurance that Members will show such restraint also in the future. In any event,
it seems desirable to reduce the potential for this problem when laying down principles for

As mentioned before, it is the AB report on Dominican Republic–Import and Sale of Cigarettes that
attempted to address this issue albeit without providing a methodology that would be appropriate to achieve
this result.
173 Ruling beyond the ambit of the claim would amount to a ruling ultra petita, which, standing case law
suggests, is considered a cardinal sin for WTO adjudicating bodies.
172
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the interpretation of Art. III GATT. This is achieved by requesting the complaining Member
to bear a significant burden of persuasion to make a plausible case that the contested
measures are indeed protectionist.

4.4.3

Why Not Only Policy Likeness, Why Also Market Likeness?

Interpretation III requires that products are both market‐ and policy‐like, in order for Art. III
GATT to possibly be violated. Products are policy unlike when it would be desirable from an
international efficiency point of view to treat them differently. Typically, the reason why
there is a need to treat them differently is that buyers do not make the desirable distinction.
That is, market likeness is often part of the reason why products are not policy‐like.
But for products to be like, why not request only policy likeness, why include market
likeness as a separate criterion? The main reason for including the market‐likeness criterion
is best illustrated through an example: it could by chance be the case that the joint welfare of
the exporting and importing country governments would increase if the importing country
government were requested to impose the same production tax on coffee cups as on diesel
trucks—the products may thus be policy‐like by chance. But it is obviously highly unlikely
that the differential taxation would reflect protectionism. The requirement that products
must also be market‐like ensures that Art. III GATT will not be violated in instances where a
WTO Member taxes trucks and cups differently which, as argued, are instances that
protectionist behavior is highly unlikely.174

4.4.4

The Relationship Between Like and DCS Products

Table 1 summarizes our aforementioned claims concerning the basic ambit of the regulation
of fiscal instruments under Art. III GATT, as viewed from the perspective of Interpretation
III. For the tax treatment of a pair of products to come under the ambit of Art. III GATT, the
products concerned have to be in a sufficiently strong competitive relationship—they have
to be market‐like. There is no rationale from an international efficiency point of view to treat
some of these pairs of products differently – assuming of course that they are not only

174 Another reason for including an explicit market‐likeness criterion could perhaps be that this could be
expected to enhance the quality of the adjudication process. As discussed supra, the case law has suffered from
unclear evaluations of the market relationship between products, the Korea – Beef dispute being one example.
The requirement of a separate demonstration of market likeness from that of policy likeness might enhance the
transparency of the argumentation by the parties and the adjudication process. For instance, this would make it
easier for outside evaluation of the methods employed in WTO disputes. One can here compare the interaction
between research and policy in the development of principles and methods for the determination of relevant
markets in antitrust.
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market‐ but policy‐like as well; in this case no tax differential should be allowed. For other
product pairs, a differential tax treatment is warranted, and thus legal; the tax differential
nevertheless should correspond to whatever level is necessary to achieve the regulatory
objective sought. Consequently, both like and DCS products are market‐like, but they differ
in the extent of policy likeness. Hence, neither set of product pairs is a subset of the other set
of product pairs. Note also that there is no difference in the extent of market likeness that is
required for like and for DCS products.
Table 1

Policy‐like
Not policy‐like

4.4.5

Market‐like
“Like”; no tax differential is
allowed
“DCS”; some tax differential is
allowed

Not market‐like
Art. III not applicable; any tax
differential is allowed
Art. III not applicable; any tax
differential is allowed

GATT Does Not Request Full International Efficiency

There are several reasons why a constraint on Members to tax imported and competing
locally produced goods equally will not implement a fully efficient situation, and we
highlighted them in Chapter 2:
 the provision has no bite in situations where the tax on the domestic product is higher
than the tax on the imported product, but where the difference should be even larger;
 in cases where the tax on the imported product is higher, the provision may ensure
equal treatment, but not better treatment of the imported product, even if this would
be desriable from an international efficiency point of view; and
 the importing country is free to choose a common tax level it desires in case of like
products, and any two tax rates that respect the permissible tax differential in the
case of DCS products. Since decisions over these taxes are likely to disregard the
interests of the exporting country, they are likely to be inefficient from an
international perspective.
The reason why measures may deviate from what is internationally efficient in these respects
is, of course, that governments will disregard the interests of trading partners when deciding
on their domestic policies. This leads to the more general observation that the GATT does not
exhibit “zero tolerance” against protectionist behavior, it only partially restricts the possibility for
governments to behave in similar fashion.
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4.4.6

Can a Measure That Violates Art. III GATT Be Justified Through
Recourse to Art. XX GATT?

Art. III and XX GATT are both tools to prevent protectionism. This raises the question of
whether a measure that is found to be illegal protection, for the purpose of Art. III GATT,
may still be granted an exception under Art. XX GATT, being found to not constitute
disguised protection. According to Interpretation III, this is normally not possible, while it is
fully possible according to Interpretation XX.
Interpretation III proposes that for a measure to violate Art. III GATT, it must be
protectionist. Hence, as long as the meaning of protectionism in Art. III GATT is the same as,
or more narrow than, the meaning of protectionism in Art. XX GATT, it would be illogical
that a measure that violates the former could receive an exception under the latter, except as
a result of a judicial mistake in the evaluation under Art. III GATT. In this vein, Art. XX
GATT is unlikely to serve as an effective exception to Art. III GATT under Interpretation III.
Interpretation XX functions very differently in this regard, since it understands the
restrictions imposed through Art. III GATT to be of a simpler form, not requesting any
demonstration of protectionism. Instead, the evaluation of protection is performed under
Art. XX GATT. Such a construction finds some support in the fact that Art. XX GATT is a list
of “General Exceptions,” with no textual support that it was not intended to play a role in
disputes involving Art. III GATT.175
Interpretation III does not render Art. XX GATT meaningless, and therefore does not conflict
with the rules concerning treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT). Art. XX GATT may still serve as an efficient exception clause for other provisions in
the GATT, such as those addressing the use of border instruments (e.g., tariffs, QRs, etc.).176
Also, it cannot be excluded that Art. XX GATT may actually, in special cases, serve as an
exception to Art. III GATT. An example might be the following situation: Country A taxes an
imported product X higher than a domestically produced product that is identical in all
respects, in order to punish the exporting country B for producing another product Y that
pollutes the environment of country A, but that it does not import from B, and hence cannot
tax directly.

Recall, however, the views of the UK negotiators that we cited supra.
Indeed, there is no basis in the VCLT to argue that the GATT should be interpreted such that Art. XX
GATT becomes an effective exception to each other provision in the GATT.
175
176

134

4.4.7

On Evaluating Market Likeness and Protection

Interpretations III and XX both require adjudicating bodies to determine the actual extent of
market likeness and the international efficiency of protection. We will here make a few
reflections on how such evaluations should be done.
First, in order to determine the nature and magnitude of the effects of contested measures, it
is necessary to characterize the competition between the domestic and the imported product.
The current case‐law approach to undertaking similar evaluation leaves much to be desired
for the reasons mentioned in Chapter 3.
The evaluation of the competitive relationship between the products should primarily be
based on data collected from the actual market at hand. But lacking such data, as when the
differential policy treatment is sufficiently pronounced to deny market access to the
exported good, one must resort to more indirect sources of information. This could, for
instance, be evidence on the relationship between the same products in other (comparable)
geographical markets, or between similar products in the importing country. One could also
use the indicators suggested in the Working Party report on Border Tax Adjustments (such as
end uses, physical characteristics, etc.). Another source of information is tariff classification.
For the most part, if two products are in the same six‐digit Harmonized System category,
they are likely to be in close competition, even though such tariff classifications are not
always informative about the properties of the products. With finer HS‐classification, it is of
course even more likely that the products are highly competitive.
Next, the data should, as far as possible, be examined through econometric analysis, using
standardized techniques. Indeed, such analysis is commonplace in the antitrust‐context
where the relevant product market within which market power will be estimated is
routinely defined in this way. In light of the similarity in the function of trade and antitrust
analysis, we see no reason why econometric analysis is routinely used in the latter and
sparingly so in the former. Recourse to noneconometric indicators should only be taken to
complement the econometric analysis, or when econometric analysis cannot be undertaken.
Another, and more complex, task facing adjudicators is to determine whether contested
measures are internationally efficient or not. But it is hard to see how this can be avoided, as
long as there is to be a test for protection that allows tax differentials under some but not all
circumstances, and where the guiding principle is that differential taxation should only be
allowed to the extent it is in the mutual interest (a concept which is at the heart of the notion
that illegal protection is essentially a beggar‐thy‐neighbor type of behavior). It should be
emphasized however, that the difficulty facing the adjudicator does not stem from the fact
that the task is to evaluate challenged measures under Art. III GATT as per Interpretation III.
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On the contrary, in the case of DCS products, the task facing the adjudicator actually may be
simpler when evaluating a claim under Art. III GATT than under Art. XX GATT. What is
requested in the former case is, according to Interpretation III, to compare two tax pairs, the
contested pair, and an Art. III.2 GATT‐compatible pair. The evaluation of protection under
Art. XX GATT is likely to be more onerous, since it does not constrain the evaluation to a
comparison of only two tax pairs, and it may additionally require a test for whether a
measure is necessary.
We believe that adjudicators actually already perform tests of this sort, albeit implicitly.
When evaluating whether a measure should be accepted, an adjudicating body will naturally
seek to identify both the costs that the measure gives rise to for the complaining party, and
the benefits it brings to the importing Member (even if no numbers are put on these costs
and benefits). Hence, we would argue that when an adjudicating body approaches a case
like Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, it would be importantly influenced by observing that there
seem to be no noncommercial benefits to Japan that could outweigh the cost to exporting
Members. Had there been noncommercial reasons for Japan to pursue the measure, the
adjudicating body would have been much more prone to accept the measure, provided that
it did not impose too large costs on the trading partners. This is how we understand the AB
when it points to the revealing “design and structure” of a contested measure. Conversely,
although not a taxation case, it seems likely that in EC – Asbestos, adjudicating bodies felt
that the costs of the measure for Canada were dominated by the gains for France, and that
the measure for this reason preferably should pass the test; the main question was instead
how this could be achieved. The point of these examples is hence to argue that adjudicating
bodies already weigh the benefits of the contested regulation against the cost to the
exporting country, albeit not openly. Of course, as is often the case for judicial decisions,
within the parameters described above, the evaluation whether the contested measures
constitute undesirable protection will still have to be a subjective judgment, regardless of
whether done under Art. III or XX GATT. We therefore do not believe that the protectionism
test that we envisage following both Interpretation III and XX, is significantly more onerous
for adjudicating bodies than what is already being practiced. The suggested interpretation to
a considerable extent simply codifies existing practice, providing a conceptual framework
within which it can be understood.177
177 A complicating factor for any preference‐based interpretation of protection in the GATT is the fact that
governments change over time. Strictly speaking, this means that a measure that with one government is an
expression of protectionism could with a change of government become legitimate, or vice versa. Allowing
such changes over time is not so much a conceptual problem. But it is a practical problem, partly since it makes
the actual meaning of tariff commitments more uncertain, and it complicates the formation of case law. The
combination of a formal lack of stare decisis in the WTO, with a significant focus in dispute rulings on earlier
case law, can perhaps be seen to reflect such a balancing between governments’ desire for the law to be
responsive to political developments, while at the same time provide some stability to the undertakings.
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4.4.8

Intent Versus Effect

As highlighted in Chapter 3, case law has repeatedly discussed the intricate issue of whether
the ASATAP notion should be seen as referring to the intent or effect of policy measures, but
without bringing much clarity to the discussion.
In our view, it is useful to distinguish between the role of intent and effect in the substantive
obligation, and the role of these notions from an evidentiary point of view. As for the
substantive obligation, the agreed general purpose of Art. III GATT is to prevent WTO
Members from circumventing their tariff concessions through opportunistic use of domestic
instruments. The main purpose of these tariff reductions is in turn to prevent negative
international externalities from unilateral policies. The ultimate aim is thus to prevent
measures that have the effect of giving rise to internationally inefficient allocations, where the
effects are evaluated based on the preferences of the Members involved.178
As for the roles of intent and effect from an evidentiary point of view, note that the
evaluation of protectionism requires knowledge concerning government preferences, which
is intimately associated with determining the intent behind measures. Since preferences are
not directly observable, and since the regulating state has strong incentive to behave
opportunistically, the judge must rely on indirect evidence concerning intent. Examples of
such indicators are:


The consistency by which the alleged objective is pursued across products: If the same
objective is disregarded in other industries, the differential treatment of the product at
hand might indicate that the protection is intentional; indeed, Art. 5.5 of the SPS
Agreement reflects a very similar idea.
The use of international standards: Assume for example that an international
standard exists that can appropriately take care of the legislative objective sought.
Deviations from the standard, while not necessarily unwarranted, should then be
viewed with suspicion: it should be normal in similar cases to request from the
deviating state to explain itself on its choice to deviate, rather than allocate the burden
of production of proof à la EC – Sardines (AB report);



The question of whether a measure should be illegal if is intended to protect but in actuality fails to do
so, seems to be of limited practical relevance, except from an enforcement perspective. Since we are not
concerned with enforcement issues here, we do not take a stand on the question. Of course, unintentional
protective effects characterize situations where measures are internationally efficient, but still have adverse
trade effects. Such effects clearly cannot be condemned a priori.
178
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Scientific evidence: Measures based on scientific evidence are in general more likely to
respond to a genuine need to intervene, at least in light of the best current knowledge
about a particular issue. Of course, this does not mean that measures based on the
precautionary principle are necessarily protectionist: for such measures, recourse to
some or all of the criteria mentioned above might be warranted.

Indications of the intent may also be obtained from the effects of contested measures, such as
the magnitude of trade effects: The larger the trade effects, the more likely that they are
intended. The choice of less trade restrictive should be understood as a proxy (albeit an
imperfect one) that the measure has been enacted for motives other than protectionism. This
list is by no means exhaustive, but only intended to illustrate the type of indicators that
could be used to evaluate whether a measure is protectionist. Hence, the effects of measures
may signal the reason why the measures themselves have been pursued in the first place.
In sum, both effect and intent are relevant to the definition of the substantive obligation.
Effect matters since the purpose is to regulate measures that cause international externalities,
and intent matters since it is closely related to the question whether international
externalities are present.179 Intent and effect are also relevant from an evidentiary
perspective, since both perceived intent as well as observed effects in the market could serve
as evidence concerning the preferences of the regulating country.

4.4.9

The Aims and Effect Test

Interpretation III shares a certain similarity with an interpretation of Art. III GATT that has
been denoted the aims and effect test, but also differs in important respects. This test goes
back to the US – Malt Beverages panel report, where like is defined in the following manner
(§ 5.25):
“Consequently, in determining whether two products subject to different treatment are like
products, it is necessary to consider whether such product differentiation is being made ‘so as
to afford protection to domestic production’. While the analysis of ‘like products’ in terms of
Article III:2 must take into consideration this objective of Article III, the Panel wished to
emphasize that such an analysis would be without prejudice to the ‘like product’ concepts in
other provisions of the General Agreement, which might have different objectives and which
might therefore also require different interpretations.”

179

Indeed, trade effects could signal intent.
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In its US – Taxes on Automobiles Report,180 the Panel had the opportunity to elaborate on this
proposition by providing its own legal benchmark to establish likeness, the so‐called aims
and effects test (§§ 5.7, 5.10):
“In order to determine this issue, the Panel examined the object and purpose of paragraphs 2
and 4 of Article III in the context of the article as a whole and the General Agreement.
…..
The Panel then proceeded to examine more closely the meaning of the phrase ‘so as to
afford protection.’ The Panel noted that the term ‘so as to’ suggested both aim and
effect. Thus the phrase ‘so as to afford protection’ called for an analysis of elements
including the aim of the measure and the resulting effects. A measure could be said to
have the aim of affording protection if an analysis of the circumstances in which it was
adopted, in particular an analysis of the instruments available to the contracting party
to achieve the declared domestic policy goal, demonstrated that a change in
competitive opportunities in favour of domestic products was a desired outcome and
not merely an incidental consequence of the pursuit of a legitimate policy goal. A
measure could be said to have the effect of affording protection to domestic production
if it accorded greater competitive opportunities to domestic products than to imported
products. The effect of a measure in terms of trade flows was not relevant for the
purposes of Article III, since a change in the volume or proportion of imports could be
due to many factors other than government measures.” (italics in the original).

According to the aims and effect test, likeness hence means policy likeness, in our terminology.
However, contrary to what the name of the test suggests, the realized effects of contested
measures are (to our understanding) explicitly irrelevant in the aims and effect test; in the
name of the premise that Art. III GATT is about protecting competitive conditions, the US –
Taxes on Automobiles panel held that trade effects are totally immaterial. In contrast, in our
preferred approach (Interpretation III), like goods must be both market‐ and policy‐like. We
are in the dark as to the applicability of the aims and effects test on DCS goods, since the panel
made no pronouncement in this vein.

In this case, the European Community challenged the consistency of a U.S. tax scheme applicable to
cars, according to which the total fleet of a producer would be taken into account in order to decide on the tax
that would be imposed. Producers with a fleet that consisted of large cubism cars (gas guzzlers) would suffer
most, as a result. Many European producers belonged to this category. The U.S. regime was apparently enacted
at a time when those suffering most were U.S. producers, in an effort to dissuade consumers eager to buy such
cars from buying them.
180
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4.4.10 Taxation Based on Features of the Production Process (PPMs)
In light of the above, it seems safe to conclude that Art. III GATT applies, in principle, to all
domestic instruments (irrespective whether of fiscal or nonfiscal nature) except for the two
instruments that have been explicitly exempted from its coverage. The NT provision does
not, however, as already discussed above, address the question of prescriptive jurisdiction: can
an importing country effectively impose its own regulatory choices on imports, by making
adjustments at the border for taxes paid by producers of domestic goods, but not by
competing imported products? The text of Art. III GATT is silent on this score.
A contentious issue involving territoriality is the legality under Art. III GATT (as well as
other GATT provisions) of domestic policies that condition market access for products on the
manner in which they have been produced, rather than on the physical characteristics of the
products; this is what the discussion concerning the role for production and process method
(PPM)‐based measures address. A core issue with regard to the compatibility of such
measures with Art. III GATT is whether an imported product that physically is identical to a
local product can nevertheless be viewed as not being like (or DCS), because of differences in
the production process and/or method.181 According to Interpretation III, the answer is “yes.”
Consider, for instance, the case where the production of an exportable causes environmental
damage to the importing country, and the importing country levies a tax on the imported
product to offset the damage. According to Interpretation III, the evaluation of this measure
should take into consideration the environmental impact on the importing country. If the tax
differential is not larger than what would be chosen if the environment objective were to be
achieved in an internationally efficient manner, the measure should be allowed. Note,
however, that a prerequisite for this is that the importing‐country government is adversely
affected by the measure other than through its impact on the competitive conditions in the
domestic market—in the example there is transboundary environmental damage. If this is
not the case, the only rationale for the PPM measure is protectionism.
This implication of Interpretation III is compatible with the “default rules” concerning
allocation of jurisdiction in Public International Law. In short, and as briefly alluded to
above, the default rules oblige states to not regulate transactions occurring outside their
geographic borders except for in certain commonly agreed circumstances. However, states
can exercise prescriptive jurisdiction on actions that occur outside their borders, by virtue of
the so called “effects doctrine,” and a reasonableness criterion will help solve conflicts in
cases in which more than one state have jurisdiction through these rules. It follows that
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PPM‐based measures may take the form of border tax adjustments (BTAs); see Chapter 2 above.
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recourse to the default rules is quite helpful, but does not eliminate jurisdictional conflicts
altogether; contractual solutions are hence encouraged.182
The default rules would thus suggest that an importing country has jurisdiction over
production processes in other countries, provided that the production process has direct and
foreseeable effect on the importing country, and provided that the countries in question do
not have an agreement regulating the issue. Hence, the fact that the production and sales of
the imported product will have effects on the competitive conditions in the importing‐
country market, is not a ground for the importing‐country government to regulate the
transaction, as long as there is an agreement concerning these effects—in this case the
GATT/WTO. On the other hand, absent an international agreement between the two
countries—such as might be the case in, e.g., the case of protection of the environment—the
effects doctrine gives the importing country jurisdiction (assuming presence of effects in its
market). When exercising jurisdiction, it will have to respect a reasonableness requirement
when choosing its measures.
The default rules are not explicitly reflected in the GATT, nor have they been explicitly
referenced in case law. However, the AB report in the US – Shrimps dispute can perhaps be
seen as a step in this direction, in that it pointed to a “sufficient nexus” between an
endangered species in the exporting country, and the importing country, absent which the
regulating state would not be in position to lawfully exercise jurisdiction. The AB did not
expand on this rather cryptic statement, so we still lack a legal test that will help us predict
in future transactions when a nexus exists and when not.
This is not to say that recourse to the default rules is a panacea. Indeed, there is no
convincing and consistent response in international adjudication regarding, for example,
jurisdiction in the presence of ”moral” externalities; for instance, assuming that the use of
child labor causes public concern in a WTO Member, can it block the trade of a good that is
produced with child labor? Or, can the importing country block trade if the exporting
country uses child labor not in the imported goods, but in the production of other goods?
The default rules do not provide clear answers to these questions. But they do constitute an
appropriate first step to resolve a jurisdictional issue that may become of significant
importance for adjudication in the WTO.

See Horn and Mavroidis (2008) for a discussion of jurisdictional aspects of the GATT, and the role of
the default rules.
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4.5 Revisiting the Leading Cases in Light of Our Proposals
The previous Sections of this Chapter presented two interpretations of Art. III GATT, based
on our understanding of the case law, the negotiating history, and economic theory. We will,
in this Section, briefly discuss whether applying our suggested interpretations would have
affected the outcome in the GATT/WTO cases that have shaped the current understanding of
Art. III GATT, and if so how.
As evidenced by the compilation presented in the Appendix, there are a large number of
cases that have been adjudicated under Art. III GATT. Ideally, we would want to see how
our suggested interpretations would fare in each of these cases, but this is not practical.
Instead, we will briefly discuss how these interpretations would affect the determinations in
some leading cases. To this end, we first identify the disputes that we believe represent the
state‐of‐the‐art of the existing case law. We then reexamine these disputes in light of the
discussion in the study.
Although de jure there is no binding precedent (stare decisis) in WTO, it is commonplace that
panels and AB have followed prior rulings. Indeed, in its report on US – Stainless Steel
(Mexico), the AB held that it expected panels to follow prior AB findings dealing with the
same issue. It further deplored the attitude of the panel in question to disregard the AB
approach on the practice of zeroing (§§ 158‐162). With this in mind, it seems appropriate to
try to identify the leading Art. III GATT cases where the AB has explained its overall
understanding of the provision, and to which reference is customarily made in subsequent
case law when issues relating to the interpretation of the provision arise.
Following this definition, the leading cases, and their main innovations, are as follows:




Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II explicitly outlawed the aims and effect test (espoused by
some GATT panels) as we saw in Chapter 3. It further incorporated the GATT leading
cases (such as Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I, and the Working Party report on Border Tax
Adjustments) that had opted for a test in the marketplace in order to define whether
two products are like or DCS. As a result, in light of the similarity of the approach
followed, we do not need to apply our approach to this class of GATT disputes as
well.
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages followed Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II in almost all aspects,
but with two crucial additions: the AB established that, in order to define whether
two products are DCS/like, the WTO adjudicator can interchangeably use econometric
and/or noneconometric indicators; moreover, the AB also held that for two products
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to be like, they must at the very least be DCS and share a detailed tariff classification
as well: DCS emerges thus as a necessary but insufficient condition for likeness.
Chile – Alcoholic Beverages introduced an inquiry into the objective intent of the
regulator (in some, rather extreme, conditions) in order to detect whether a measure
has been applied so as to afford protection to domestic production.
Philippines – Distilled Spirits held that two goods are like when they are in intense
competitive relationship (while DCS goods are in less intense relationship). It is
unclear, nevertheless, whether this criterion in and of itself suffices to afford likeness
or whether they must still share HS classification: a few pages later, in a separate
finding, the AB mentions the relevance of HS classification. Because of the existing
uncertainty (and the absence of a clear pronouncement overruling the relevance of HS
classification as a criterion that can appropriately define likeness) we will not let this
determination change our conclusions regarding the definition of likeness in case law.
In Philippines–Distilled Spirits, the AB faced the following facts (§ 98): distilled spirits
produced from one of the following materials, sap of the nipa, coconut, cassava,
camote, etc. (predominantly produced in the Philippines), were subjected to a flat
rate, whereas distilled spirits produced from other materials (predominantly
imported) were subjected to a higher excise tax. The AB suggested that DCS products
are those with low substitutability between them, whereas like products are those
with high, almost perfect substitutability (§§ 120‐122, 148). [1] In sharp contrast to its
prior case law (Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II), the AB did not condition a finding of
likeness on common tariff classification across two products: it first held that a 4‐digit
tariff classification was uninformative, since not sufficiently detailed, and no
conclusions on likeness could be drawn (§ 182). It then noted that two of the goods
did not share the same 6‐digit tariff classification; it still found that they were like,
overlooking thus the significance of tariff classification, satisfying itself that the goods
were like since they were in intense competitive relationship (§ 164).

We will now briefly discuss how these leading cases would have been adjudicated if
Interpretations III and XX were adopted.

4.5.1

Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II

Recall that in this case the AB found the Japanese measures to be in violation of Art. III.2
GATT, because Japan was taxing predominantly western drinks substantially higher than
predominantly Japanese drinks. Recall further that Japan had no policy justification for this
tax differential and only took recourse to ex post facto justifications to explain its policies; all
its justifications were dismissed by the panel precisely because they were ex post facto. In this
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case, the panel found (and the AB upheld) that a class of products were DCS based on
consumer surveys that were conducted in Japan, which used econometric indicators to
quantify the degree of substitutability across the various products. Two products were
furthermore considered like since they shared the same tariff classification. Finally, the in
excess/ASATAP‐requirement was justified by the tax differential itself.
The outcome of this dispute seems desirable from both an Interpretation III and XX
perspective. We are also in agreement with some of the reasoning in the report:



DCS products should be defined by using econometric indicators, when appropriate
(as was the case here);
A substantial tax differential across two DCS products, and the absence of any policy
rationale for it, suggest that the measure is protectionist.

We have two main misgivings concerning the report. First, following either of our suggested
Interpretations, we would have preferred to see an explicit evaluation of whether the
measure was to be considered protectionist. Second, Interpretation III is not compatible with
the AB’s understanding of the term like. In our view, sharing a tariff classification should not
be a dispositive feature for a finding of likeness, since the products that come under the same
tariff heading are not necessarily policy‐like as well. In this case, however, this was
immaterial since Japan was ostensibly not pursuing any policy goal through the differential
taxation, other than providing its producers with a tax advantage.

4.5.2

Korea – Alcoholic Beverages

In this case, the AB found the Korean measures to be in violation of Art. III.2 GATT. Recall
that the AB held that econometric and noneconometric indicators are equally useful methods
to decide on the DCS‐relationship across two products; without explaining under what
circumstances recourse to either is warranted, it treated them as perfect substitutes
irrespective of the facts.
As things stand, it is difficult to clearly determine whether we agree or not with the final
outcome, since we lack information that is crucial for us to apply our test, irrespective
whether we follow Interpretation III or XX: recall that DCS relationship is defined in the
same way under both interpretations. The evidence supporting DCS‐relationship across
predominantly Korean and predominantly western drinks seems at least debatable to us. As
mentioned above, recourse to econometric indicators is not panacea. We do not know if this
was one of those situations where recourse to econometric indicators would solve the
problem (although we suspect, in light of the evidence submitted by Korea, that this is not
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the case). The panel in its report examined evidence from the Japanese market regarding the
relationship between the products without explaining why evidence from the Korean market
was inappropriate. However, as facts make it clear, western drinks did exist in the Korean
market, the tax differential notwithstanding. Nevertheless, neither the panel nor the AB
explained why such evidence could not have been appropriately taken into consideration.
We consequently find unsatisfactory the manner in which the AB decided on the DCS
relationship across the products.
Since we are unsure about the extent of DCS relationship, there is not much we can add with
respect to like products, never mind the remaining parts of the test (ASATAP).

4.5.3

Chile – Alcoholic Beverages

Recall that the case concerned a Chilean progressive taxation scheme, whereby the tax rate
increased with alcohol strength. The AB found the scheme to be GATT‐inconsistent because
the tax differential across the various tax categories was too large, without explaining,
however, what would be acceptable. We are opposed to the approach used, but cannot
definitely pronounce on the outcome had our preferred approach been privileged. We have
reasons to believe, nonetheless, that Chile should have prevailed under either approach.
In this case, there was no dispute regarding the fact that the goods at hand were DCS. The
only disputed matter was whether the tax differential was discriminatory. The AB dismissed
the relevance of the claim by Chile that the majority of the products hit by the higher tax
were of Chilean origin. We find this hard to accept. Under Interpretation III, just as adverse
trade effects indicate (but do not prove) intent to protect, adverse effects borne primarily by
domestic product should be taken to indicate lack of such a motive; the AB dismissed the
relevance of this factor, invoking the no‐effects test that it customarily applies in Art. III
GATT cases. To be precise, the AB accepted that it was Chileans that were burdened with
paying the major proportion of the tax burden in the highest category, but explicitly
dismissed its relevance arguing that this fact, in and of itself, was not enough to undo its
belief that, in light of the sharp rise of the tax burden across categories and the fact that
Chilean goods were predominant in the lowest tax category, the challenged tax regime was
GATT‐inconsistent.
As argued above, we do believe that regulatory intent is relevant for the evaluation of
whether a measure is protectionist or not, and would therefore seek to understand the
regulatory intent of the Chilean legislation at hand. To this effect, we would consider
questions that the AB did not address, such as:
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4.5.4

Who is burdened by the higher tax? Chile raised this question, but it went
unanswered by the plaintiffs and was considered, as mentioned, uninformative by the
AB. From what we understand, however, the measure burdened Chilean producers
more than it did EC producers;
What is the alleged policy rationale for the tax differential? For instance, is it to
combat alcoholism, or to raise revenue? Absent was an explanation by the respondent
of what policy objectives the contested measure was meant to promote.)

Concluding Remarks on the Revisit to the Leading Cases

It stems from this brief discussion that in these leading disputes, from the perspective of
Interpretation III, we disagree more with the reasoning by the AB than with actual outcomes.

5 Principles
We summarize these findings in the following principles:

§ 1. The Provision Under Which a Protectionism Test Should Be Performed
The protectionism test should be performed primarily under Art. III GATT.

§ 2. The Discipline on Fiscal Instruments in Case of Like Products
Two products are like for the purpose of Art. III.2 GATT if both (i) they are in
close actual or potential competition; and (ii) international efficiency requires
taxation by the same amount. Like products should be taxed equally, but the
level of taxation is unilaterally determined by the importing country.

§ 3. The Discipline on Fiscal Instruments in Case of DCS Products
Two products are DCS for the purpose of Art. III.2 GATT if both (i) they are
in close actual or potential competition; and (ii) international efficiency
requires higher taxation of the imported product. The taxation of DCS
products may differ, but not by more than could be motivated from an
146

international efficiency point of view. The level of taxation is unilaterally
determined by the importing country.
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Appendix
Table 1: NT Disputes Adjudicated Under the GATT183
No.

Dispute

DS No

Subject Matter

1)

Pakistan v.
India: Tax
Rebates on
Exports (III.2)

2 – 24
Aug.
1948

Denial of rebates affected
all of Pakistan’s imports
from India

2)

France v. Brazil:
Internal Taxes
(III.2)

4 – 25
April
1949

Brazil’s raise of taxes
applied to many imports

3)

Netherlands v.
United
Kingdom:
Purchase Tax
Exemptions
(III.2)
Norway &
Denmark v.
Belgium:
Family
Allowances
(III.2)

12 – 26
Oct.
1950

Claim that purchase tax
that provided exemptions
for certain domestic
products, but not for ‘like’
foreign products, violated
III.2
Claim that grants of
exemptions from internal
tax to products of some
countries but not others
were violations of Art. I
and was not excused by
PPA reservation for
existing legislation
Claim that new tax on
imports was either
internal tax contrary to
III.2, or a border charge
contrary to II

4)

5)

France v.
Greece: Special
Import Taxes
(III.2)

183

14 – 19
Sep.
1951

19 – 27
Sep.
1952

Source: Hudec (1993).
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Result
India eliminated
discrimination as part of
broader settlement
involving other trade
problems.
In 1950, Brazil agreed to
request corrective
legislation. The tax
discrimination was
entirely terminated on 14
August 1957 as part of
major tariffs revision.
Differential treatment of
foreign products
abolished in 1952.

Report
adopted
YES

YES

YES

Entire tax abolished on 6
March 1954.

YES

Tax eliminated on 9
April 1953.

YES

6)

Italy v. Greece:
Luxury Tax on
Imports (III.2)

30 – 5
Oct.
1954

Claim that certain internal
taxes applicable only to
imports violated III

7)

Australia v. US:
Hawaiian
Regulations
Affecting
Imported Eggs
(III.4)

36 – 28
Sep.
1955

8)

United
Kingdom v.
Italy: Turnover
Tax on
Pharmaceutical
Products (III.2)
US v. France:
Auto Taxes
(III.2)

37 – 11
Oct.
1955

Claim that regulation of
Hawaiian territorial
government requiring
merchants to display ‘We
sell foreign eggs’ sign
violated III.4 and was not
justified under rule‐of‐
origin provisions of IX
Claim that internal tax
rate on imported
pharmaceutical products
violated III.2

9)

10)

Netherlands v.
Germany (III.2)

40 – 12
Sep.
1956

41 – 23
Oct.
1956

Claim that auto tax
structure based on
horsepower/weight
formula (‘fiscal
horsepower’) resulted in
significantly greater tax on
certain foreign autos,
which constituted
violation of III.2
Claim that formula for
computing German turn‐
over tax on printing work
done in foreign country
(Netherlands) resulted in
higher tax charges that
discriminated against
foreign printing, in
violation of III.2
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Discrimination in
internal taxes was
eliminated. Undertaking
made to restore tariffs to
bound rates.
Regulation invalidated,
on ground that as a
matter of US internal
law, GATT obligations
are binding upon
territory of Hawaii, and
that a measure violated
art. III.4.
Italy undertook to lower
the rate on imported
pharmaceuticals to 5 %.

YES

YES

YES

No change in French
practice. (In 1986 the ECJ
ruled that the fiscal
horsepower formula
violated 95 EC Treaty by
affording indirect
protection to French
producers.)

NO

Outcome not known

YES

11)

US v. Chile:
Auto Taxes
(III.2)

44 – 16
Nov.
1956

12)

UK v. Italy:
Discrimination
Against
Imported
Agricultural
Machinery
(III.4)
Germany v.
Greece:
Discrimination
in 14) Credit
Facilities for
Imported
Goods (III.4)
UK v. France:
Discrimination
Against
Imported
Agricultural
Machinery
(III.4)
Austria v. Italy:
Measures in
Favor of
Domestic
Productions of
Ships Plates
(III.4)

46 – 29
July
1957

13)

15)

16)

Claim that a new law
imposing a sharply
graduated tax on autos
impaired value of tariffs
concessions by placing
significantly heavier
burden on US autos
Claim that law granting
buyers more favorable
loan terms for purchase of
domestic machinery
violated III.4

Problem rectified to US
satisfaction by new
legislation.

YES

Settled by undertaking to
allow law to expire.

YES

47 – 19‐
23 Sep.
1957

Claim that Greece
discriminated against
imported goods in credit
facilities made available to
buyers, apparently
claiming violation of III.4

Not reported.

48 – 3
Oct.
1957

Claim that subsidy to
purchasers of domestic
machinery violated III.4

Subsidy restored for
foreign products.

YES

52 – 9
Oct.
1958

Claim that tax remission
granted only to firms
purchasing domestic
product violated GATT

Tax remission extended
in May 1961 to firms
using any foreign
products.

YES
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CONSUL‐
TATIONS

17)

US v. Italy:
Administrative
and Statistical
Fees (III.2)

60 – 1
Dec.
1969

Claim that service fee on
import entries (…)
violated III.2 by failing to
provide National
treatment to imports

18)

US v. EC:
Measures on
Animal Feed
Proteins (III.2
and III.4)

78 – 27
April
1976

Claim that regulation
requiring sellers of certain
animal feed proteins, of
which 85% were imports,
to purchase specified
quantities of domestic
milk powder was an
internal QR in violation of
(…) III.2 and III.4

19)

US v. Spain:
Measures
Concerning
Domestic Sale
of Soybean Oil
(III.4)

91 – 1
Nov.
1979

Claim that internal
restrictions on the sale of
soybean oil (…) were
contrary to III.4 because
they failed to impose
similar burdens on other
vegetable oils that were
‘like products’…

20)

US v. Japan:
Restraints on
Imports of
Manufactured
Tobacco (III.2
and III.4)

92 – 8
Nov.
1979

Claim that practices of
state trading monopoly
violated Art. III

151

A Presidential report to
the US Congress for 1970
reported that the
proposed law had been
enacted by the Italian
Senate and was expected
to pass the House of
Delegates and enter into
force in January 1971.
According to the panel
report, the EC measures
had been expressly
limited to a short
duration and terminated
for internal reasons on 25
October 1976, before the
panel had even met.
They had been in force
for only six months.
In seeking to overturn
the panel report, the US
announced that it was
withdrawing its
complaint against Spain
– so that governments
voting to reject the panel
rulings would not be
voting to find Spain in
violation.
Japan agreed, inter alia,
to repel an internal tax
on imported cigars, to
make substantial
reductions in the tariffs
on cigarettes, cigars, and
pipe tobacco, to expand
the number of retailers
allowed to sell foreign
tobacco products, and to
permit advertising of
foreign tobacco products,
in Japanese‐language
media.

YES

YES

CONSUL‐
TATIONS

YES

21)

US V. EC: ‘Spin‐
Chill’
Requirements
on Imports of
Poultry (III.4)

97 – 19
June
1980

22)

US v. Canada:
Administration
of the Foreign
Investment
Review Act
(FIRA) (III.4)

108 – 26
March
1982

23)

EC v. Finland:
Internal
Regulations
Having an
Effect on
Imports of
Certain Parts of
Footwear (III.4)

116 – 28
Sep.
1982

24)

South Africa v.
Canada:
Discriminatory
Application of
Retail Sales Tax
on Gold Coins
(III.2)

132 – 3
July
1984

Standards Code
Complaint: Claim that
standards for processing
and production methods
were subject to code’s
basic obligations via Code
Section 14.25, and
application of new
processing standards to
imports but not domestic
products violated
National treatment
obligation of Code Section
2.1
Claim that administrative
practice of using foreign
investment controls to
promote undertakings by
foreign investors to
purchase domestic goods
violates III.4 …
Claim that III.4 violated
by Finnish regulation
requiring that only shoes
with soles of domestic
origin could be exported
to USSR; regulation
constituted less favorable
treatment for imported
soles
Claim that a provincial
government tax on sales
of gold coins, which
exempted Canadian gold
coins from tax,
discriminated against
imported gold coins in a
manner inconsistent with
the requirements of II and
III

152

According to US sources,
the problem disappeared
when US suppliers
found it easy to comply
with the new process,
and so asked the US
government to withdraw
complaint.

CONSUL‐
TATIONS

On 5‐6 November,
Canada informed the
Council that it had fully
complied with the
ruling.

YES

In July 1984, EC
informed GATT
Secretariat that, while
bilateral consultations
were still continuing,
dispute could be
removed from GATT
agenda. Not known
whether Finland’s export
regulation ever changed.
Within a month of the
panel ruling, the
Province of Ontario
announced its intention
to remove the tax
discrimination, and the
change became effective
in January 1986.

CONSUL‐
TATIONS

YES

25)

26)

27)

28)

29)

EC v. Canada:
Import,
Distribution
and Sale of
Alcoholic
Drinks by
Provincial
Marketing
Authorities
(III.2 and III.4)
Mexico, Canada
and EC v. US:
Taxes on
Petroleum and
Certain
Imported
Substances
(Superfund)
(III.2)
EC v. Japan:
Restrictions on
Alcoholic
Beverages (III.2)

EC v. US: Tax
Reform
Legislation for
Passenger
Aircraft (III.4)
EC v. US:
Section 337 of
the Tariff Act of
1930 (‘Aramid
Fibres Case’)
(III.4)

139 – 12
Feb.
1985

Claim that trading
practices of Canadian
Provincial liquor boards
were inconsistent with
GATT provisions

Canada agreed to
roughly the same
liberalization granted to
US.

YES

152 – 27
Oct.
1986

Claim that border tax
adjustment on imported
petroleum violated III.2
because it was higher than
the internal tax on like
domestic products. (also
other claims under III.2)

In December 1989 the US
Congress amended the
Superfund legislation to
equalize the tax on
imported and domestic
products.

YES

154 – 5
Nov.
1986

Claim that tax system
involving classification of
alcoholic beverages into
complex categories with
substantially different
rates for each category
violated III.2
Claim that tax advantage
granted only to buyers of
certain US – produced
aircrafts violated III.4

Japan abolished its ad
valorem tax on the
beverages affected by
this ruling, its tax based
on extract content, and
its ‘grading system’ used
for classification.
None called for. Measure
had expired.

YES

Claim that special section
‘337’ procedure for en‐
forcing patent
infringement claims
against imported goods
violated III.4 because
special procedure was less
favorable than procedure
applicable to patent claims
involving domestic goods

US indicated that
compliance would be
delayed until, and
conditioned upon, the
outcome of the Uruguay
Round negotiations on
intellectual property
rights.

YES

160 – 9
April
1987

162 – 29
April
1987

153

NO

30)

Canada v. US:
Section 337
Action on
Cellular Mobile
Telephones
(III.4)

167 – 15
Sep.
1987

31)

US v. EC:
Directive on
Third‐Country
Meat Imports
(III.4)

168 – 25
Sep.
1987

32)

Chile v. US:
Quality
Standards for
Grapes (III.4)

178 – 22
April
1988

33)

US v. EC:
Payments and
Subsidies on
Oilseeds and
Animal‐Feed
Proteins (III.4)

179 – 22
April
1988

Claim that special section
337 procedure for en‐
forcing patent
infringement claims
against imported goods
violated III.4 because
special procedure was less
favorable than court
procedure applicable to
domestic goods
Claim that health
requirements, which
applied to imports but not
to domestic products,
violated III.4
Claim that law
authorizing inspection of
Chilean grapes at port of
entry into US while
Mexican suppliers were
allowed inspection at
point of origin in Mexico,
violated I and III
Claim that subsidy
payments made to EC
processors for processing
EC oilseeds, but not
foreign oilseeds, violated
III.4

154

Section 337 proceeding
was terminated by
consent of both parties.

YES

In April 1988 the EC
published a list of US
firms found to qualify
under the Directive. All
or most US export firms
qualified.
No change was made in
US marketing order
regime.

YES

On 20 November 1992
the parties announced a
settlement, involving
both an agreement to
limitations on EC
soybean production and
a broad agreement on
the key elements of the
Uruguay Round
agricultural agreement
then under negotiation.

CONSUL‐
TATIONS/
MAS

NO

34)

Japan v. EC:
Antidumping
Regulation on
Imports of Parts
and
Components
(‘Screwdriver
Assembly’
Case) (III.4)

188 – 8
Aug.
1988

AD duties not authorized
by VI or XX(d) GATT,
thus violated III

35)

EC v. Chile:
Internal taxes
on Spirits (III.2)

207 – 8
Nov.
1989

Claim that differential in
sale taxes on substitutable
products violated III.1 and
III.2

155

In agreeing to adoption
of the report, the EC
undertook to comply
with the report, but
stated it would defer
compliance until
implementation of yet‐
to‐be‐determined results
of Uruguay Round
negotiations on the
Antidumping code.
Not yet known.
According to EC sources,
the complaint was frozen
for the duration of the
Uruguay Round, but not
abandoned.

YES

CONSUL‐
TATIONS

Table 2: NT Disputes Adjudicated Under the WTO184
No.

Dispute

DS No

Subject Matter

36)

EC v. Japan: Taxes
on Alcoholic
Beverages (Japan –
Alcoholic
Beverages II) (III.2)
Canada v. Japan:
Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages (Japan –
Alcoholic
Beverages II) (III.2)
US v. Japan: Taxes
on Alcoholic
Beverages (Japan –
Alcoholic
Beverages II) (III.2)
EC v. Japan:
Measures affecting
the purchase of
telecommunications
equipment (III.4)
Japan v. Brazil:
Certain automotive
investment
measures (III.4)

8

Internal taxes on
certain alcoholic
beverages pursuant
to the Liquor Tax
Law
Internal taxes on
certain alcoholic
beverages pursuant
to the Liquor Tax
Law
Internal taxes on
certain alcoholic
beverages pursuant
to the Liquor Tax
Law
The agreement
between US and
Japan regarding
telecommunications

37)

38)

39)

40)

41)

EC v. Indonesia:
Certain measures
affecting the
automobile
industry (Indonesia
– Autos) (III.2, III.4)

10

11

15

51

54

Report
by185
AB

Automotive
investment
measures incl. dom.
content
requirements, trade
balancing
requirements
National Car
Program

184

Source:
Mavroidis
&
Horn,
World
Bank
www.worldbank.org/trade/wtodisputes).
185 AB denotes Appellate Body Report, P denotes Panel Report.
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Result
Japanese Liquor Tax Law
is inconsistent with
GATT Article III.2.

AB

Japanese Liquor Tax Law
is inconsistent with
GATT Article III.2.

AB

Japanese Liquor Tax Law
is inconsistent with
GATT Article III.2.

P

Although there has been
no official notification,
the case appears to have
been settled bilaterally.

P

No panel established.

P

The Panel found that
Indonesia was in
violation of Articles I and
II.2 of GATT 1994,
Article 2 of the TRIMs
Agreement, Article 5(c)
of the SCM Agreement,
but was not in violation

Database,

2011

(available

at

42)

Japan v. Indonesia:
Certain measures
affecting the
automobile
industry (Indonesia
– Autos) (III.2, III.4)

55

National Car
Program

P

43)

US v. Indonesia:
Certain measures
affecting the
automobile
industry (Indonesia
– Autos) (III.2, III.4)

59

National Car
Program

P

44)

US v. Brazil:
Certain measures
affecting trade and
investment in the
automotive sector
(III.4)

65

P

45)

EC v. Korea: taxes
on Alcoholic
Beverages (Korea –
Alcoholic
Beverages) (III.2)
EC v. Brazil:
Certain measures
affecting trade and
investment in the
automotive sector
(III.4)

75

Discriminatory
tariffs, domestic
content
requirements, trade
balancing
requirements, local
content
requirements
Internal taxes
imposed by Korea
on certain alcoholic
beverages

46)

81

Discriminatory
tariffs, domestic
content
requirements, trade
balancing
requirements, local
content
requirements

157

AB

of Article 28.2 of the
SCM Agreement.
The Panel found that
Indonesia was in
violation of Articles I and
II.2 of GATT 1994,
Article 2 of the TRIMs
Agreement, Article 5(c)
of the SCM Agreement,
but was not in violation
of Article 28.2 of the
SCM Agreement.
The Panel found that
Indonesia was in
violation of Articles I and
II.2 of GATT 1994,
Article 2 of the TRIMs
Agreement, Article 5(c)
of the SCM Agreement,
but was not in violation
of Article 28.2 of the
SCM Agreement.
No panel established.

Korea had violated
Article III.2 of GATT
1994.

No panel established.

47)

US v. Korea: taxes
on Alcoholic
Beverages (Korea –
Alcoholic
Beverages) (III.2)
EC v. Chile: Taxes
on Alcoholic
Beverages (Chile –
Alcoholic
Beverages) (III.2)

84

Internal taxes
imposed by Korea
on certain alcoholic
beverages

AB

Korea had violated
Article III.2 of GATT
1994.

87

Special Sales Tax on
Spirits

AB

49)

EC v. US: Tax
Treatment for
‘Foreign Sales
Corporations’ (US –
FSC) (III.4)

108

Special Tax
Treatment for FSCs

AB

50)

US v. Chile: Taxes
on Alcoholic
Beverages (III.2)

109

Internal taxes on
certain alcoholic
beverages

51)

EC v. Chile Taxes
on Alcoholic
Beverages (Chile –
Alcoholic
Beverages) (III.2)

110

Additional tax on
alcoholic beverages

AB

52)

EC v. US:

136

US Antidumping

AB

Chile’s Transitional
System and its New
System for taxation of
distilled alcoholic
beverages was
inconsistent with
Article III.2 of GATT
1994.
The Appellate Body
upheld the Panelʹs
finding that the so‐called
ʺfair market value ruleʺ
under the ETI Act
accorded less favourable
treatment to imported
products than to like US
domestic products in
violation of Art. III.4 by
providing a
ʺconsiderable impetusʺ
to use domestic products
over imported products
for the tax benefit under
the ETI Act.
The US contended that
this differential
treatment of imported
spirits violates Article
III.2 of GATT 1994.
Chile’s Transitional
System and its New
System for taxation of
distilled alcoholic
beverages was
inconsistent with
Article III.2 of GATT
1994.
Claim under conditions.

48)

158

P

53)

54)

55)

56)

57)

58)

Antidumping Act
1916 (US – 1916
Act) (III.4)
Japan v. Canada:
Certain automotive
industry measures
(Canada – Autos)
(III.4)
EC v. Canada:
Certain measures
affecting the auto
motive industry
(Canada – Autos)
(III.4)
EC v. Argentina:
Measures affecting
the export of bovine
hides and the
import of finished
leather (Argentina –
Hides and Leather)
(III.2)
US v. EC:
Protection of
trademarks and
geographical
indications for
agricultural
products and
foodstuffs (EC –
Trademarks and
Geographical
Indications) (III.4)
US v. Philippines:
Measures affecting
trade and
investment in the
motor vehicle
sector (Philippines
– Motor Vehicles)
(III.4)
Hungary v.
Romania: Import

Act 1916

Conditions not fulfilled.

139

Automotive
industry measures

AB

142

Measures affecting
the automotive
sector

AB

155

Export prohibition
on raw and semi‐
tanned bovine
hides, “additional
VAT” on the import
of products,
“advance turnover
tax”
Protection of
trademarks and
geographical
indications for
agricultural
products and
foodstuffs

P

Argentine tax
inconsistent with III.2.

P

Regulation found to be
inconsistent with III.4.

174

The Panel judged the
application of the CVA
requirements to be
inconsistent with Article
III.4 of GATT 1994.
The Panel judged the
application of the CVA
requirements to be
inconsistent with Article
III.4 of GATT 1994.

195

Certain Measures in
the Motor Vehicle
Development
Program

Panel established, not yet
composed.

240

Decree prohibiting
the import of wheat

Withdrew request for
establishment of panel.

159

Prohibition on
Wheat and Wheat
Flour (III.4)
59)

60)

61)

62)

Brazil v. US:
Equalizing excise
tax imposed by
Florida on
processed orange
and grapefruit
Products (US –
Florida Excise Tax)
(III.2, III.4)
Canada v. EC:
Measures affecting
the approval and
marketing of
biotech products
(EC – Approval and
Marketing of
Biotech Products)
(III.4)
Honduras v.
Dominican
Republic: Measures
Affecting the
Importation of
Cigarettes (III.2,
III.4)
Korea v. EC:
Measures Affecting
Trade in
Commercial Vessels
(EC – Commercial
Vessels) (III.4)

186

250

and wheat flour
which does not
meet certain quality
requirements
Equalizing Excise
Tax

292

Measures affecting
the approval and
marketing of
products that
contain, consist of,
or are produced
from, genetically
modified organisms

300

Selective
Consumption Tax,
stamps to be
affixed, bond as a
prerequisite to
importing

301

Subsidies in favor
of commercial
vessels

MAS stands for mutually agreed solution.

160

MAS.186

P

Judicial Economy.

No panel established.

P

Regarding the claim of
Korea under Article III.4
of the GATT 1994, the
Panel found that the
subsidies authorized
under the TDM
Regulation were covered
by the notion of “the
payment of subsidies
exclusively to domestic
producers” in Article
III.8(b) of the GATT 1994,

63)

Honduras v.
Dominican
Republic: Measures
affecting the
importation and
internal sale of
cigarettes
(Dominican
Republic – Import
and Sale of
Cigarettes) (III.2,
III.4)

302

64)

US v. Mexico: Tax
Measures on Soft
Drinks and Other
Beverages (Mexico
– Taxes on Soft
Drink) (III.2, III.4)
EC v. US:
Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (US – Large
Civil Aircraft) (III.4)
EC v. Brazil:
Measures Affecting
Imports of
Retreaded Tires
(Brazil – Retreaded
Tires) (III.4)

308

65)

66)

67)

US v. Turkey:
Measures affecting
the importation of
rice (Turkey – Rice)
(III.4)

Rules, procedures,
and administrative
practices to
determine the value
of imported
cigarettes for the
purpose of
applying the
Selective
Consumption Tax;
stamps be affixed to
cigarette packages;
bond pursuant to
imports
Soft drinks and
other beverages
that use any
sweetener other
than cane sugar

AB

AB

317

US subsidies to
Boeing

332

Import ban on
retreaded and used
tires

AB

334

Import licenses for
rice

P

161

P

and thus were not
“prevented” by Article
III.
Stamp requirement and
bond requirement to be
inconsistent with III.4;
Selective consumption
tax inconsistent with
III.2, first sentence.

Soft drink tax and
distribution tax to be
inconsistent with III.2
and III.4.

Second Complaint.

The measure maintained
by the Brazilian State of
Rio Grande do Sul in
respect of retreaded
tyres, Law 12.114, as
amended by Law 12.381,
was inconsistent with
Art. III.4.
Turkeyʹs requirement
that importers must
purchase domestic rice,
in order to be allowed to
import rice at reduced‐
tariff levels under the
tariff quotas, accorded

68)

69)

70)

71)

72)

73)

74)

EC v. China:
Measures affecting
import of
automobile parts
(China – Auto
Parts) (III.2, III.4)
US v. China:
Measures affecting
import of
automobile parts
(China – Auto
Parts) (III.2, III.4)
Canada v. China:
Measures affecting
import of
automobile parts
(China – Auto
Parts) (III.2, III.4)
US v. EC –
Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (III.4)
EC v. India –
Measures Affecting
the Importation and
Sale of Wines and
Spirits from the EC
(III.4)
EC v. US –
Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (III.4)
EC v. Canada – Tax
Exemptions and
Reductions for
Wine and Beer

less favorable treatment
to imported rice than
that according to like
domestic rice, in a
manner inconsistent with
Article III.4 of the GATT
1994.
Measures to be
inconsistent with III.2
and III.4.

339

Measures affecting
Imports

AB

340

Measures affecting
Imports

AB

Measures to be
inconsistent with III.2
and III.4.

342

Measures affecting
Imports

AB

Measures to be
inconsistent with III.2
and III.4.

347

Measures affecting
trade in Large Civil
Aircrafts

A panel was composed,
but its authority lapsed
in 2006.

352

Measures Affecting
the Importation and
Sale of Wines and
Spirits

A panel was composed,
but its authority lapsed
in 2008.

353

Measures affecting
trade in Large Civil
Aircrafts

354

Tax Exemptions
and Reductions for
Wine and Beer

162

AB

Partially adopted.

MAS.

75)

76)

77)

78)

79)

80)

81)

(III.2, III.4)
US v. China –
Certain Measures
Granting Refunds,
Reductions or
Exemptions from
Taxes and other
Payments (III.4)
Mexico v. China –
Certain Measures
Granting Refunds,
Reductions or
Exemptions from
Taxes and other
Payments (III.4)
US v. India –
Additional and
Extra – Additional
Duties on Imports
from the US (III.2,
III.4)
US v. China –
Measures Affecting
Trading Rights and
Distribution
Services for Certain
Publications and
Audiovisual
Entertainment
Products (III.4)
Canada v. EC –
Certain Measures
Prohibiting the
Importation and
Marketing of Seal
Products (III.4)
Philippines v.
Thailand – Customs
and Fiscal
Measures on
Cigarettes from the
Philippines
EC v. India –

358

359

360

363

Tax Exemptions,
Refunds, and other
Payments to
Chinese Enterprises
to purchase
Domestic goods
instead of Imported
Tax Exemptions,
Refunds, and other
Payments to
Chinese Enterprises
to purchase
Domestic goods
instead of Imported
Two border
charges, consisting
of the ʺAdditional
Dutyʺ and ʺExtra‐
Additional Dutyʺ
on imports
Restricted Trading
Rights and
Distribution
Services for Certain
Publications and
Audiovisual
Entertainment
Products

369

Measures
Prohibiting the
Importation and
Marketing of Seal
Products

371

Various Customs
and Fiscal
Measures on
Cigarettes

380

Discriminatory

163

MAS.

MAS.

AB

Judicial Economy.

AB

Measure to be
inconsistent with XX(a)
and III.4 of GATT and
XVI and XVII of GATS.

Panel not yet established.

AB

AB found Thailand
violates its obligations by
exempting only resellers
of domestic cigarettes
from obligation to pay
VAT.
Panel not yet established.

82)

Certain taxes and
other Measures on
Imported Wines
and Spirits
Canada v. US –
Certain Country of
Origin Labeling
(COOL)
Requirements

Taxation on
Imported Wines
and Spirits
384

83)

US v. China –
Grants, Loans and
other incentives

387

84)

Mexico v. China –
Grants, Loans and
other incentives

388

85)

Guatemala v. China
– Grants, Loans and
other incentives

390

86)

Philippines –
Distilled Spirits

396

Certain Country of
Origin Labeling
(COOL)
Requirements on
Beef and Pork and
COOL
Implementation
Grants, Loans, and
other incentives to
Chinese Enterprises
that are related to
their Export
Performance
Grants, Loans, and
other incentives to
Chinese Enterprises
that are related to
their Export
Performance
Grants, Loans, and
other incentives to
Chinese Enterprises
that are related to
their Export
Performance
Discriminatory
Taxation on
Imported Distilled
Spirits

164

P

Measure to be
inconsistent with 2.1 and
2.2 of TBT and X.3(a) of
GATT 1994 and Judicial
Economy on Art. III.4 of
GATT.
Panel not yet established.

Panel not yet established.

Panel not yet established.

AB

Philippines violates its
obligations by taxing
spirits made of cane
sugar (predominantly
produced in the home
market) lower than
spirits made of
nondesignated goods
(predominantly
produced abroad).
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